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Abstract  
 
 
This study explores public opinion on land reform in South Africa using data gathered 
by Ipsos-Markinor in nationally representative public opinion surveys conducted in 
2004 and 2007, and by an elite survey conducted by Centre for International and 
Comparative Politics in 2007.  
 
This study explores whether public opinion on land reform reveals distinct trends that 
correlate with the selected socio-demographic variables of race, language, party 
affiliation and social status. It is hypothesised that there is an identifiable correlation 
between these independent variables and the opinions of respondents on land reform, 
with specific groups tending to support land reform whilst other groups tend to reject 
it. 
 
The data analyses yielded results that highlight distinct trends in public opinion on 
land reform. Responses are clustered around specific characteristics of the 
independent variables and point towards distinct groups having specific views on land 
reform.  
 
From this set of findings it is inferred that public opinion on land reform illustrates 
that certain groups of South Africans have contrasting views of how the rule of law 
and transformation should find expression in a democratic society. These 
fundamentally differing opinions on key elements of democracy illustrate that South 
Africans hold diverging opinions of what constitutes democracy, through adherence 
to either the liberal or the liberationist model of democracy. These models were 
previously identified as two distinct and diverging interpretations of democracy in 
South Africa and were labelled as such. These two models uphold sharply divergent 
normative prescriptions of democracy, as well as contrasting prescriptions for various 
policies of democratic consolidation, including that of land reform.  
 iii 
Opsomming 
 
Openbare mening oor grondhervorming in Suid-Afrika word in hierdie studie 
ondersoek. Die ondersoek maak gebruik van data ingewin deur Ipsos-Markinor in 
nasionaal verteenwoordigende openbare meningsopnames uitgevoer in 2004 en 2007, 
asook ‘n elite opname wat in 2007 uitgevoer is deur die Sentrum vir Internationale en 
Vergelykende Politiek (CICP).  
 
Hierdie studie ondersoek die moontlikheid dat openbare mening ten opsigte van 
grondhervorming met geselekteerde sosio-demografiese veranderlikes (ras, taal, 
politieke affiliasie en sosiale status) korreleer. Die hipotese is dat daar ‘n 
identifiseerbare korrelasie is tussen hierdie onafhanklike veranderlikes en die menings 
van die respondente ten opsigte van grondhervorming en dat daar spesifieke groepe is 
wat grondhervorming ondersteun en ander nie.  
 
Analise van die data toon duidelike tendense in openbare mening oor die kwessie van 
grondhervorming. Menings korreleer wel met die onafhanklike veranderlikes en wys 
daarop dat bepaalde sosiale groepe uiteenlopende standpunte het oor 
grondhervorming. 
  
Uit hierdie stel bevindinge maak die navorser die afleiding dat daar, binne die Suid-
Afrikaanse bevolking, groepe is met uiteenlopende menings oor hoe die oppergesag 
van die reg en transformasie binne ‘n demokrasie uitgeleef moet word. Hierdie 
fundamenteel kontrasterende menings ten opsigte van hierdie sleutelelemente van 
demokrasie, illustreer dat Suid-Afrikaners uiteenlopende menings oor demokrasie het 
in die vorm van ondersteuning van hetsy die liberale- of bevrydingsmodelle van 
demokrasie. Hierdie modelle is as twee duidelike en afsonderlike interpretasies van 
demokrasie voorgestel en beskryf. Hierdie twee modelle verteenwoordig skerp 
uiteenlopende normatiewe beskouinge oor demokrasie, en bied daarmee saam, 
botsende beleidsvoorskrifte aan vir demokratiese konsolidering, insluitende beleid oor 
grondhervorming.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The following study explores trends in public opinion on land reform. The 
transformation process espoused by the African National Congress (ANC), which 
includes the government’s land reform programme, forms a key component of their 
rhetoric on democracy in South Africa. It is acknowledged within the field of political 
science that the principle of ‘rule of law’ is a critical aspect of democratic forms of 
government. Taken together, transformation and the rule of law therefore constitute 
major aspects of democracy in South Africa. It is inferred by the researcher that, by 
assessing public and elite opinion on land reform and its relationship with the rule of 
law and transformation, one can align public and elite opinion with different 
normative models of democracy identified in South Africa. Within the South African 
context there are two diverging and distinct models of democracy — the liberal 
model and the liberationist model (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996). These models can 
find resonance in a broader cultural framework that proposes two distinct cultural 
orientations, a low-context culture and a high-context culture.  
 
It will be investigated to what extent South Africans subscribe to the liberationist 
model of democracy or to the liberal model of democracy. This will be done through 
an assessment of public and elite opinion regarding land reform and its relationship to 
the rule of law and transformation.  
 
The study comprises firstly of a theoretical component which creates a framework 
with which to understand and interpret views on land reform, and by extension, 
democracy in South Africa. The ruling ANC’s conception of democracy is 
subsequently investigated in order to determine the normative conception of 
democracy to which they subscribe. The second and empirical component of the study 
aims to use the theoretical models of democracy in the interpretation and analyses of 
public opinion on land reform and its relationship to the rule of law and 
transformation. Empirical data was obtained from nationally representative public 
opinion surveys, as well as an elite survey, in order to ascertain which normative 
model of democracy the public and elites adhere to. 
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It is proposed that by assessing the views of not only the ruling party, but also of the 
public and elites, it would be possible to ascertain which normative models of 
democracy have the largest popular support in South Africa. This in turn, will allow 
the researcher to draw conclusions on the prospects of consolidating the democratic 
regime in South Africa, as the two models have divergent prescriptions for land 
reform in particular, and for democratic consolidation in general.  
 
1.1 Background and rationale 
 
South Africa’s history of unequal land distribution dates back to the 17th century with 
the arrival of the first Europeans. As was common amongst most European colonies, 
the indigenous population was at the whim of the coloniser and experienced loss of 
land, livestock and life to pave the way for colonial development. In the early 20th 
century, a range of legal documents was created to ensure that ownership of land be 
concentrated in the hands of the white minority which served to institutionalise the 
practice of unequal land distribution. The Land Act of 1913 prohibited the African 
population from owning any land outside of the Homelands and ensured that the 
largest segment of the African population would remain landless. The 1936 Native 
Trust Act stipulated what type of farming was allowed within the reserves, such as 
amount of cattle allowed. The 1936 Act also formed the basis upon which many 
forced evictions of Africans took place. Those Africans who managed to slip through 
the system and hold on to land, were caught by the second wave of legislation, the 
Group Areas act of 1950 (Bosman, 2007:2).  
 
These legislative watersheds formed the basis of dividing the South African society 
into a white landed class and a black landless one. This legacy of unequal land 
distribution is still evident today, and the current government wishes to address the 
inequalities in land ownership through the land reform programme. These policies 
form part of the larger process of transformation espoused by the ANC led 
government that is in turn part of the entire democratic project in South Africa. 
 
The political problem of land reform is a serious issue: South Africans have only to 
look at the path travelled by our Zimbabwean neighbours to understand what effect 
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poorly implemented land reform can have on society. In the Zimbabwean case, it has 
led to large scale social and economic unrest, and in many ways has created a failed 
democratic project. There is therefore a serious need for the government to address 
the issue of land reform, as neglecting the issue can have grave implications for the 
future of our democracy. 
 
Despite the initiation land reform the pattern of land ownership has remained racially 
divided with most agricultural land remaining in the hands of white farmers. The slow 
pace of land reform is a cause of concern and it is estimated that in the last 15 years 
less than 5% of agricultural land has been transferred to African owners (Hall, 2009). 
The government has set a target of transferring 30% of agricultural land into the hands 
of black South Africans. It is clear that, at the current pace of land reforms, the target 
will not be reached by the 2014 target date (Bosman, 2007:10-11).  
 
Due to the sluggish pace of reform and difficulties in implementing desired 
programmes, the government is reconsidering the willing-buyer willing-seller 
principle (WBWS). This principle upholds property rights and individual’s right to 
contests land claims in court. Adhering to the land reform policies, as they are 
currently formulated, protects the rights of landowners as well as the landless, thus 
respecting the Constitutional rights of all citizens and upholding the rule of law. The 
rule of law can come under threat if the government abandons the WBWS principle 
and adopts a more communitarian and drastic pursuit in attempting to achieve the 
desired land reform target, such as expropriation without fair compensation. To date, 
only a few farms have been expropriated and it is possible that the figure may rise 
(Masinga and Hammond, 2008). This does not bode well for the rule of law and 
prospects for consolidating South African democracy.  
 
Bosman (1997) cites a few relevant reasons as to why the current policies have not 
achieved the desired effect. These include the fact that the majority of black South 
Africans do not want to farm; South Africa is no longer a rural society; the 
agricultural sector simply cannot achieve the desired economic objectives hoped for 
by the government, as it no longer employs enough people or comprises a large 
enough portion of the GNP; rising prices of arable land; state ineptness including 
under-spending of budgets; inadequate capacity and large amounts of vacant posts all 
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contribute to the poor performance of land reform in the Republic (Bosman, 1997: 30-
39). State ineptness is a factor sited by Gran (2007) as being a major factor hindering 
the process of reform. It should be evident that there are a myriad of problems 
concerning the goals set by the government and their inability to achieve them. As it 
currently stands, poor government management of land reform is placing greater 
pressure on the transformation and the democratization process as a whole.  
 
Even though South Africa will be entering its 17th year of democratic rule in 2010, 
and it is acknowledged that it is a relatively short period of time within the context of 
democratic regimes, there still exists some doubt whether South Africa’s democracy 
will consolidate or become what Zakaria (1997) has labelled an illiberal democracy. 
Since the transition from authoritarian minority rule, South Africa has enjoyed a 
relatively stable and prosperous democratic system governed by what many regard as 
one of the most advanced liberal constitutions in the world (Mattes, 2002: 24). Four 
national elections have been held, which have all been deemed free and fair, wherein 
the ANC has achieved substantial victories in every election.  
 
Positive aspects of the South African democracy include an economy that has shown 
a steady growth rate with moderate inflation and the implementation of restrained 
macro economic policy. Furthermore, the emergence and growth of a black middle 
class (Rivero, du Toit and Kotze, 2003:23) along with considerable improvements in 
basic service delivery have given the current regime credibility amongst the South 
African population. Although substantial gains have been made by the democratic 
regime in South Africa, there are many factors that cast doubt on the future of South 
Africa’s democracy and prospects for its consolidation and survival.  
 
Along with the slow pace of land reform discussed above, Mattes (2002) argues that 
alongside a positive economic growth rate, the economy has shed approximately 
500 000 jobs. Official unemployment figures for the second quarter of 2009 cite the 
unemployment rate at 23.6% (STATSSA, 2009). Income inequality is also increasing 
amongst the entire population, including amongst black South Africans (Rivero et al. 
2003). The high unemployment rate and widening income gaps are causes for 
concern. On an institutional level, the continuing pursuit of democratic centralisation 
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and the pursuit of hegemony by the ANC is blurring the divide between party and 
state (Mattes, 2002; Giliomee, Myburg and Schlemmer, 2001).  
 
There are also some serious problems with governance such as the rising HIV/AIDS 
crisis and high crime rates (Mattes, 2002:26-28; du Toit, 2003:104). Furthermore, 
electoral dominance, sidelining minorities and opposition parties and placing certain 
issues above public debate are all traits that warrant concern (Giliomee et. al. 2001; 
Pretorius, 2006). Declining trust in the institutions of the state amongst South 
Africans is worrisome, as without public support, consolidating a democratic system 
becomes increasingly difficult (Garcia-Rivero, du Toit and Kotze, 2002:176-177).  
 
Along with these structural and institutional hurdles facing the South African 
democratization process, is an inherent disagreement amongst the public on what 
constitutes a democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001) investigated whether support for 
democracy in Africa is intrinsic or instrumental. The authors argue that intrinsic 
support for democracy is a commitment to democracy regardless of social or 
economic conditions, whilst instrumental support hinges on the government’s ability 
to provide substantive ends, such as jobs or basic services. Without material gains 
being awarded to them, many South Africans would stop supporting a democratic 
regime (Bratton and Mattes, 2001: 448). The authors found (Bratton and Mattes, 
2001: 445) that in South Africa there is a large disparity amongst racial groups in their 
support for democracy. Africans tend to equate democracy with the provision of 
material benefits, such as jobs, houses and increased incomes — their support for 
democracy is therefore instrumental. White South Africans tend to support democracy 
in intrinsic terms, supporting the procedural aspects of democracy, with specific focus 
on the protection of minority rights, regular elections, free speech and party 
competition. “[And] While many South Africans of all races say they accept the 
necessity of redistributing jobs, houses and incomes, blacks seem to focus more on 
‘equality of results’ while whites stress ‘equality of opportunity’” (Bratton and 
Mattes, 2001: 455).  
 
This study links up with that of Bratton and Mattes (2001) and will further investigate 
the inherent differences in how South Africans view democracy. This is done by 
examining public and elite opinion on land reform, and the implications of these 
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opinions for the rule of law and for policies of transformation. The significance of 
these implications will be spelt out by drawing on two particular models of 
democracy as a conceptual framework of interpretation. Gagiano and du Toit (1996) 
argue that there are two traditions on democracy within the South African context. 
The one is labelled the liberationist model and the other the liberal model of 
democracy.  
 
This is relevant to South Africa due to the relatively young nature of the democratic 
regime, and it can be argued that South Africa is in the midst of a transformation stage 
that is still defined in terms of the negotiated transition of the early 1990’s (du Toit, 
2003; du Toit 2001). Furthermore, within ANC rhetoric, transformation cannot be 
separated from the process of democratization, that is to say the ruling party tends to 
equate the two as indistinguishable processes that are complementary and are of equal 
relevance (du Toit, 2006: 4). Negotiation and transformation are therefore two 
inseparable concepts within the South African context and are intertwined in the 
milieu of democratic consolidation.  
 
The relevance of examining public and elite opinion in terms of the framework 
provided by these two models of democracy is that these models have different 
implications for the consolidation of democracy. Gagiano and du Toit (1996: 48) 
argue that the liberationist model does not distinguish between public and parochial 
interests, and runs the risk of degenerating into corruption. The liberationist model of 
democracy also poses threats to democratic survival through the threat it poses to 
constitutional liberalism (Zakaria, 1997). The fusion of party and state and the 
blurring of economic, social end political spheres of powers, opens the door to what 
Zakaria (1997) has labelled illiberal democracy. The danger is inherent to the fact that 
constitutional liberalism holds dearly the imperatives of property rights, the rule of 
law and the separation of powers whilst it is argued that illiberal democracy, is about 
the accumulation and use of power, and not necessarily about the protection of the 
above mentioned rights (Zakaria, 1997:30). 
 
It is against the backdrop of the future of the democratic regime, and diverging views 
on democracy in South Africa, that the issue of land reform is investigated. Land 
reform can be used to gauge state willingness to subscribe to the rule of law and the 
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constitutional rights that all South Africans should enjoy and it consequently serves as 
a barometer for the condition of our democracy and the prospect of democratic 
consolidation.  
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
Public opinion on land reform provides the researcher with an excellent case study for 
investigating divergent opinions of democracy. Land reform has political, social, 
economic and historical significance in South Africa due to the unequal distribution of 
land ownership. Land reform policies have bearing on important aspects of 
democracy in South Africa as it is part of the transformation project and is an 
exemplar of how the rule of law finds expression. In addition, land reform also 
engages important aspects of individual rights, most notably the right to own private 
property as enshrined in the Constitution of 1996. These aspects make land reform an 
adequate case study for investigating the main research question of this study.  
 
The underlying assumption of this study is that without agreement on normative 
definitions of democracy, there can be no consolidation of democracy. If there is an 
inherent disagreement amongst government and the people on what constitutes a 
democracy, how can democracy become consolidated? If the meanings ascribed to 
democracy are ambiguous and even competing, it would be erroneous to argue for 
democratic consolidation.  
 
1.3 Research question, hypothesis and objectives 
 
The overarching research question guiding this study is: Do South Africans have 
shared opinions on land reform? The hypothesis will be employed in the empirical 
component of the study to determine whether demographic factors (race and 
language), party affiliation and social standing correspond with respondents’ support 
or rejection of the government’s land reform policies and venture an answer to the 
proposed question.  
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It is hypothesised that that there is an identifiable correlation between public opinion 
on land reform and race, language, party affiliation and social status. This study 
explores whether public opinion on land reform forms distinct clusters that can be 
associated with the selected independent variables, with specific groups tending to 
support land reform whilst other groups tend to reject it. 
 
The main objective of the study is to investigate public opinion on land reform, and 
determine whether there are identifiable trends within the South African population 
within this process.  
 
1.4 Research design 
 
The study is descriptive in nature and will rely on qualitative and quantitative data. 
The qualitative data include academic journals, books, government publication, ANC 
documents, working papers, NGO papers and other relevant sources. The empirical 
data that will be used was obtained from nationally representative surveys conducted 
in 2004 and 2007 by the private survey research company Ipsos-Markinor. The 
surveys consisted of 2000 respondents from urban areas and 1500 respondents from 
rural areas. All respondents were 16 years of age and older and men and women are 
represented equally in the sample. All data was acquired through personal interviews. 
The results are weighted and projected onto the national demographic profile, and can 
be considered to be nationally representative. The sample error for the polls was 
between 0.72% and 1.66% (du Toit, 2006:8). The other data set that will be used is an 
elite survey conducted in 2007 by Ipsos-Markinor for the Centre for International and 
Comparative Politics (CICP) using face to face interviews with a structured 
questionnaire.  
 
The study employs secondary data analysis in order to address the hypothesis. Other 
recent studies which also employed the method of secondary quantitative data 
analysis to investigate or test theories include work by Garcia-Rivero (2006), Askvik 
(2008) and Leysens (2006). Databases often used in secondary analysis are the 
Afrobarometer and World Value Surveys. 
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The study by Leysens (2006) uses empirical data from the Afrobarometer to 
investigate Cox’s theory that the socially marginalised are a social force that could 
bring about political and economic transformation from below. Although the 
Afrobarometer survey is essentially designed to poll democratic consolidation in 
southern Africa, the items in the questionnaire cover a wide range of issues that are 
relevant to Cox’s theory of transformation initiated by the marginalised (2006:39).  
 
Other studies have been conducted using the same, albeit less extensive, datasets that 
this study employs in the quantitative section. Gerber (2004) and du Toit (2006) used 
the same dataset, but only had access to the first set of surveys conducted in 2004. It 
was found by du Toit (2006: 18) that democratic rule has different meanings to 
different South Africans. The author found that the low-context culture and high-
context culture models, identified by Cohen (1997), corresponded to certain views 
held by respondents, and that such views show a correlation with demographic 
factors. Gerber (2004: 66-68) found that demographic factors (race, party affiliation 
and province) do correspond with respondents’ views of land reform and the rule of 
law. Furthermore, Gerber found that there existed a divergence in what people 
believed democracy to be. Many respondents could be placed within the liberationist 
perspectives on democracy. The work of these authors has shown that there exists a 
difference amongst South Africans concerning the meaning of democracy and 
transformation.  
 
This study follows the same design as that followed by the researchers mentioned 
above, in that it utilises empirical data to investigate a proposed hypothesis or 
research question. In analysing survey data on public opinion on land reform this 
study will also allow an investigation into whether South Africans have a shared 
understanding of democracy.  
 
1.5 Delimitations 
 
This study uses limited data sets, that of public opinion surveys conducted in 2004 
and 2007 and an elite survey conducted in 2007. The land reform policies and 
developments in land reform under consideration in this study include only those from 
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the period 1994-2009. The research presented here is that of a Masters study, and has 
a limited scope. 
 
1.6 Limitations 
 
The following study is a descriptive study. It is based on empirical data of public 
opinion regarding land reform and as such is subject to a major and inherent limitation 
of all secondary data analysis in that the item construction is determined by the 
primary data collection process. The researcher does therefore not necessarily have 
any input in the construction of items or questions posed to respondents. It is the task 
of the researcher to ‘make sense’ of the hard data available through constructing 
conceptual models to answer questions or problems deemed relevant by the 
researcher.  
 
The study is limited to using only Afrikaans and English sources to gather 
information and create a context of understanding. The study focuses on specific 
aspects of democracy and only partially assesses public opinion regarding democracy, 
as all facets of democracy are not investigated or measured by the surveys. The nature 
of the item construction is confined to scale variables (Likert-scale) and statistical 
manipulation is limited to those techniques applicable to scale variables. The number 
of items posed to the respondents was limited to four and index construction is 
therefore deemed irrelevant.  
 
1.7 Analysis 
 
The data analysis will be done by using Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS). The survey data will be analysed using SPSS and due to the nature of the 
data, a longitudinal trend analysis of the survey data will be employed. Cross-
tabulation, Chi-square tests and Cramer’s V strength of association test will be 
employed. 
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The data analysis section of the thesis is unique, and although the 2004 public opinion 
survey has been used by Gerber (2004) and du Toit (2006) in other studies, the 
combined use of the 2004 and 2007 data sets is conducted for the first time. The elite 
section of the data for which the survey was conducted in 2007, was obtained from 
the CICP, and although it has been used in a publication (Kotze and Steenkamp, 
2009) the specific items used in this research project were not previously used. The 
elite data was provided by the CICP, but all graphs and analysis was done by the 
researcher. The combination of the 2004 and 2007 public opinion surveys and the 
2007 elite survey is original and has not been done before. All statistical analysis 
deductions and conclusions were done by the researcher, except in the case of the elite 
survey, for which the cross-tabulation data only was provided by Ms C-L Steenkamp 
of the CICP.  
 
1.8 Research methodology 
1.8.1 Unit of analysis and variable selection 
 
In the empirical section of the study, the unit of analysis will be individuals within the 
population of South Africa as represented in the survey data. 
 
The dependent variable of the study is attitudes or opinions held by respondents on 
land reform, which are gauged by the four items posed to respondents as discussed in 
chapter five. The independent variables used are race, language, party affiliation and 
social status. These variables were selected based on availability of the data and the 
nature of the primary research question. Specific racial, language and political groups 
have been subjected to different social, economic and political realities due to the 
nature of Apartheid and the legacy with which it has left South Africa. The use of the 
Elite component is based on the importance of elites in the theories on democracy. In 
both the work of Gagiano and du Toit (1996) and Dahl (1971), the role of elites in 
steering democracy is acknowledged. Although democracy is a form of government 
that gives expression to the greater population, it is the people in positions of power, 
rather than the general population, that have a greater influence on the course of 
democracy.   
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The independent variables are listed below: 
 
Race: This variable has four categories, white, black, coloured and Indian. The 
respondents indicated into which category they fell when the survey was conducted.  
 
Language: This variable has twelve categories, including the eleven official languages 
and one category of ‘other’. The respondents indicated into which category they fell 
when the survey was conducted.  
 
Party affiliation: This variable has twenty-two categories. The respondents were asked 
the following question, “If there were national elections tomorrow, which political 
party or organisation would you vote for?”. The answer to the question determined the 
political affiliation through a respondent’s willingness to vote for a specific party. The 
researcher selected only the political parties which are represented in parliament, and 
the category of ‘don’t know’ due to the high response rate in this category.  
 
Elites: Are defined as “…those people who fill top positions in the largest and most 
resource-rich political, governmental, economic, professional, communications and 
cultural institutions in society.” (Kotze and Steenkamp 2009:12). 
 
1.8.2 Conceptualisation 
1.8.2.1 Democracy: Liberal and liberationist perspectives 
 
Gagiano and du Toit (1996) identify two distinct and conflicting views of democracy 
in South Africa. These are the liberal and liberationist perspectives on democracy. 
The liberal view of democracy holds that the Constitution was created in order to 
liberate the individual from the oppressive Apartheid regime. During the years of 
Apartheid the concentration of power by social, economic and political elites and their 
total control of state apparatus resulted in the blurring of the divide between state and 
society. The oppressive nature of the regime was what is viewed in the liberal 
perspective as repressive and the importance of democracy lies in the protection of 
individual rights and in the establishment of an autonomous state apparatus. Rules and 
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procedures that ensure the separation of state, civil society and the economy are what 
these individuals hold as paramount to the democratic order (du Toit, 2006:3). 
 
The liberationist view differs substantially from the legal and procedural perspectives 
held by the liberals. For them, democracy formed part of a larger project of 
emancipation from centuries of colonial rule and years of Apartheid discrimination. 
They see democracy as a vehicle to prosperity and for them, the righting of previous 
injustices is paramount. This emancipation would be pursued in the policies of 
Affirmative Action, black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and the larger project of 
transformation. Democracy, to these individuals, is not essentially about laws and 
procedures enshrined in legal documents, but rather about their struggle towards 
economic, social and political emancipation. The rights of the individual upheld in the 
democratic constitution are secondary to those that enable the government to pursue 
the emancipation project (du Toit, 2006:3-4).  
 
1.8.2.2 Democratic consolidation 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, a definition of democratic consolidation as put 
forward by Leftwich will be used. Leftwich (2000: 135) argues that a democracy can 
seen to be consolidated when “…people, political parties and groups pursue their 
interests according to peaceful, rule-based competition, negotiation and cooperation, 
and where there is agreement that the succession of one government by another is 
decided by these means.” Other authors also stress the difficulties and requirements of 
democratic consolidation and include Schedler, 1998; Linz & Stepan, 1996 and 
Przeworski et al, 2000. 
 
1.8.2.3 Culture 
 
The proposed study will use the concept of culture as well as high-context and low-
context perspectives on culture, as defined by Cohen (1997). Cohen recognises that 
culture is a notoriously difficult concept to define and no single definition can capture 
the essence of all its aspects. Cohen (1997:11) identifies three main features of 
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culture. Firstly, it is not the trait of individuals, but of a society of which individuals 
form part. Secondly, it is acquired through acculturation or socialization. Finally each 
culture is a “unique and complex set of attributes subsuming every area of social 
life.”. Cohen argues that “…culture is fundamentally a property of information, a 
grammar of organizing reality, for imparting meaning on the world.” Culture should 
be seen as a sort of common sense that shapes a specific groups’ view of the world 
enabling them to live together as a society (Cohen, 1997:11-12).  
 
Cohen draws a distinction between two distinct frameworks in organising and 
understanding reality in a cultural sense. These he labels high-context and low-context 
cultures. High-context cultures are typified by the importance that is placed on the 
community, above that of the individual. Individual characteristics are subordinate to 
the communal framework. The social context is of utmost importance — negotiations 
do not take place within a vacuum but rather form part of a continuity of events that 
comprise the social understanding of reality. Negotiated events give the opportunity to 
assign meaning to aspects under negotiation, with strong reference to the historical 
context. There is a strong need in such cultures to sustain relationships and cohesion 
in order to maintain the communal framework. Hostile confrontations are to be 
avoided at all costs and “face” must be maintained at all times. Respect and deference 
are seen as fundamental to successful communication and the functioning of society 
(Cohen, 1997; du Toit 2003:105-106).  
 
In contrast to this perspective, Cohen identifies a low-context cultural perspective 
which is typified by the Anglo-American society. Here relationships are subordinate 
to transferring relevant information and ‘getting the job done’. Historical context 
holds little relevance and issues that are being negotiated are defined outside of 
historical context. Their meaning is not negotiable or subject to current relationships. 
The emphasis is on rules and regulations and contract style agreements that must be 
adhered to irrespective of a contextual continuum. Negotiation is future orientated 
instead of having a strong historical component (Cohen, 1997; du Toit, 2003:106).  
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1.8.2.4 Land reform 
 
This concept will be defined in terms of polices being implemented by the South 
African government. The larger social role of land reform, will for now, be omitted 
from the definition. The South African policy on land reform is based on three 
programmes: Land Restitution, Land Redistribution and Land Tenure reform.  
 
1.8.2.4.1 Land restitution 
 
Those who were removed from their property during apartheid are given back land or 
are compensated in monetary terms. In order to qualify for this form of restitution, 
applicants had to have been removed from their property after 1913. Claims are made 
to the Land Claims Court that decides on reasonable compensation (Bosman, 2007:7). 
 
1.8.2.4.2 Land redistribution 
 
The goal of this form of land reform is to increase the ownership of property by black 
South Africans. Previously disadvantaged people are allotted land for residential and 
productive ends. Redistribution of land is largely aimed at the rural poor, although 
urban land does fall under its purview. The main programme for implementing this 
type of reform is known as Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
(LRAD). A basic subsidy of R20 000 is given to those who successfully apply for 
land to serve as start-up capital for new owners (Bosman, 2007:7-8). 
 
1.8.2.4.3 Land tenure reform 
 
This section of land reform is aimed at securing the tenure of all South Africans. It 
was enacted to ensure the rights of all those who rent property and to ensure that their 
tenure is stable (Bosman, 2007:8).  
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1.8.2.5 The rule of law 
 
Sánchez-Guenca (2003:67-69) argues that the rule of law is a property of a political 
system. The rule of law exists only when there is compliance with the law and the law 
satisfies specific minimal requirements. The rule of law can be defined, as compliance 
with the law by all, when the law is general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, 
performable and stable (Sánchez-Guenca, 2003: 69; Maravall, 2003: 261). In essence, 
the rule of law refers to the idea that all interactions, at individual and institutional 
levels, must be conducted within legal constraints placed on them by the law, and that 
all are subject to the law. For the principle of rule of law to be valid, it must rest on a 
system of laws that are consistent with the above criteria.  
 
1.9 Chapter outline 
 
Chapter one provides a brief overview of the study. The chapter provides some 
background and rationale for the research project, as well as identifying the main 
research problem, hypothesis and objectives. The method followed, including the 
variable selection, is described and brief conceptualisations given.  
 
Chapter two examines the historical nature of land dispossession in South Africa from 
the arrival of Europeans to the onset of democracy in 1994. The chapter focuses on 
legal measures adopted that institutionalised the racial division of land in South 
Africa. Attention is paid to how successive powers, used state apparatus, including 
but not limited to legal measures, in order to entrench and ensure the racially divided 
nature of land possession in South Africa.  
 
Chapter three presents the theoretical framework with which democracy in South 
Africa, as well as the empirical data is investigated and analysed. Chapter three 
represents the main theoretical argument, which is subsequently applied in the 
chapters that follow.  
 
The nature of democracy in South Africa is described in chapter four. This is done by 
focussing on the ANC’s conception of democracy and related concepts. Attention is 
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also given to the nature and expression of ‘law’ in South Africa, through an 
investigation into certain elements of the Constitution of 1996. 
 
The fifth chapter presents the empirical data and the analysis thereof. The hypothesis 
and research question are tested in this chapter. 
 
The sixth, and final chapter, presents the concluding remarks.   
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Chapter 2: Historical exposition of land dispossession 
in South Africa 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Terreblanche (2002: 6) argues that any interpretation of South Africa’s history should 
be conducted from the standpoint of either racial domination; that of land deprivation 
or that of unfree labour, with the author focussing on the latter. Other authors (Bundy, 
1988 and Beinart, Delius and Trapido 1986) also highlight the role of unfree black 
labour, but emphasise that the dispossession of land was part of a larger process 
geared towards the creation of a controllable labour force. These authors argue that 
land dispossession not only served the purposes of racial ideology and political 
domination, but also played a role in early capitalist development of South Africa. 
The study at hand follows this argument, and although the merits of viewing South 
Africa’s history solely as a continual process of land dispossession (Drimie, 2003: 39) 
is noted, it is the researcher’s opinion that it will only offer a one-sided view of a 
multidimensional problem, of which solutions can only be offered to if one 
understands the issue in a broader sense.  
 
It is the aim of the following chapter to show how successive white-led state 
structures in South Africa had managed to dispossess the indigenous population of 
their land and subordinate them to the will of the ruling elite. By no means is the 
following section an attempt to a complete account of the South Africa’s long history 
of dispossession, it merely serves as an explanatory introduction towards the historical 
nature of land dispossession in South Africa; first under colonial power and later 
under the South African Union and the Apartheid state. The analyses will attempt to 
highlight all the important legislative acts that enabled whites to institutionalise the 
dispossession of land from the African population.  
 
The first section of the chapter focuses on the period of the first permanent European 
settlement in the Cape from 1652 to the mineral revolution of the late 19th century. 
The following section deals with transformation of Africans from a landed class to 
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landless, working semi-urban labour force, after the discovery of gold. Thereafter, a 
systematic look at the legislative assault on the African peasantry implemented by the 
Union of South Africa is conducted. The final section deals with the role of the 
Apartheid state in, not only institutionalising racist practise, but also in creating the 
impetus for a unified liberation movement in the form of the ANC. Throughout the 
chapter, attention is paid to the global context of South Africa’s development and 
dispossession is viewed as part of local and international capitalist development. 
Furthermore, the analysis is state centric in that it focuses on how successive state 
apparatus was able to dispossess Africans of land and create an African working class 
ensuring the profitability of capitalist development.  
 
2.2 Systematic colonial exploitation: 1652-1886 
 
The first permanent fortified structure erected by the Europeans at the Cape, under the 
auspices of the Vereenigde Oos-Indiese Compagnie (VOC), was a provision station at 
Table Bay. The VOC, a Dutch owned trading company akin to the modern day 
corporation, established a permanent settlement at the Cape to serve as a stopover 
station for weary sailors embarking on the six to eight month voyage to the East from 
Europe. At this time, the Cape was inhabited by pastoralists known as the KhoiKhoi, 
and a group of hunter-gatherers known as the San. Collectively these groups are 
known as the Khoisan. The Khoisan had lived in southern Africa for approximately 8 
000 years prior to European arrival. Initial contact between the VOC and the Khoisan 
was peaceful, as the VOC was dependant on the Khoisan for cattle and other fresh 
produce. The VOC employed a policy of trying not to disturb the indigenous way of 
life or cause a war, as this would be costly to the company. It is only after some of the 
employees of the VOC were released from their contracts and became independent 
farmers that a situation arose in which there was competition for land between the 
Europeans and the Khoisan which consequently  resulted in war between the VOC 
and Khoisan in 1659 (Williams, 1990: 10; Claasens, 1991:45-47).  
 
It took less than a decade of colonial presence in southern Africa for the first violent 
conflicts between settler and indigene to break out. The Europeans found that land 
was relatively easily occupied and their military superiority enabled them to eliminate 
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the Khoisan, either through integration into an agrarian labour force or through 
campaigns of violence (Terreblanche, 20002:9; Stadler, 1987:37). It is important to 
note that the Dutch felt that it was their right to claim the land as they saw fit, since 
they were of the opinion they had won a military victory and were therefore entitled 
to the spoils of war (Terreblanche, 2002: 155). This rationale of ownership through 
military conquest was a well established practise amongst European powers during 
this period as is evident in the historiography of many other regions in the world and 
can be viewed as part of the early stages of the development of the early global 
capitalist system. 
 
The Cape was not technically a Dutch colony, but rather the commercial property of 
the VOC trading company that was extended vast privileges by the Dutch 
government. It is with the backing of the Dutch government that the VOC was able to 
exercise extreme power. This came to bear in the mercantile measures adopted by the 
VOC at the Cape. These measures included tariffs, patronage and corruption to name 
but a few, and were all geared towards promoting the business interests of the VOC 
by promoting the sale and trade of their products which were produced as cheaply as 
possible. The VOC was, for all practical purposes, fulfilling the functions of the state 
and answered to no other entity except itself, with the sole purpose of maximising 
profits. The expansion of the agricultural sector was one of the main priorities of van 
Riebeeck and this occurred with rapid pace at the expense of the indigenes at the 
peninsula and surrounding countryside (Claasens, 1991:45-48).  
 
The acquisition of land through title deeds and land grants issued by the VOC was 
first initiated by Simon and later by Willem Adrian van der Stel. Land, in the form of 
freehold farms, was issued to freeburghers, farmers released from their VOC 
contracts, with farms increasing from 50 in 1682 to 435 in 1731 (Terreblanche, 
2002:155; Claasens, 1991: 45-48). This is a process that would be refined and 
perfected by British land companies during the latter stages of the 19th century. 
During this period agricultural production expanded at an unprecedented rate, all the 
while at the expense of Khoisan land ownership. Agricultural production increased to 
such an extent that the sector suffered from a lack of markets and a shortage of labour. 
The labour problem was overcome by employing slaves, either using imported slaves 
or subjugating the Khoisan as serfs (Bundy, 1988: 14-22). This process of subjugating 
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the Khoisan into the labour force was initiated in the early 18th century and had a 
profound impact on subsequent development of the agricultural, and later the mining 
sector in South Africa. The practice of turning a once independent landed indigene 
class from peasants to a coerced labour force is one of the most dramatic aspects of 
South Africa’s historical development. 
 
Although using the Khoisan as serfs was illegal, it was impossible for the VOC to 
exercise direct control over those farming on the frontiers as farmers moved further 
away from the Cape. Furthermore, the Khoisan were subjugated to the inboekstelsel, a 
system whereby Khoisan children could be booked in to the ownership of a white 
land-owning farmer and remained part his work force until the age of 25. This 
practise was continued with freeburghers’ expansion into the interior and applied to 
the KhoiKhoi remaining on tribal lands. The Trekboer and freeburghers moving 
further inland found it easy to conquer land, thanks to their superior military 
firepower. The smallpox epidemic of 1713 reduced the KhoiKhoi’s remaining 
numbers significantly and forced them into the labour force as a means of survival. 
This led to more extensive forms of inboekelingskap, as labour was in short supply 
and buying slaves was too expensive. The Trekboer deprived the Khoi of land and 
livestock as they moved further into the interior, and it was only when the Xhosa was 
encountered that this process became more difficult (Terreblanche, 2002: 163-168).  
 
Colonial expansion was given a further boost around the turn of the 19th century when 
greater demand for meat was fuelled by an increase in the number of ships visiting the 
Cape. The increased number of ships also solved the problem of the limited market 
experienced at the time. Also, as British involvement increased, the British Empire 
initially became a consumer of wool produced in the Western Cape and later sugar 
that was obtained from the Eastern Cape and southern parts of Kwazulu-Natal 
(Andreasson, 2001:189). The trade increase also fuelled the Trekboer expansion as 
they moved further into the Eastern and Northern Cape. The expansion into the 
Eastern Cape brought the first contact between settlers and the Xhosa as areas 
traditionally used by the Xhosa for grazing was claimed as colonial property for 
farming.  
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This heralded the beginning of the indenturement of Xhosas into the labour force with 
the Trekboere, being far away from administrative control, developing a sense of what 
Terreblanche (2002: 169) labels ‘reckless independence’. This was characterised by 
the idea that the land owner was law onto himself, a characteristic later embodied by 
the Voortrekkers who moved away from the British-controlled Cape in ever 
increasing numbers. The ‘reckless independence’ that developed would greatly 
influence how the Voortrekkers viewed themselves in relation to land and power as 
well as playing an important role in how power relations developed in South Africa.  
 
With the expansion of the colony entering regions of the Eastern and Northern Cape, 
a significant shift in power occurred at the Cape Colony, namely the onset of British 
control that lasted from 1795 to 1910. From 1795 to 1814 three power shifts occurred, 
with the Dutch retaking control in 1803-06 and the British subsequently regaining 
control in 1814, remaining in power until 1910 (Bundy 1988:30; Terreblanche, 
2002:179). For the purposes of this research study, these power shifts are regarded as 
negligible, as it did not impact directly on frontier policies regarding land, agriculture 
and labour relations with the indigenes.  
 
During the period of British domination, the British were the world superpower in 
what has been named the long nineteenth century by some historians (Terreblanche, 
2002:179; Wallerstein, 1988; Hobsbawm, 1979). This period was characterised by 
unprecedented increases in global production and consumption as well as great 
advancement in travel, communications and manufacturing technology. This was 
undoubtedly what Hobsbawm (1979) has labelled the ‘golden century’ of capitalist 
development. This era of unparalleled capitalist expansion was dominated by the 
British and the influence thereof did not go unnoticed in southern Africa. The British 
rearranged key factors of production (land, labour and capital) in such a way as to 
promote the interests of the British Empire. The reorganisation included the 
dismantling of mercantile practises initiated by the Dutch and the opening of markets 
for the British Empire.  
 
From 1814-1853, the British, under command of successive senior military officers, 
waged a bloody campaign on the eastern frontier of the colony against the Xhosa. The 
Xhosa people were ultimately defeated by the British military and were subsequently 
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deprived of their land and livestock at the expense of British expansion (Terreblanche, 
2002:181; Bundy, 1988: 31).  
 
With the areas of the Eastern Cape and parts of southern Kwazulu-Natal under the 
command of the British, the demand for products from the colony, especially cattle, 
wine and wool, could be met by the acquisition of these new areas. Under British 
command, settlers were granted land and holdings in order to produce the goods 
required by the British. Landholdings of whites increased in size and number, and 
large areas were given to single farming units. The demand for labour thus increased 
and was subsequently met by the indigenous people. The expansion of the agricultural 
sector was done at the cost of the locals together with the deprivation of their land that 
was transferred into the hands of a white land owning elite. The indigenous people 
were expected to pay rent to live on land previously owned by them, with rent being 
extracted either through the barter of goods or increasingly through labour (Bundy, 
1988:32, 48-54; Richardson, 1986: 137-143).  
 
The only significant legislation passed in the transitional phase of 1795-1814 was the 
Hottentot Proclamation of 1809, which legalised the practise of indentured African 
labour and forced those previously not indentured into the labour force for the first 
time (Terreblanche, 2002:184). The 1809 Hottentot Proclamation, also known as the 
Caledon Proclamation after the new British governor Earl Caledon, required a degree 
of strict administrative adherence. The proclamation required all Khoisan to specify a 
fixed place of residence. It also stated that, after the labour contract was completed 
and a worker wanted to change residence, the worker required a pass from their 
masters stating that they had completed their contract. In addition, if the person in 
question wanted to change residence from one district to another, they required the 
permission of the Landrost to do so (Terreblanche, 2002:184). Thus the 1809 
Proclamation can be seen as the first state-led attempt to control ownership and 
movement of the indigenous people in what would become South Africa, and it would 
be a pattern set to repeat itself. This involvement of the state would have far reaching 
repercussions, as it can be seen as one of the catalysts for the Great Trek. 
 
Missionary work into the interior of the country, along with the idea of a ‘Christian 
Civilisation’, coupled with a sense of western development embodied in the ideas of 
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Adam Smith’s free market and individual interest, led the British to lose sympathy 
towards coercive labour practices of the early 19th century. This coincided with the 
suspension of the slave trade in 1808 and the abolition of slavery in 1838. The 
ideological backing for abolishing slavery and coercive labour forms sprouted from 
the ideas of individual liberties and freedoms. It was however, coupled with a strong 
economic rationale that a free labour force would be more productive than a coerced 
one. This train of thought led to the issuing of Ordinance 50 of 1828, which in effect 
recalled the Caledon Proclamation of 1809. The dismantling of coercive labour forms 
did not curtail the demand for sufficient and controllable labour required for the 
profitable production of goods in the colonies of southern Africa. From the 1840’s 
onwards, free labour was acquired by depriving Africans’ access to land. The white 
controlled state machinery created conditions that forced Africans into the labour 
market, where they had no choice other than entering harsh labour contracts. 
Although the indigenes were released from slavery, they were subsequently forced 
into harsh labour contracts due to the lack of land and capital, ensuring a source of 
income (Terreblanche, 2002: 188-191; Bundy, 1988: 44-60).  
 
The sense of independence of the freeburghers and trekboere, as is reflected in their 
independent nature and behaviour, was tightly coupled to a patriarchal homestead 
configuration. In this relationship the patriarch was the head of not only the household 
but also of his workforce. The combination of a patriarchal homestead and a sense of 
total independence, led to many farmers seeing the 1809 proclamation as a direct 
state-led assault upon their personal domains. And even though the proclamation 
strengthened their legal hold over the indentured workers, the rights allocated to the 
workers were seen as an invasion of their private spheres. This state interference 
along with other factors, such as a shortage of land, labour and a sense of 
marginalisation, were all causes for the Great Trek of the 1830’s (Giliomee, 2003: 
144-149). The migration of many Afrikaner people saw the dominion of whites 
extend past the borders of the Eastern and Northern Cape, northwards to new areas 
that are known today as Free State, North West, Northern Kwazulu-Natal, Gauteng, 
Mpumalanga and southern Limpopo. There was for the first time a clear split amongst 
the European settlers in southern Africa, with British settlers expanding eastwards 
along the coast, while Afrikaners were moving towards the interior of South Africa.  
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It is neither the topic nor the scope of this research study to discuss in detail the 
different forms of labour subjugation and slavery in South Africa from 1652 to 
present. What is relevant is how the European powers, in the form of the Dutch and 
later the British, and subsequently the Afrikaners, managed to incorporate the 
indigenous population into a coerced labour force, either through outright slavery or a 
form of indentured labour, and that these forms of labour coercion were preceded by 
the loss of land of the indigenes. First their land was taken, and then they were forced 
to cultivate the land for the accumulation of wealth for the land owner. This pattern of 
land dispossession and forced labour that occurred at the Cape was subsequently 
repeated throughout the colonised areas of southern Africa, and was accelerated by 
the discovery by diamonds and gold in the latter half of the 19th century (Stadler, 
1987; Bundy, 1988; Beinhart et. al., 1986; Drimie, 2000).   
 
2.3 The Impact of the mineral and agricultural revolutions on 
Africans: 1886-1910 
2.3.1The Cape colonies: British assault on African peasantry 
1880’s-1910 
 
The abolition of slavery and serfdom had varying effects on labour patterns in the 
Western and Eastern Cape. In the Western Cape, most labourers stayed in their 
positions as there were very limited opportunities for them in the workforce. In the 
Eastern Cape, many Africans sought refuge at the Kat River settlement or became 
deserters living outside the influence of whites. In addition, many Africans pursued a 
form of land tenant farming on white-owned land. This led, paradoxically to the 
disowning of land, to an overall growth of the African peasantry from the 1840’s until 
the early 20th century (Bundy, 1988: 71-81). During this period, the demand for 
labour rose dramatically which led to a series of laws and acts to be passed in the 
Cape colonies, ensuring that a docile and coercible labour force could be commanded. 
 
From about 1860 to 1910, a systematic legislative assault was made on those Africans 
managing to stay outside the lure of the labour market. Africans who managed to stay 
out of the labour force were living as subsistence farmers on white or crown-owned 
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land. They were producing enough goods to sell on the local markets, making the rent 
demanded by the white land owner. This was the situation in the Eastern Cape and 
Natal, where large numbers of peasant farmers had managed to slip the noose of 
restrictive labour practices. These peasants were in the form of labour tenants, rent 
tenants or share-croppers. This would however be undone by the British colonial 
administration who, fuelled by the mining and subsequent agricultural revolutions  of 
the late 19th and early 20th century, had it in their best interest to transform landed 
Africans into a landless, working class (Bundy, 1988:134-140; Terreblanche, 2002: 
204-210).  
 
The Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1841 bound former slaves, described as 
‘people who may be inclined to lead an idle life’, to strict contracts and the breaking 
thereof was treated as a criminal offence (Terreblanche, 2002:196). The appointment 
of Sir Harry Smith in 1847 saw an increase in the intensity with which the African 
‘problem’, that of insufficient labour, was dealt with. For Sir Smith, one of his major 
duties was to undermine the power of the chiefs and control them via colonial 
authorities. The Masters and Servants Act of 1856 tied labourers to a five-year labour 
contract and imposed severe punishments for breach of contract. A year later, the 
Kaffir Employment Bill of 1857 was passed in parliament that further strengthened 
the idea of long term contracts, making it mandatory for all Xhosa work-seekers to 
sign a contract of indentureship (Terreblanche, 2002: 197-201). In addition, the series 
of Location Acts passed in 1869, 1876 and 1884, were all aimed at reducing the 
numbers of rent-paying African tenants on white-owned land (Bundy, 1988:78).  
 
In 1894, the Cape parliament passed the Glen Grey act. This act stipulated that only a 
selected number of Africans could own land in certain ‘Bantu areas’ through the 
allocation of individual and communal land tenure. This system ensured that there 
would always be a part of the African population living in the Glen Grey district that 
would not be able to acquire land, and would consequently be forced to become part 
of the labour force. The Glen Grey act was designed to ensure that the Glen Grey 
district would be able to provide a steady labour force to the Cape colonies (Bundy, 
1988:135; Stadler, 1987: 39; Terreblanche, 2002: 254). In conjunction with the Glen 
Grey act, which had focussed on minimising the amount of arable land available to 
Africans and on securing a labour supply, were those acts focussing on Africans 
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squatting on white-owned land. These include Act 30 of 1899 that permitted farmers 
to keep Africans on their farms only in the form of permanent employment. Act 32 of 
1909 further narrowed definitions of labourers and was more stringently applied than 
previous Location Acts (Bundy, 1988: 135-137). The Location Acts and other 
restrictive legislation were being enforced more successfully as state capacity 
increased which included the creation of a police force to ensure laws would be 
adhered to. Act 32 of 1909 led to large scale evictions and the removal of people from 
farms and was one of the first acts of state-led removals of indigenes.    
 
2.3.2 The Transvaal and Orange Free State: The Afrikaner 
assault on African peasantry 1880’s-1910 
 
The previous sections highlight the effective nature of the British state machinery in 
creating a coercible labour force through the dispossession of land in the Cape 
colonies. This was done through the passing and, more importantly, the 
implementation of successive laws and acts aimed at both African farmers and 
squatters. The situation in the interior of the country, under the control of the 
Voortrekkers, was somewhat different. The Voortrekkers defeated the Ndebele and 
Zulus before 1840, and created the Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free 
State. The Afrikaners found it relatively easy to take large parts of land from the 
African tribes, but had more difficulty in turning them into a docile labour force. This 
can be attributed to the weak political and economic nature of the Boer Republics. In 
addition, the discovery of diamonds (1867) and, more importantly gold (1886), 
opened new markets that enabled Africans to farm with relative success. It is only 
after the creation of the Union in 1910, that the state managed to dismantle African 
peasantry in the interior of southern Africa (Terreblanche, 2002:219; Bundy, 
1988:197-200).  
 
Labour relations in the interior of southern Africa assumed the nature of those in the 
Cape prior to British involvement — a patriarchal homestead configuration with the 
farmer viewing the workforce as part of his domain. This pattern of labour 
configuration stayed in place until after the Anglo-Boer war. As stated above, the 
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weak state capacity of the Boer Republics made it difficult to turn Africans into a 
docile labour force. The Voortrekkers easily deprived indigenes of their land and in 
the Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State roughly 850 000 hectares of 
land was set aside for Africans, with Voortrekkers claiming approximately 60 million 
hectare. Despite the limited land set aside for them, Africans still managed to practice 
forms of agriculture with relative success (Bundy, 1998: 198-9; Terreblanche, 2002: 
219-20, 228-9). The situation in the two Republics concerning the passing of laws, 
bills and acts, was not nearly as advanced as in the Cape. Apart from the 1887 
Squatters Law which stated that a farmer was not allowed to have more than five 
squatter families on his farm, not many other laws appearing on the statute could be 
implemented with great success. The Squatters Law was enacted to prevent the 
owners of large farms from becoming rich off rent received from Africans.  
 
Very few other significant legislation was passed prior to the Anglo-Boer War of 
1899-1902 and African peasant farming experienced a growth from the period of 
1880’s (commencement of mining) to about 1910 (Bundy, 1988:209-210; 
Terreblanche, 2002:242). This can be ascribed, in part, to the British’s war practice of 
the burning of pastoral lands and homesteads and the destruction of livestock, leaving 
many Afrikaners without the means to cultivate their land. Everything was destroyed 
and the Afrikaners’ position vis-à-vis the Africans, was such that they were in direct 
competition in the labour market. The creation of these two competing working 
classes would have resounding and long lasting consequences for South Africa 
(Terreblanche, 2002:245).  
 
African peasant farmers were able to acquire land vacated by Afrikaners after the war 
and were, in many cases, able to productively farm large swaths of agricultural land. 
The British government was even willing to lift the ban on Africans owning land and 
this created a substantial African landed peasantry on the higveld in the years after the 
war (Bundy, 1988: 210). Thus the situation in the Republics of the Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State can be summarized as one in which Africans experienced some 
freedoms concerning agricultural production and land ownership; the creation of two 
competing working classes, African and Afrikaners; and the increase in the demand 
for cheap labour fuelled by the mineral revolution.  
 
 29
2.3.3 The effect of the mining industry on land and labour 
relations 
 
The discovery of diamonds in 1867 and, more importantly, gold in 1886 at the 
Witwatersrand, heralded a new age in South African history. The mineral and 
subsequent agricultural revolutions would have the most profound impact on African 
labour and land relations in South Africa. The discovery of diamonds and gold gave 
the British the impetus to push for a federation of South African colonies under the 
control of the British Empire. The Anglo Boer war waged from 1899-1902 was one 
fought for the control of the gold deposits, as well as for the British to gain control of 
the South African labour force (Legassick, 1995:46; Wolpe, 1995: 62).  
 
During the period of 1886-1905, land ownership was increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a few Afrikaner notables and in mining and land companies controlled by the 
British. These groups entered into what Terreblanche (2002:241) labels the alliance 
between ‘gold and maize’. Many other authors (Bundy, 1988:205; Legassick, 
1995:46-48l; Wolpe, 1995: 62-63; Bernstein, 1996:4-5) highlight the importance of 
this alliance. It was this alliance that created a condition favourable to the forming of 
the South African Union in 1910. This alliance also made it possible to initiate a 
concerted drive towards the creation of a single state apparatus that had at its fore the 
goal to transform Africans into a stable workforce for the mining sector, thereby 
boosting capitalist development. While the British wished to dismantle standing 
labour and land relations that made it possible for Africans to stay outside of the 
labour force, the Afrikaners wished to commercialize and capitalise their farming 
practises, with both requiring cheap labour for the initiatives to be practised 
profitably.  
 
A large, cheap and totally controllable labour force was required to secure the 
profitability of the gold-mining sector for at least the first 50 years of its existence. 
The price of gold was fixed externally and had no bearing on the actual cost of 
production. Mining gold profitably required a large supply of cheap labour and, even 
though it was the world’s largest known deposit, the quality of ore grades was poor.  
As surface ore became depleted deep level mining ensued, necessitating site crusher 
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and extractor plants to create a marketable product. As this became the only way to 
mine gold, greater capital investment was required, resulting in big companies being 
the only ones able to mine gold profitably. Within this scenario, labour was the one 
element of cost that could be controlled and consequently control over recruitment 
and living conditions of labourers became important in the assurance of profitability 
(Stadler, 1987: 38). 
 
During this period, the Chamber of Mines set up the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association which recruited labour on behalf of all the mines and distributed the 
labour equally. Mineworkers signed contracts that stipulated nine months work and 
three months ‘rest’ in the homelands, areas set aside by the state as Africa areas. 
When working at the mine, workers were supplied with accommodation and food in 
barrack-like quarters, which enabled management to save on labour costs. During the 
‘rest’ period workers went to the homelands and were expected to engage in 
agricultural production that would provide them and their family with subsistence. 
The migrant labour system made it possible for mining industry to keep wage levels 
absurdly low. During the period 1910-1973 wages did not increase in real terms. It 
was only after 1973 that wages increased dramatically following large scale strikes 
and the increase in the price of gold (Stadler, 1987: 39-40; Terreblanche, 2002:257).  
 
The political and social structures within South Africa were severely changed by the 
advent of the mining industry. The goldfields created an effective economic 
absolutism that coerced thousands of African labourers into the mining sector. What 
was unique to the mining industry was that it required elaborate systems of labour 
recruitment and control that consequently transformed the social and political 
landscape of South Africa (Stadler, 1987: 37-38).  
 
The measures described above to secure cheap labour for the mining industry required 
close collaboration between the mining interests and the state. The companies that 
dominated the Kimberly diggings, and later the goldfields operations, had 
considerable influence with the Cape government during the 1880’s. The Glen Grey 
Act and the railway construction undertaken serve as examples of how influential the 
mining industry was in securing its needs (Stadler, 1987: 42; Terreblanche, 
2002:258). It was however, not a harmonious process where government and mining 
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needs completely coincided. The British wanted to secure the mining franchise for 
white foreigners on the goldfields and tension between the British and Transvaal 
government escalated. In 1899, the Republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State 
declared war on the British government. The subsequent defeat of the Boer Republics 
in 1902 advanced the interests of the mining industry and put it in a position to 
dominate political power for a quarter of a century.  
 
The war intensified the transformation of society that was begun with the opening of 
the goldfields, and paved the way for British colonial administration intent on 
modernising the state and developing the mining industry (Stadler, 1987: 43). Direct 
British governmental control did not last as long as was hoped for by the British 
colonial powers. By 1909 there were Afrikaner ministries in both the Orange Free 
State and the Transvaal with the Cape depending heavily on the Afrikaner vote for 
political power. The consequences of the war on the social structure of the Boers were 
immense —white people had become poor and landless after the war. Many whites 
migrated to mining areas in search of work. This urbanised Afrikaner population 
(mostly poor) would later provide the foundation on which the National Party would 
win the election in 1948 and institutionalise the system of Apartheid (Stadler 1987: 
45-51). Wallerstein (1986:111-113) points to the effects of British hegemonic decline 
during this period and the effect it had on the global system. The fact that the Union 
of South Africa was able to gain a measure of political independence at such an early 
stage may also be attributed to the decline in British power. Although Britain was not 
in total political control, it must however, be noted that gold was being produced for 
export and Britain stood to gain from gold mining practices in the South Africa.  
 
2.3.4 Effects of agricultural sector on land and labour 
relations 
 
Following the mining development new markets opened up in the agricultural sector. 
The Transvaal Highveld and the Free State became centres for agricultural activity, 
supplying the mining areas with agricultural products. Poor soil, droughts, low rainfall 
and the system of inheritance stimulated the control of the labour force that were 
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comparable in purpose, but different in form to the mining industry. As noted above, 
most Afrikaner farmers could not survive and became an industrial urban working 
class after the Anglo-Boer war. Those that managed to survive on agriculture 
production during the early 20th century had to pay ruthless attention to production 
costs. The state was invoked to control the labour force, supply subsidies, credits, 
loans and technical assistance. These systems created a small land holding elite and a 
vast number of impoverished black workers (Stadler, 1987:51). 
 
The agriculture sector suffered from a lack of markets, and was forced to seek export 
markets for its goods as early as 1908. The black mining and manufacturing labour 
force could not afford to buy produce and were therefore not a viable market. In 
addition, the white populations in urban areas were too few in number to provide an 
adequate market. Agricultural producers were forced to seek external markets in 
which they felt the full brunt of international competition. Global markets were 
markedly more favourable for African exports for the period 1900-1913 than for the 
period 1914-1946 with markets being more difficult to penetrate during the latter 
period (Wallerstein1986:120). African producers struggled to compete effectively, 
making profitable agricultural development very problematic. South Africa was 
affected by this and many agricultural producers could not compete in this 
environment and subsequently went out of business and left the sector. Many rural 
areas were depopulated of white farmers between 1900 and 1948.The exodus of white 
farmers further served to stratify the white population and increase white urban 
populations. The low economic productivity of the agricultural sector as a whole also 
served to reinforce strict controls on the African labour force (Stadler, 1987: 53-54). 
 
2.4 The formation of the South African Union: 1910-1948 
 
During the period from 1910 to 1948, state building in terms of institutional capacity 
with white supremist rule was consolidated. It is during this period that the state, in 
conjunction with gold mining and agricultural elite, developed into a power bloc 
capable of enacting and enforcing a wide range of restrictive laws aimed at turning the 
Africans into a controllable labour force. It is also during this period that some of the 
most severe segregationist acts were instituted, most infamously the 1913 Natives 
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Land Act. The creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 enabled those who 
controlled the state apparatus to enact measures throughout the whole geographic area 
of South Africa for the first time. It is with this robust state apparatus that further 
dispossession of Africans could take place with unprecedented speed and 
effectiveness.  
 
The first decade of the 20th century after the Anglo-Boer War and preceding the 
creation of the Union can be viewed as an era of compromise between mining capital 
and Afrikaner settler (agricultural) elite. It is during this era that the power bloc 
consisting of these two forces (section 2.3.3) was able to create a new state with 
unprecedented economic and bureaucratic sophistication (Bernstein, 1996:5). One can 
safely conclude, that the state that developed from this milieu was one geared towards 
serving the needs of the capitalists. These included instituting an environment where 
Africans became landless and were turned into a working class. This was achieved 
through establishing segregationist policies aimed at enriching those in power and 
securing a coercible labour force.  
 
During the Anglo-Boer war, Africans were assured by the British authorities that they 
would receive equal rights after the Boers were defeated. This is also the grounds on 
which the British were able to secure help from the Africans during the war in the 
form of supplies and other auxiliary services. In an about turnaround by the British, 
they conceded to Afrikaner needs in the form of Article 8 of the Peace of Vereeniging 
signed in 1902. The British agreed to postpone the issue of African suffrage until after 
self government had been restored to the ex-ZAR, leaving Africans disenfranchised 
and without a voice (Terreblanche, 2002:245).  
 
As discussed in section 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, the mining and agricultural sectors had 
secured the labour required to ensure profitable operation. It should, however, be 
noted that during the first decade of the 20th century the Mining Commission had 
some difficulty in securing African labour (Wolpe, 1995:63; Legassick, 1995:46-48; 
Bundy, 1988:208). Africans still had the ability to stay outside the labour force by 
entering or continuing agricultural activities, such as share cropping and rent farming. 
In addition, a number of Africans owned farms, either collectively or individually, as 
there was abundant land available after the war (Bundy, 1988:208-212; Terreblanche, 
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2002:260). Pressure on labour supply for the mines gave the impetus for the formation 
of the South African Union, as it was to the advantage of the capitalists (the alliance 
of gold and maize) to create a state apparatus effective enough to command the 
African labour force (Terreblanche, 2002; Bundy, 1988).   
 
In 1909 the British Parliament passed The South African Act of Westminster (The 
Constitution of the Union of SA), that honoured article 8 of the Peace of Vereeniging. 
It is argued by Legassick (1995), Wolpe (1995), Bernstein (1996) and Terreblanche 
(2002) that the passing of the Act of Westminster was the event that heralded the 
beginning of a unified segregationist policy in South Africa, and that segregation as 
state policy was instituted by the British although it was enforced and refined by the 
Afrikaner establishment. 
 
2.4.1 The Union’s legacy: Segregationist legislature 
institutionalised 
 
Thus we are now, in our summary of the history of South Africa’s land and labour 
relations, on the eve of the passing of the most influential legislation ever to appear in 
the South African statute, the Natives Land Act of 1913. The situation in South 
Africa, prior to the passing of the Act, was that for the first time there existed a single 
state apparatus that could be wielded to satisfy the labour needs of both mining and 
agricultural elite. African farmers in the northern areas of the Union had been able to 
escape being sucked into the labour force, due to the availability of agricultural 
avenues. The situation in the Cape was somewhat different, where the dispossession 
of African peasantry had been far more advanced than that in the Northern provinces. 
The state and ruling elite were looking for a way to secure labour needs, and it was 
clear to them that the only way to force Africans into the labour force was to deprive 
them of land.  
 
Thus was enacted the most significant piece of legislation to be passed in the Union of 
South Africa, The Natives Land Act of 1913 (Stadler, 1987; Terreblanche, 2002; 
Bundy, 1988; Bernstein, 1996; Wolpe, 1995; Marais, 1988 and Legassick, 1995).  It is 
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safe to say that the Union of South Africa made a systematic legislative attack on all 
Africans, in- and outside of the labour force, as approximately eighty seven Bills and 
Acts related to land and labour were passed by the Parliament of the Union of South 
Africa (Terreblanche, 2002:263). For the purposes of this research study, not all of 
these acts will be discussed in detail, as it should be clear that this warrants an 
independent study. Attention will be given to those that the researcher feels are most 
relevant to land deprivation and other discriminatory practises relating to land.  
 
The 1913 Natives Land Act divided South Africa geographically where Africans 
could own land inside a prescribed area amounting to a total of 8% of the area of 
South Africa, while 92% was allocated to whites. The Act instituted a legal separation 
between all whites and non whites in terms of ownership and residence. The areas 
assigned to Africans were known as reserves. Africans were allowed ownership of 
land, and to pursue agricultural activities within the reserve areas. It was believed by 
the Union government that Africans could pursue subsistence activities in the reserves 
through agricultural and pastoral activities. The areas were limited to ensure that there 
would never be enough land available to all for ownership and this would force 
Africans into the labour force to survive. It was envisioned that Africans would live in 
the reserves only for short periods during the year, and migrate to the urban areas or 
minefields in search of work during the other periods. The 1913 Act cemented the 
practice of a migrant labour system in South Africa that would ensure a stable 
workforce for the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors of the economy 
(Bernstein, 1996:5; Harley and Fotheringham, 1999:13; Bundy, 1988:213-215).  
 
The act not only served the purpose of securing cheap labour, but also to quiet the 
fears of white farmers who were struggling to compete with successful African 
peasants in the northern provinces. Furthermore, it extinguished share-cropping and 
other forms of labour tenancy outside the reserve areas, rendering all activities illegal 
and allowing Africans to remain on white land only in the form of labour tenants 
(Bundy, 1988:214; Bernstein, 1996:5). The outcome of the 1913 Act, was that it 
turned a growing African peasantry [practised in many forms in the different areas of 
SA (Bundy, 1988)] into a landless, working class and caused the large scale 
movement of Africans off what became ‘white land’ and into the reserves and urban 
areas. This in turn, led to severe overcrowding in the reserves as well as the creation 
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of a permanent migrant labour system creating the problem of urban African slums, 
both issues that the Union government addressed with legislative measures.  
 
The 1923 Native (Urban Areas) Act and the 1927 Native Administration Act were 
both geared towards dealing with the ‘problem’ of urbanised Africans. The migration 
of Africans to urban areas increased due to overcrowding in the reserves and due to 
disparities in wages between the mining, agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 
Wages in the manufacturing sector was far greater than in the other two, and this 
served to increase the volume of African urbanisation (Stadler, 1987:59). The Acts of 
1923 and 1927 were aimed not only at controlling the number of Africans that were 
allowed to urbanise, but also regulated who would be afforded basic services such as 
housing and water in urban areas.  
 
These legislatory acts made it illegal for Africans to own urban land, curtailed the 
time allowed in urban areas, and also laid the foundation for controlling the 
movement of Africans into and out of urban areas. Furthermore, the Acts further 
institutionalised the practice of indirect rule, in that it recognised the legitimacy, albeit 
partial and based on clientalism, of Native administration, and of other native 
legislative bodies and their subjugation to the Native Affairs Department that was 
controlled by the central state (Stadler, 1987: 88-91, 119-121, 129; Terreblanche, 
2002:255, 272-274, 313). These two legislatory acts formed the basis of the Native 
Urban policy from their inception until the late 1980’s. They were the basis upon 
which many non-white urban dwellers were evicted and forcible removed, and can be 
seen as the urban equivalent of the 1913 Land Act in that they stipulated where 
Africans could and could not live. The 1913 Act could not have been implemented 
with a great degree of effect without the creation of the 1923 and 1927 Acts relating 
to urban areas, African movements and indirect administrational control. 
 
Other significant legislature includes the 1936 Native Trust Act. The 1936 Act 
increased the land available in the African reserves from 8% to 13% and placed an 
absolute limit on the amount of land that would be made available to Africans. It 
should be noted that this increase in size was never completed, and it is estimated that 
reserve size never surpassed that of 10% of total area of South Africa. Furthermore, 
the 1936 Act placed limitations on the amount of cattle allowed to graze and also 
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farming practises that would be followed in the reserves, seriously curtailing the 
freedom of African farmers. This, in turn, led to an increase in African urbanisation, 
as the pressure on the reserve lands only increased. The Act would also serve as the 
basis upon which forced rural removals would take place (Harley and Fotheringham, 
1999:21; Stadler, 1987:42, 146; Terreblanche, 2002: 278).  
 
These acts discussed above should be viewed as part of the larger process of African 
dispossession that was initiated in the late 17th century by the first freebhurgers 
released from their VOC contracts. They are not more significant, in absolute terms, 
than the 1809 Hottentot Proclamation, the Master and Servant ordinances of the 
1840’s and 50’s, or the Glen Gray Act of 1894, but they had a more significant impact 
due to bureaucratic capacity of the state. The Acts that were passed after the 
formation of the Union of South Africa were instituted across the whole geographic 
area of South Africa, and were far more rigorously applied by the Union and later 
Apartheid state machineries than by ruling powers in any preceding eras. Another 
important impact of the 1913 Land Act is the scale and the intensity of forced 
removals of Africans living on lands outside of the reserves. African share-croppers, 
tenant farmers and other forms of agriculturalists were turned into criminals at the 
stroke of a pen, and those not willing, or able, to stay on as labour tenants were 
forcibly removed and relocated to reserve areas (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999:20-
28).  
 
2.4.2 Birth of the liberation movement: The African National 
Congress 
 
On the 8th of January 1912 the South African Native National Congress (later to be 
known as the African National Congress, ANC) was formed. There is a widely held 
view amongst scholars that the creation of the ANC was spurred on by the initial 
inception of what was to become the Land Act of 1913 (Asmal, Chidester and Lubisi, 
2005:35; Terreblanche, 2002:281 and McKinley, 1997:5). Limb (2003:13-16) argues 
that the initial actions by the ANC prior to the mid 1920’s was greatly influenced by 
British ideas and had a subsequent impact on how the early ANC would fight the anti-
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oppression struggle. The author argues that the alignment of the early ANC leaders 
with British ideals of peaceful protests, resulted in the ANC having very little 
organisational clout and liberation gusto. Furthermore, the ANC leaders were initially 
comprised of black petty bourgeois, and their whole value system was aligned closer 
to those of the British elites than to their poverty stricken African counterparts. It is 
postulated that the early ANC was meek in the manner in which it tried to battle the 
white-dominated state. Some of these actions included picketing, attempts at debating 
politicians, writing articles of protests in liberal minded newspapers and peaceful 
protests (Legassick, 2007:157-159). Suffice to say, the ANC in its embryonic stages 
of development did very little in terms of mass mobilisation against the white 
controlled state, as it did not want to be seen to be operating outside legal boundaries.  
 
The legal barrage launched against Africans in terms of legislation discussed in the 
previous section, changed the tone of the liberation movement of the ANC. Most 
importantly were the effects of the 1913 Act and the 1923 Urban areas act in 
radicalising the ANC as an opposition movement (McKinley, 1997:7-10; Stadler, 
1987: 16-18). The nature of the discriminatory laws gave the organisation a degree of 
impetus and a rationale along which they could mobilise the masses. The 
Organisation went through another lull in activities during the late 1920’s and it is 
only after the Second World War and the passing of the 1936 Act, that the drive 
towards liberation took form. It is interesting to note the paradoxical effects of the 
successive legislative assaults on African freedoms sowed the seeds for the demise of 
the white-dominated state, albeit nearly 60 years later. A major contributing factor 
towards the rise of the ANC as a liberation movement came from the defeat of 
Nazism in the Second World War and the subsequent adoption of a universal form of 
human rights. The ANC as a movement took inspiration from the adoption of human 
rights by the victorious Allies, and saw in this a justification for mobilization and 
emancipation (Asmal, et.al, 2007:1-7). The role of land, and more pertinently the 
curtailing of African ownership, played a crucial role in the mobilization of the ANC. 
It is however, only during the 1950’s that the ANC became an effective mass 
mobilisation movement with regards to combating the ruling white elites (McKinley, 
1997:13-16; Legassick, 2007: 183-185).  
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2.5 The Apartheid state 1948-1990 
 
In 1948 the National Party won a closely fought election on the back of a numerically 
increasing impoverished Afrikaner working class. Mention has been made of the 
landless white Afrikaner, who had been increasing in size since the beginning of the 
century. It is with the help of this poor, white, landless class that the National Party 
took power in 1948, and instituted nearly 50 years of an Afrikaner dominated political 
system (Terreblanche, 2002: 298-300). The Afrikaner establishment added its own 
distinct racist feel to the state, by enacting a number of racist laws soon after it was 
elected to power. These included the Mixed Marriages Act, the Immorality Act and 
the Population Registration Act, to name but a few (McKinley, 1997:14). It must be 
noted that by the time the National Party (NP) took power in 1948 the character of 
urban and rural land division along racial lines was already firmly in place (Harley 
and Fotheringham, 1999:28). The foundation for a geographically and racially 
segregated society had been laid and the only noteworthy legislation, relating to land 
relations, was the Group Areas Act of 1950 that demarcated all land use according to 
race and resulted in the forced removal of thousands of people. This is not to say the 
NP was idle with regard to legislative measures, on the contrary, a plethora of laws 
and acts relating to African movement, urbanisation and settlements were passed, but 
by and large they were merely extensions, additions or alterations to the already 
existing land legislation.  
 
The forced removal of millions of Africans, on the grounds of successive legislative 
acts was perhaps the single most important function relating to land that the apartheid 
state apparatus fulfilled. In the time spanning 1960 to 1983 the number of Africans 
removed from their homes and relocated under duress is estimated at 3, 5 million. 
Furthermore, 1, 4 million urbanised Africans were removed and ‘returned’ to the 
homelands from 1950-1990. During the period of 1950 to the mid-1980s 80 000 
coloured families and 38 000 Indian families were forced to move (du Toit, 1995: 
309).  
 
The removal of Africans from urban and rural areas was the result of legislative 
measures adopted by the Apartheid regime, and apartheid state was responsible for 
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implementing these laws (Terreblanche, 2002: 387). Relocation or forced removal 
occurred in urban areas such as District Six and Sophiatown, and also in rural areas in 
what became known as ‘black spots’. These black spots were simply areas on white 
farm land where Africans had managed to remain. Africans were moved under 
different acts and laws, but all for the same purpose, the creation of separate ‘states’ 
for African people (Harley and Fotheringham, 1999:36). It is not the purpose of this 
study to describe the removals, either in location and intensity or emotional anguish it 
caused, and that is why it is relegated to a mere paragraph in this study. This is not to 
undermine the importance of forced removals or relocations, it is simply a matter of 
practicality. For the purposes of this study, the single most important effect of 
enforcing apartheid laws was to crystallize opposition and the effect it had on the 
nature of the opposition. It should also be noted that the effective nature of the state 
apparatus, in the form of the Native Affairs Department, serves to further illustrate the 
role of the state in land relations in South Africa. The state, if adequately equipped, is 
the most powerful tool that can be utilised to influence land relations, and this remains 
true today. 
 
It has previously been argued that the ANC was given serious boost in its battle for 
liberation during the 1950’s (McKinley, 1997:17-23; Legassick, 2007: 193-203). This 
is attributed, amongst other things, to increased urbanisation of Africans; deteriorating 
conditions in the reserves; increased awareness amongst Africans of their 
marginalised situation; increased influx control measures and forced removals. The 
researcher is not arguing causality, but merely stating that land dispossession played a 
role in mobilising mass action and that the effects of dispossession should not be 
underestimated. The disenfranchisement of Africans, relating to land, played an 
important role in why the masses started serious rebellion against the apartheid state.  
 
In conclusion, the era from 1948-1990 must be seen as an era of entrenching 
segregationist policies initiated at the turn of the 20th century. The apartheid state 
played a crucial role in providing the ANC, for the first time in South African history, 
with a clear and well defined enemy. This enemy was characterised by a very 
effective state apparatus, one that could not only enact laws but also implement them 
with unprecedented effectiveness.   
 
 41
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter attempted to summarise the historical nature of land dispossession in 
South Africa. It showed that dispossession at the hands of the Dutch, the English and 
Afrikaner establishments were carried out in order to ensure the profitability of the 
agricultural and later the mining and manufacturing sectors. All the while, this 
dispossession took place within South African and within global, capitalist 
development. Without the economic impetus, such large scale dispossession would 
never have been achieved and successive state machineries could not have been 
mobilised to ensure such a goal. The power bloc formed between agricultural and 
mining elite at the turn of the 20th century serves as an apt example. This chapter 
showed that the disowning of Africans was a deliberate process pursued by successive 
state apparatus in order to ensure the profitability of capitalist development. The 
dispossession of land and coercion of labour was justified through economic and 
social arguments that today seem absurd, as arguments such as segregation and 
apartheid fly in the face of basic human rights. It can, however, not be ignored that we 
have not moved out of a capitalist global order, and that subsequent changes relating 
to land and labour cannot be initiated while ignoring the global situation. 
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Chapter 3: Conceptual framework 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will serve to illuminate the concepts that are central to understanding the 
main thrust of this dissertation. Some, such as the state, have already been extensively 
used and a definition is long overdue. Others have not gained prominence, and it is 
only when a discussion of contemporary South Africa commences that these concepts 
will be extensively used. This chapter serves as a theoretical exposition of some 
concepts, shedding light on the ambiguity surrounding them and illustrating their 
complex nature. 
 
One of the basic premises of this dissertation is that South Africa is currently in a 
phase of transition. South Africa is a young democracy and there are still many 
unknowns in our future concerning the durability, sustainability and prospects for 
consolidating democracy (du Toit, 2001; du Toit 2003; Mattes, 2002; van Beek, 
2006). It is the opinion of the researcher that a major obstacle or impediment to 
consolidating the South African democracy rests on differing interpretations of 
democracy held by the population and elites.  
 
The general thrust of the chapter rests on the premise that, within the South African 
context, culture, the state, democracy, democratic consolidation, transformation and 
land reform all form part of the social fabric of South Africa. Furthermore, these 
aspects all have bearing on South Africa’s prospects for consolidating the democratic 
regime and ensuring a stable future for the country. Most central to this debate are the 
divergent meanings linked to democracy, which are rooted in deep seated cultural 
differences amongst the parties responsible for South Africa’s negotiated transition. 
And it is this inherent cultural tension amongst negotiating parties that has given rise 
to two diverging interpretations of democracy namely the liberal and liberationist 
models of democracy (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996).  
 
In this chapter, an interpretive framework is created by the researcher for 
understanding the relationship between culture, the state, democracy, law and land 
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reform in South Africa. This model is based on Raymond Cohen’s (1997) theory of 
differing cultural models. Cohen (1997) draws a distinction between high-context and 
low-context cultures. Concepts such as the state, democracy, law, transformation and 
land reform will be illuminated and grounded within Cohen’s (1997) framework. 
Cohen (1997) does not specifically focus on notions such as the state, democracy and 
law, but does make some references to these concepts when highlighting the 
differences between high- and low-context cultures. The interpretive framework 
attempts to ‘fill out’ or supplement the original distinction and characteristics 
highlighted by Cohen (1997) and his distinction between high- and low-context 
cultures.  
 
The chapter will begin by explaining this interpretive framework of understanding, or 
models of democracy as well as the concepts that are used therein. Thereafter, culture, 
democracy, transformation, the rule of law and land reform are explored. The aim of 
this chapter is to create a coherent theoretical model within which the South African 
situation can be better understood.  
 
3.2 An interpretive framework 
 
The theoretical framework that will be presented below rests on the premise that 
culture is a salient, pervasive and active agent in how all people perceive and interact 
with their social, economic and political environment. From this follows that all social 
interactions are not only influenced by culture but are, to a large extent, shaped by 
cultural orientations. Consequently, culture not only has a decisive role in how social, 
political and economic institutions are constructed, but also in creating standard 
meanings that are associated with these institutions. It will be argued that meanings 
associated with democracy, the state, law, transformation and land reform can be 
better understood when placing it within cultural perspectives.  
 
It will be argued that there are competing, and sometimes contradictory, 
interpretations of what economic, political and social institution come to mean to the 
populace and elites in South Africa (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996). The main purpose of 
this theoretical exposition is to create an adequate framework or models of 
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democracy, in order to understand the nature of democracy within South Africa and 
the difficulties facing its consolidation. The model does not advocate causality, nor 
does it wish to explain ‘why’ there are differing meanings associated with these 
concepts — the model merely wishes to propose a way of understanding and 
interpreting the ambiguities surrounding normative meanings of democracy in South 
Africa.  
 
The definition of culture that follows is limited, for the researcher echoes the views of 
Huntington (2007:15) who argues that “…if culture includes everything, it explains 
nothing.” Culture is therefore defined in limited terms and should be viewed as an 
explanatory variable of sorts. It merely assists the reader in understanding the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables of this particular study 
and facilitates understanding the variances perceived in the quantitative section of the 
study.  
 
3.2.1 Culture 
 
The language we speak, the customs we follow, our values and norms all form part of 
our cultural make-up and orientation. Our culture is not only determined by these 
aspects, it in turn, influences them. It influences how we view ourselves and others 
and influences rules, interactions and institutions in society. Above all, culture 
influences our frame of reference for all social interactions and all thought-processes. 
An individual’s cultural background shapes how one thinks, what one thinks and 
consequently how one will act not only as an individual, but as a society. This study 
holds that culture matters and that values constituting culture have a profound impact 
on how we organise our political, social and economic landscape1. Furthermore it is 
believed that our cultural orientation has significant affects on the type of institution 
that is created and the meanings associated with these institutions. 
 
In his work, Negotiating Across Cultures Raymond Cohen defines culture as “… a 
property of information, a grammar for organising reality and for imparting meaning 
                                                 
1
 For other works that argue cultural importance see Esmer and Pettersson 2007; Harrison and 
Huntington, 2000 
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to the world.” (1997: 12). Culture consists of patterned ways of acting and feeling, 
and at its core rests on historically derived and selected ideas and values. Culture rests 
on shared meanings, permitting members of a community to perceive and 
consequently act on reality (Cohen, 1997: 12). What makes Cohen’s framework of 
culture relevant not only to South Africa, but to many newly formed democracies, is 
that it is conceived entirely for the purposes of understanding the difficulties of 
negotiation. This is relevant in the South Africa context due to the nature of our 
negotiated transition to democracy. During the transition of the early 1990s 
everything was up for negotiation, and it was partly due to the nature of the transition 
period and the need to move negotiations forward, that certain incommensurables 
were ignored or at least ‘swept under the rug’. These include differences in the 
normative meaning that was assigned to the institution of democracy. It is a premise 
held by the author, that it is this difference in what democracy is believed to be that 
lies at the heart of difficulties for consolidating the South African democracy2.  
 
In his work, Cohen (1997) elaborates extensively on how certain cultural orientations 
influence the process of negotiation. The author argues extensively that cultural 
differences influence not only the context of negotiation, but also the ‘meaning’ of 
‘what’ is being negotiated. In numerous examples, it is argued by Cohen (1997) that 
American-individualistic cultures can be distinguished from communal based 
cultures. The author identifies two distinct cultural frameworks, one he labels the 
high-context (non-western) cultures and the other the low-context cultures, epitomised 
by the American culture. The basis for this distinction lies in the prominence or role 
that is ascribed to the individual within the specific cultural context. 
 
Low-context cultures are dominated by the idea that the individual is of prominence, 
and holds that individual rights are more important than duty towards one’s family or 
community. In this framework, status is acquired and not inherited. Political authority 
is a function of office and can and should be questioned and challenged when 
individuals feel their rights are being impeded in any way. Conflicts are resolved 
through legal processes enshrined in law, where justice is an abstract notion that 
applies to all, where litigation is common and all parties are allowed to argue their 
                                                 
2
 For other studies advocating such an hypothesis see also Gagiano and du Toit, 1996; du Toit, 2001 
and du Toit, 2003 
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cases on equal basis. Equality before the law is the ‘prevailing ethic’ in such societies 
and the importance of contracts above custom cannot be overstated. The economic 
side of this framework is enshrined in the principles of the free market and the 
prevailing political system that is usually pursued is that of representative democracy 
(Cohen, 1997: 29-30).  
 
In contrast, high-context cultures follow a communal ethos wherein the needs and 
freedoms of the individual are subordinated to the welfare of the group. The identity 
of an individual is derived from group affiliation and not personal choice and 
individual needs are defined in terms of communal interests. Face, an individuals 
standing in the eyes of the group, is paramount and dishonour is seen to be worse than 
death. Group identity is acquired by birth, is lifelong and bestows upon the individual 
a sense of duty to family and group that supersedes other obligations. The notion of 
duty towards an abstract entity such as the state is foreign, as all duty and obligation is 
towards the individuals’ group. Law with an abstract sense of justice is meaningless 
and law is rather viewed in the context of group affiliation and past favour. Contracts 
are subordinated to customs, and the idea of a disembodied contract applying to all is 
alien in this cultural framework. Authority is paternalistic and unquestionable in 
nature and roles are ascribed within the group and rests heavily on past hierarchies. 
Conflict is resolved by mechanisms of communal conciliation and not with an idea of 
an abstract universal law. Continuing group harmony is the paramount concern of 
conflict resolution and not with ensuring that contracts are adhered to irrespective of 
context (Cohen, 1997: 30-31).  
 
The role of language, time and history are significant points of difference between the 
cultural contexts. For the low-context cultures, language is merely a means of 
communication and communication is viewed as a tool for relaying information. 
Language and communication are seen as performing an informational function. For 
low-context cultures, time is seen to be precious, and to waste time on frivolities when 
work could be done is meaningless and unfulfilling. This cultural orientation that 
highly values individual achievement, views time as a medium in which productive 
tasks must be completed in specific periods. In addition, time is viewed as 
monochronic, alluding to the idea that it is best to do one task at a time and, in a 
sense, this culture ‘regiments time’. Consequently, this cultural perspective has a view 
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of the present that tends to underplay the importance of the past in shaping current 
context. History is mostly subordinated to dealing with more pressing and immediate 
concerns, and the preoccupation and fascination with the future leads to historical 
factors being underestimated in their significance of shaping the present (Cohen, 
1997: 31-35). 
 
Within high-context cultures, language and communication forms part of the total 
social fabric and in this cultural perspective language is not merely a way of 
communicating, but forms an integral part in maintaining face, group harmony and 
social cohesion (Cohen, 1997: 31-32). High-context cultures ascribe much less value 
to the division of time on the clock dial and are not as preoccupied with the future as 
their low-context counterparts. High-context cultures subordinate the importance of 
time to human interaction and adds value to the act of ‘doing’ rather than that of 
‘getting things done’. Cohen (1997:34) captures this when he poses the following, “… 
in the overall scheme of things, where the individual counts for so little in the face of 
much greater, inexorable forces, what could be more futile than urgency?”. This sense 
of time has implications on the importance placed on the role of history in 
contemporary context.  
 
High-context cultures tend to view what their low-context counterparts would perceive 
as ‘ancient, irrelevant’ history, as having a significant impact on creating the current 
social context (Cohen, 1997: 31-36). In a sense, for low-context cultures history is 
recreated in terminology of today, and is compartmentalised and viewed as distinct 
from other social forces. In contrast, high-context cultures view the present as part of 
a continuum of events. There is no division or segmentation of time, but rather a 
flowing continuum of social interactions that shape today and tomorrow, based on 
what happened yesterday — hence the label, high-context. For high-context cultures, 
the context dominates the details of the present. All social interactions and 
relationships are characterised by the context that they take place in, nothing is void 
of context and all interactions and relationships are based on context specific dealings. 
 
One final aspect that is an important distinction between high- and low-context 
cultures is the idea of good faith as opposed to goodwill. The idea of good faith is 
important in low-context cultures. This is the notion that all parties will subscribed to 
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the agreed upon rules of a negotiation after the negotiation is complete. Negotiation is 
viewed as a finite process that culminates in the creation of a legally binding contract. 
For the high-context counterparts, this is not the case. High-context cultures view the 
creation of a legal contract as merely another stage in the process of an open-ended 
relationship. They operate on the basis of goodwill, the idea that all parties are 
working together in a co-operative way, and that non-compliance to, or changing of a 
contract is part of the relationship and does not in any way signify an offence or 
breaking of an agreement. This difference in good faith and good will is grounded in 
the contrasting views the two cultural orientations have on the role of law, contracts 
and time. Whereas low-context cultures view negotiation and contracts as being a 
function of a specific time, high-context cultures view it as part of the continuum of 
time, the never-ending always changing social reality that cannot be abstracted or 
subordinated to the ticking of a clock (Cohen, 1997:199-201).  
 
In essence, the difference between high- and low-context cultures lies in the 
separation of meaning from context. For low-context cultures, events, actions, 
processes and relationships can be invested with meaning without bringing the entire 
context of relationships into the framework of understanding. To the contrary, by 
stripping the context away, by eliminating, discarding or ignoring the context of the 
relationship as ‘irrelevant’, even greater clarity, and therefore meaning can be 
established. It is held that context can clutter, obscure and confuse the understanding 
and functioning of relationships. High-context cultures argue the exact opposite of 
their low-context counterparts.  
 
The cultural distinction of high-and low-context cultures will form the basis of the 
interpretive framework. It will be attempted to define the state, democracy, law, 
transformation and land reform in relation to high- and low-context cultures. This will 
hopefully also show that there is a high degree of divergence in the normative 
meanings associated with these concepts and that there is some correlation between 
value orientations within the differing cultural perspectives and meanings associated 
with these concepts.  
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3.2.2 Democracy 
3.2.2.1 Ideal type democracy 
 
Defining democracy is notoriously difficult, as it is a term that has as many meanings 
as it has states conforming to the principles thereof. How one chooses to define 
democracy is very much the choice of the author. Democracy in this study is viewed 
as a form of governance. It is viewed as a process, a constantly evolving system of 
government that, despite fluctuations and differences, remains true to a number of 
minimum requirements. It is the opinion of the author that democracy can be viewed 
as a political system that is influenced by societal (political, economic and social) and 
cultural forces. 
 
As stated earlier, an underlying premise of this dissertation is that South Africa, 
although recognised as embodying a constitutional democracy, is in the process of 
consolidating the relatively young democratic regime. The definition of democracy 
must therefore be so inclined that it acknowledges the fact the democracy is as much a 
process as a definitive state. Robert Dahl (1971) in his seminal work Polyarchy: 
Participation and Opposition, investigates which factors permit opponents of 
government to organize and contest government in free and fair elections.  The author 
argues that the transformation of a regime towards one in which opposition is allowed 
forms the cornerstone of a democratic system of government, which he labels a 
polyarchy. Dahl (1971:2) argues that there are three necessary conditions that allow 
for contestation and democratization, allowing a form of government to be labelled a 
polyarchy —citizens must have unimpaired opportunities to formulate their 
preferences, signify their preferences by individual or collective actions and lastly, 
have their preferences weighed equally regardless of content or source of set 
preferences. Although essential but by no means sufficient, these conditions are 
viewed as minimal requirements a political system must employ in order to be 
labelled a democracy.  
 
In order for these three basic conditions of democracy to be met, societal institutions 
must provide at least eight guarantees to the population which are summarised in the 
table below. 
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Table 3.1 Requirements of a democracy  
The opportunity to:  The following institutional guarantees are required: 
I. Formulate preferences  1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Right of political leaders to compete for support 
5. Alternative sources of information  
II. Signify preferences  1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5.Right of political leaders to compete for support 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
III. Have Preferences 
weighed equally in 
government conduct  
1. Freedom to form and join organizations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. Right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5.Right of political leaders to compete for support 
5a Right of political leaders to compete for votes  
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
8. Institutions for making government policies dependent 
on votes and other expressions of preference  
(Source: Dahl, 1971:3) 
 
It is furthermore possible to order different political systems along a theoretical scale, 
based on their level of contestation and inclusiveness and in so doing gauge their level 
of democracy or degree of democratization (Dahl 1971:4). Although contestation and 
inclusiveness vary independently and are not mutually inclusive, it is argued that the 
higher their level, the greater the degree of democracy. Polyarchies then, are thought 
of as regimes that are highly inclusive and extensively open to public debate (Dahl, 
1971: 6-8). 
 
The significance of transforming a regime into a polyarchy from one with lesser 
degrees of public contestation and inclusiveness, has far reaching effects on the rights 
and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Classic liberal freedoms such freedom of 
expression, association and organisation without government prosecution are 
associated with democratic regimes. Furthermore, universal suffrage, concurrent with 
political competition, increases the degree of representation for the population 
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amongst political leaders in parliament. Although the author acknowledges that the 
populace will never be equally represented in political leadership and parliament, a 
greater degree of representation results from broader inclusiveness. Broader 
representation in turn, has meaningful implications regarding the level of 
accountability that can be expected from, and assigned to, political leaders and 
parliament. The public generally feel a greater connection with their political leaders 
and more involved in the policy process, resulting in increased ease with which they 
feel they can engage in political life. This in turn, can lead to greater diversity of 
political preferences being expressed within the parliament and amongst political 
leaders (Dahl: 1971: 20-27).  
 
It is also necessary to highlight the difference between the procedural and substantive 
notions of democracy, as put forward by Dahl (1971). The author implies this 
distinction when he argues that in order for citizens to be fairly represented in 
formulating, signifying and having their preferences weighed equally, a number of 
‘institutional guarantees’ need to be adhered to. There is therefore an implied 
recognition that in order for a democracy to exist and become an inclusive polyarchy, 
there should be a clear separation of the procedural and substantive aspects of 
democracy (Dahl 1971: 3). It is the procedural norms, as adhered to by the state, 
which allows citizens the ability to fully realise the freedoms that are provided by a 
democratic dispensation. It is also implied in democratic theory that adherence to the 
rules are of paramount importance. A democracy cannot exist without adhering to the 
rules and it is out of ‘institutional guarantees’ (procedures) that citizens are able to 
enjoy the freedoms (substance) that a democratic system of government allows them. 
 
The above then illustrates that democracy is viewed as a process, or form of 
government, that increases public contestation and inclusion. This results in the public 
forming a greater part of the political landscape and in turn, nurtures the feeling in the 
body politic that they form part of the democracy. The broader the inertest groups that 
are represented in parliament and other forms of government, the greater the level of 
association felt by the public towards government. This theory of democracy also 
highlights the importance of political leaders, or elites, in ensuring that the public can 
benefit from a democratic system. Greater representation amongst political leaders in 
turn, increases the governments’ legitimacy and also the belief of the populace in 
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democratic forms of governance. This explanation of democracy as put forward by 
Dahl (1971) emphasises the importance of the role of the public, their opinions and 
their ability to take part in creating and maintaining a system of government. It 
furthers the idea that government is not removed from the people, but is there solely 
to serve the needs of all people under its control equally.   
 
The above can be viewed as an ideal type of democracy. Whether such a political 
system, that is completely or almost completely responsive to all citizens, exists, has 
existed or will ever exist is not what is of concern (Dahl, 1971:4). It is only a 
theoretical construct that allows social researchers to gauge the level of democracy 
within a specific country. It serves as a yardstick against which all democratic systems 
of government can be measured, in order to estimate whether they are merely 
democratic in facade, or whether they are truly democratic states. This definition 
advanced by Dahl (1971) highlights the minimum requirements a democratic system 
of government must adhere to in order to be labelled as such. This definition 
recognises the institutional constraints and formal boundaries that must be adhered to 
in order to allow citizens to be part of a democratic system. It also has as its point of 
departure, the ordinary citizen, the population, and specifies that certain criteria must 
be met in order for the individuals in society to enjoy a level of freedom associated 
with democratic forms of government.   
 
3.2.2.2 Framing the democratic debate in South Africa 
 
Democracy in the South African context takes on a somewhat more substantive notion 
than the definition given above. It can be argued that democracy in South African is 
inexorably linked to the process of social transformation, and more specifically the 
process of black empowerment. “In a certain sense democratization is understood as a 
process of black empowerment. The [corollary of this] understanding is that any 
social, political or economic engagement in the new South Africa that blocks or 
impedes the process of black empowerment is essentially undemocratic.” (Gagiano 
and du Toit, 1996: 60). 
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Within the South African context, democracy and the consolidation of such a system, 
is inexorably linked to the idea of transformation. The two contrasting models of what 
constitute successful democratic consolidation discussed below, are in essence 
diverging with regards to how the differing paradigms conceptualise and envision 
transformation to manifest in society, and how to achieve a concrete manifestation of 
such a policy directive3.  
 
Gagiano and du Toit (1996:48) identify “…two major diverging and adversarial 
notions of what could be regarded as the establishment of successful democracy…”. 
The authors argue that in the South African context, there are two diverging 
interpretations of what constitutes democracy and more pertinently, what strategies 
should be followed to foster democratic consolidation and the establishment of a 
successful democratic dispensation. The authors argue that the two distinct and 
conflicting paradigms surrounding normative ascriptions of democracy in South 
Africa can be labelled liberal and liberationist perspectives on democracy. The 
authors argue that although all the major political role players are to some extent or in 
some way concerned with consolidating the South African democracy, there is no 
agreement about the “…sort of normative or institutional order in society that will 
give concrete expression to the philosophical principles…” that underlie these two 
paradigms (1996:48-50). I will argue that these paradigms, or models of democracy, 
can be linked to the cultural framework described above through corresponding 
notions about the role of the individual, and more pertinently what importance is 
placed on the idea of individual autonomy and the maintenance of such a system by 
codifying it into law4.  
 
The liberal view of democracy holds that the defining feature or most important 
function of democracy is to maximize individual freedom and autonomy. For liberals, 
inequalities in political, economic and social power threaten to expose the individual 
to economic, political and social repression (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996:50). 
According to this paradigm, the best way to ensure individual freedom and autonomy 
is to ensure the separation of the economic, political and social spheres of society 
                                                 
3
 The two models do not only differ with respect to transformation, as will be shown in the following 
paragraphs. The diverging notions of transformation is however central to the thrust of this dissertation, 
as it is one of the concepts that is directly measured in the empirical component of the study. 
4
 See also du Toit 2003, Gerber, 2004 and du Toit 2006. 
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through explicit expressions enshrined in law. Liberals hold that in order to maximize 
freedom and autonomy of the individual, democracy must ensure the separation of the 
political, economic and social spheres of society and prevent the creation of a power 
bloc with simultaneous influence in all these spheres. It is only when the separation of 
these spheres are complete that the individual is protected against a coercive state, 
repressive society and exploitative economic forces. Democracy for them requires the 
separation of these spheres; an autonomous state apparatus; robust civil society and a 
market economy (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 50-51). 
 
The separation of these spheres ensures that the individual is free by ensuring that 
economic, social and political power is dispersed amongst power wielding elites. This 
separation gives rise to a societal condition that allows the individual greater freedom 
to pursue individual choice (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 51). It is argued that the 
ability of the individual to pursue personal choice is to a degree influenced by 
inequality constituted by the unequal distribution of resources5. Furthermore, the 
separation of these spheres is also crucial in curtailing, or at least, ensuring the 
transient nature of inequality, by dispersing power amongst individuals or groups 
within society. Consequently, “[A] associations that organize these spheres of power 
in society, and the elites at their apex, do not overlap to form a united power bloc 
capable of controlling society on its own terms. The hierarchies of wealth, status and 
power are controlled by different groups.” (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 52). 
 
The liberals hold that democracy is undermined when there is a blurring of the 
boundaries between these societal realms (economic, political, and social). For them, 
democracy is only possible if there is a clear separation of the realm of politics from 
inequality in society (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 54). Democracy then is seen as the 
process of ensuring that the individual has the greatest scope to exercise individual 
choice with this being achieved by codifying these freedoms into law. The aim of 
democracy for liberals is “…the transformation of society into civil society.” 
Furthermore “…it entails the transformation of members of society into individuals.” 
(Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 54). Within the liberal framework, transformation refers 
to creating a society that will increase individual autonomy. As this interpretation 
                                                 
5
 Resources defined as  “…material wealth, political power and societal influence…” (Gagiano and du 
Toit: 1996:51) 
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holds dearly the value of human choice, it equates equality and freedom to individuals 
being treated equally under the law and being free to pursue their own conception of 
the good life.  
 
Liberals argue that in order to achieve successful democracy, the creation of an 
environment wherein the individual can pursue personal choice facilitated by 
institutional separation, requires a strong, autonomous state and the application of the 
principle of the rule of law. They hold that all people are equal before the law and that 
the law creates the framework, stipulating the rules that will allow the society to be 
democratic (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 56). In short, “Democracy, for them, is [was] 
about the rules that secure the boundaries of state, civil society and economy.” (du 
Toit, 2006:3).  
 
In contrast to the above, there exists what Gagiano and du Toit (1996) label the 
liberationist perspective of democracy in South Africa. This school draws its support 
base from the large numbers of the population that were dispossessed, disenfranchised 
and disempowered under the partisan Apartheid state. For them democracy is not 
merely a process enshrined in law, but has a distinct emancipative goal. Democracy is 
seen as the next site for the liberation struggle — it is with democracy that the 
liberationists will gain freedom from economic, political and social repression. 
Democracy entails the breaking down of previously oppressive state structures and 
the “psychological empowerment” of those oppressed under the previous regime 
(Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 59-60).  
 
For the liberationists, inequality is perpetuated and increased by viewing democracy 
in the vein that the liberals do. Inequality is not seen as being dispersed throughout 
the separate spheres of society, but is rather viewed as being concentrated amongst a 
certain community. This school holds that within the liberal framework inequalities in 
society will only increase, since it functions to protect only a small portion of society, 
the middle class. “What liberals see as the remedy, the liberationists interpret as the 
problem.” (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 60-61).  
 
At its core, the aim of democracy according to the liberationist perspective is to 
pursue the interest of the previously oppressed community. It is not individual choice 
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that is paramount, but rather emancipation of the previously oppressed community 
from material inequality. The liberationist wish to shape society in such a way that 
emancipation can be pursued on behalf of the community through a democratic 
system of government. This is achieved by the fusion of institutions in political, social 
and economic spheres so that a powerful ruling bloc can be created that will pursue 
the interests of the community. In contrast to the liberals, the aim of democracy is not 
to transform society into civil society that increases individual freedom, but rather to 
transform society in such a way that will facilitate the pursuit of the communal good 
(Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 60-61). The liberationists view democracy as a process 
that transforms society through empowering the previously disenfranchised 
community. In summary, democracy for them can be equated to the process of black 
empowerment, and all forces that impede policies designed to foster such changes are 
essentially viewed as undemocratic (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996:60). 
 
Transformation for the liberationist refers to transforming society in order to 
emancipate the majority from material suffering. The liberationist wishes to transform 
society in such a way that those individuals who were disempowered (in a political, 
economic and social sense) under the Apartheid regime, are given the necessary 
political, economic and social stimuli in order to uplift them from their current 
oppressed situation. The liberationists do not place an emphasis on individual 
autonomy, but rather on group emancipation. Consequently, it can be deduced that the 
liberationists’ view of equality is not the same as that of the liberals. Liberationists 
hold that equality is not equated to individuals being equal to pursue their own 
conceptions of what is desirable in life. Rather, equality to the liberationists is more 
closely aligned to the idea of having equal access to material benefits of democracy. 
 
From the presentation above, it should be evident that there exists a correlation 
between the cultural framework sketched as well as meanings associated with 
democracy. The liberal model with its emphasis on the individual, the rule of law and 
institutional separation geared towards enhancing individual freedom, is consistent 
with the low-context cultural value of individualism. Furthermore, corresponding 
interpretations of the rule of law and equality before law, is another corollary to the 
low-context perspective.  The liberationist model fits aptly with the high-context 
perspective with its emphasis on the community and the merging of spheres of society 
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in order to achieve communal goals. The retrospective view of the liberationists, 
regarding their viewing of democracy as a vehicle for emancipation, ties it with the 
idea of the importance of history and subsequent significance associated with past 
events in forming current context, as is characteristic of high-context cultures.    
 
3.2.2.3 Critiquing the dichotomy 
 
Creating a distinction between the different perceptions of democracy, as was done in 
the preceding paragraphs, serves as an example of how the debate surrounding 
democracy and democratic consolidation can be framed in the South African context. 
It is especially useful for the purposes of this dissertation due to the centrality of the 
role of transformation in both democratic models described. It must however also be 
noted that such a dichotomy on interpretations of democracy is open to a wide variety 
of critique.  
 
Hudson (2003: 93-94) touches on the problems of creating a dichotomy on 
interpretations of democracy when the author discusses the nature of the South 
African transformation project. He notes that some authors describe the nature of 
South Africa’s democracy through employing a conceptual distinction between 
‘liberation democracy’, involving the permanent capture of state power and resources, 
and ‘liberal democracy’ characterised by neutrality, tolerance and pluralism. This 
distinction corresponds to the one used in this thesis. Hudson then continues to argue 
that creating such a dichotomy when discussing the nature of South Africa’s 
democracy is inherently flawed due to its limited prescriptive nature. He argues that 
the principles such as freedom and equality that underlie the very nature of democracy 
“… cannot be caught by any distinction as coarse as that between ‘liberal’ and 
‘liberation democracy’.” (Hudson, 2003: 94).  
 
This is a duly noted criticism on creating a dichotomy for interpreting meanings 
associated with democracy in South Africa, and is one that is not lost on the 
researcher. This problem of limiting the debate to a mere conceptual distinction is 
hopefully overcome by the attention that is given to the very nature of freedom and 
equality that can be equated to specific models of democracy and subsequently 
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transformation. In the following sections, particular attention is paid to the strands of 
equality and freedom that underlie transformation, and in so doing show that it is 
possible to capture the underlying principles of democracy in South Africa in the 
distinction of ‘liberal’ and ‘liberationist’ democracy. What enables one to do this is 
the conception and justification of transformation by the ANC, as will be disused in 
the following pages. Suffice to say that, although such a dichotomy does not capture 
all the relevant principles of democratic theory, it successfully captures the 
distinctions that can be drawn on approaches to facilitating transformation and 
democratic consolidation in the South African context. 
 
Another way of critiquing such a dichotomy is through specific ideas concerning what 
constitutes liberal and liberationist paradigms on democracy. Krista Johnson (2002; 
2003) and Dale McKinley (2001) both argue that the ANC displays significant 
amounts of what is known as liberal democratic theory, and that a distinction between 
two such paradigms does not explain much variance on what constitutes liberal 
democracy. Johnson (2002; 2003) frames the issue of democratic consolidation in the 
light of Gagiano and du Toit (1996) in that the author focuses on the issue of state and 
societal interactions. Johnson (2002:223-229) identifies roughly the same conceptual 
distinction as the one used in this dissertation, but labels them liberal and popular 
conceptions of democracy. For Johnson though, there are sufficient features of classic 
liberal democracy within the ANC’s interpretation of democracy. 
 
Johnson (2002:229-233) argues that the ANC employs a mixture of these models of 
democracy. In a sense, the ANC conforms to notions of liberal democracies 
concerning the functioning of the economy and the protection of fundamental 
individual rights. Although the ANC is aware of international pressure and has 
consequently reformulated economic policies relating to socio-economic outcomes, it  
rejects the notions of limited state and ideas of a robust and autonomous civil society. 
ANC leadership and liberalism have, however, diverged around the issue of balancing 
socio-economic and political rights. This is based around the issue of poverty and the 
pervasive nature of poverty amongst large segments of the population (Johnson, 2003: 
337).  
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3.2.3 Transformation6 
 
It is clear, from the discussion above, that the normative meaning associated with 
transformation can be dependent upon the view of democracy that is ascribed to. 
Regardless of normative ascriptions individuals might have towards democracy and 
transformation, transformation is seen as a long-term policy goal of the ruling ANC 
and forms a major part of the political landscape in South Africa. Transformation is 
cited as a goal of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which forms a key 
component of the ANC’s overarching democratic goals (Netshitenzhe, 1996; 
Pretorius, 2006). Furthermore, the transformation project is used as justification for 
current policies of Affirmative Action and black Economic Empowerment (Hudson, 
2000; Stacey, 2003).  
 
Despite the importance of and regular reference to transformation, it has, to date, not 
been explicitly defined. Definitions include, amongst others, that transformation refers 
to achieving demographic representative composition within all institutions of society 
and gaining control of all sites of power, specifically state institutions (du Toit, 2006: 
4). The objective of transformation refers to the establishment of a society 
characterised by proper racial balance and representivity throughout all sectors, 
classes and status orders (Hudson, 2000:96). The form of transformation espoused by 
the ANC has a distinct racial and therefore specific group character to it. 
 
This section serves to illustrate the ideological canvas against which the current 
project of transformation, as advocated by the ANC, gains justification. This section 
also wishes to highlight associations between transformation, the liberal and 
liberationist models of democracy and the cultural framework adopted7. Hudson 
(2000) examines the role of liberal individualist and collectivist conceptions of the 
good in the politics of transformation in South Africa. The author finds that the 
current transformation process followed by the ANC follows a strong collectivist 
                                                 
6
 This section serves as an introductory discussion on transformation, and how the concept relates to 
the theoretical framework of the thesis. This section ties closely with section 4.2, in which 
transformation is discussed with specific reference to the role it plays in ANC rhetoric and democray in 
South Africa. 
7
 In section 4.2 transformation is discussed in terms of specific ANC documents 
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strand and gains justification through specific conceptions of liberty and equality that 
allow for the good of the individual to be subordinated to that of the collective. 
 
The individual theory of liberty under consideration rests on the premise of pluralistic 
negative liberty and a neutral state. This principle of liberty views individuals as 
moral gents, able to perform, revise and pursue individual conceptions of the good. 
This view allows for all conceptions of the good to be pursued, as long as the pursuit 
of set good by an individual does not hinder other individuals’ ability to follow their 
own conception of the good. Excluded from this view are all those conceptions of the 
good that, if pursued, leads to a net decrease in conceptions of the good eventually 
sought by individuals throughout society. A plurality of reasonable conceptions of the 
good is allowed for under this principle, and individuals should enjoy the ‘maximum 
degree of non-interference’ (negative liberty) to pursue their conception of the good. 
In this view, society is “…best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not 
presuppose any particular conception of the good, for any other arrangement would 
fail to respect individuals [them] as moral persons capable of autonomously choosing 
and practising their conceptions of the good.” (Hudson, 2000: 94-95).  
 
The theory of negative liberty holds that equality supposes that political decisions 
must be independent of any particular conception of the good. Equality in this view 
consists of a distribution of negative liberty that is equal across all individuals and 
only societal configurations that do not abrogate any individuals’ negative liberty can 
satisfy requirements of equality in society. What is of importance to this strand of 
liberalism is that the ‘normative priority’ of the individual to community remains in 
tact (Hudson: 2000:95-96). In this view, the state is seen as a neutral entity that does 
not presuppose any particular conception of the good or implement policies designed 
to cater for the needs of a specific group. The state is seen as a neutral state, one that 
is guided by the goal of allowing an institutional order wherein all individuals are free 
to pursue their conception of the good and equality is held to be the equal distribution 
of negative liberty.  
 
The goal of transformation, that of transforming the ‘entire fabric of social life in 
South Africa’ in order for society to reflect proper racial representation, implies a 
specific conception of the good and that achieving the goal set by this particular 
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conception of the good can only be reached through collective action. Society is thus 
envisioned as “…a collective unit of agency, acting upon itself to achieve a certain 
outcome or structure for itself.” (Hudson, 2000: 96). Realising transformation 
therefore requires a collective action in the pursuit of a common good. More 
pertinently it is “…a common good of a specific sort, the goal held in common is not 
that of a society of autonomous liberal individuals each striving for her own good 
within a framework of state neutrality, but rather that of a society in which a specific 
conception of the good is pursued by the state…” (Hudson, 2000:96). The ‘collective’ 
referred to above, is seen as a ‘transindividual’ entity wherein individuals do not act 
separately based on choice, but rather act collectively to achieve the common good. 
Society envisioned in such a manner, acting as a collective unit, makes it possible to 
justify that the collective can rightfully determine the distribution of collectively and 
individually held rights. The good that is encapsulated by transformation is not 
acceptable within the liberal individual perspective, because the transformation 
project does not accept the “…ultimate normative priority of the individual over the 
collective.” (Hudson, 2000: 97). Rather, it places emphasis on the collective and 
allows for the collective to decide what the public good is and how it is to be pursued.  
 
Equality in this vein does not rest on individuals being able to freely pursue their own 
conception of the good life. Rather, equality refers to the idea that equal weight be 
attributed to individuals’ inputs in determining the collective good. In the latter 
perspective, equality rests on equal inputs in determining the common good and 
collective decisions, and not on the individuals’ ability to pursue differing 
interpretations of the good (Hudson, 2000: 98-99).  
 
The transformation project subscribed to by the ANC gives the collective the right to 
decide what is in the interest of the individual. The normative priority is therefore 
placed on the collective, above the individual. It is on the basis of the priority of the 
collective over the individual, which gains justification through a specific conception 
of equality, that allows one to correlate the transformation project to the cultural 
framework adopted in this thesis. The transformation project followed by the ANC, 
with the community taking prominence over the individual, is more closely aligned to 
high-context cultural framework that favours collective well-being over individual 
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autonomy. Such a transformation project is alien to low-context cultures that gives 
priority to the individual over the community. 
 
The normative priority of the collective over the individual found in the 
transformation project can also be associated with specific democratic orientations 
that were described earlier. It is argued that those subscribing to the liberal paradigm 
of democracy, equate transformation to “…the transformation of society into civil 
society.” (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 54). Transformation must ensure that a society 
is created that can ensure and maximise individual choice. On the other hand, 
transformation for the liberationists, refers to the process of changing the current 
status quo in order to minimize inequality and redistribute resources. Transformation 
of society refers to the restructuring of society in such a way that past inequalities can 
be mitigated and remedied (Gagiano and du Toit, 1996: 60-61).  
 
Transformation can therefore be seen as playing a central role in the democratic 
process for both the liberal and liberationist models of democracy. It should also be 
evident that the liberationist model of democracy aligns more closely to that of the 
conception of transformation described above, with its focus on past inequalities and 
mitigates these by placing the good of the community over that of the individual. The 
transformation project followed by the ANC is quite clearly unacceptable within a 
liberal perspective of democracy which favours the autonomy of the individual over 
that of the collective as well as equating transformation to an act that increases 
individual autonomy. The main difference is in how equality is conceived, with the 
liberals holding that all individuals must be free to pursue their conception of the 
good life, whilst liberationists equate equality to equal input in collective decision 
making.  
 
The acceptability of the transformation project by society can therefore be seen to be 
dependent on the strand of democracy that is subscribed to. The current 
transformation project followed by the ANC is, as stated above, unacceptable to the 
liberals, for whom transformation of society aims to transform society into one with 
institutional separation, thus ensuring individual freedom. In contrast, the current 
transformation project espoused fits aptly within liberationists conceptions of 
democracy, as it is linked to a specific community (previously disenfranchised) and, 
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in essence, is what the democratisation project is all about. The goal of democracy for 
the liberationists entail that society is transformed into a new social order with strong 
racial preferences, rectifying the injustices of the Apartheid regime in South Africa.  
The proposed goal of the transformation project enables one to further link views on 
democracy and transformation with the cultural framework. The idea that 
transformation is geared towards the benefit of the individual within the liberal 
perspective further strengthens the argument that it can be correlated to the low-
context cultural perspective. In contrast to this is the idea that the goal of the 
transformation project is to improve the quality of life for a specific community, 
aligns the liberationist perspective on transformation with the high-context cultural 
perspective. It is the value orientation of prominence of the community, as apposed to 
the individual, that place it within a specific cultural framework. 
 
3.2.4 Law and the principle of the ‘rule of law’ 
 
Within the legal field there are many ways of viewing and interpreting the law. For 
the purposes of this study, only a select number of interpretations of the law will be 
focussed on. This is done to ensure conceptual clarity and also to ensure that the 
concept is workable and understandable. This section wishes to define law, explore 
the principle of rule of law as well as highlighting differing ideological interpretations 
of law.  
 
3.2.4.1 South African Common Law 
 
The term common law refers to the law that is common to a particular geographic 
region and/or group of people. The term is usually used to refer to a whole country or 
large region, as opposed to area specific laws of communities or small groups. More 
specifically, common law in essence refers to the law that is commonly interpreted 
and applied in the courts of a specific country (du Plessis, 1999: 18-19). The South 
African common law, as interpreted by the courts, has its roots in laws that were 
common to the Netherlands and Europe. The common law in these countries was, in 
turn, strongly influenced by Roman law. This legal system was subsequently 
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transplanted to South Africa by the colonial settlers from the Netherlands. The South 
African common law has evolved from of this milieu and, over time, to form an 
interpretation of law with strong influences from Western Europe (especially the 
Netherlands) and Roman law.  
 
In South Africa, the Interpretations Act 33 of 1957 defines law as “…any 
proclamation, ordinance, Act of parliament or other enactment having the force of 
law.” (du Plessis, 2002:20). Law then refers to any positive or national law as laid 
down by the state with laws being merely rules laid down by an institution with the 
power and authority to do so. In South Africa, the Constitution of 1996 is viewed as 
the supreme document of law resulting in South Africa employing a constitutional 
system. Furthermore, it is enshrined in the Constitution that the principle of the rule of 
law is viewed as a funding provision of the Republic of South Africa (Constitution of 
RSA, 1996). Through stating this in the Constitution, it is stipulated that the South 
African society is guided by the principle of rule of law.  
 
3.2.4.2 The rule of law 
 
Maravall and Przeworski (2003:1) assert that “…a normative conception of the rule of 
law is a figment of the imagination of jurists.”. Those discussing the principle often 
affirm that the point of rule of law is to institute a government of laws, not of men. 
Other phrases that are commonly linked to the term include the ‘sovereignty of law’, 
or the ‘supremacy of law’. “All this is empty rhetoric. The law being a human 
creation, must necessarily be subject to human will. In fact, the very term “rule of 
law” is in itself rhetorical. The law cannot rule. Ruling is an activity, and laws cannot 
act.” (Sánchez-Guenca, 2003: 62). Another term that is less ambiguous or rhetorical 
referring to the same principle, is that of the Rechtsstaat, as it is free of these 
metaphysical implications8.  
 
Rhetorical questions and metaphysical considerations aside, the principle of the rule 
of law is one that is concerned with obligation, obedience or compliance (Maravall 
                                                 
8
 For the purposes of this dissertation, the terms are either interchangeable or are held to represent the 
same principle.  
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and Przeworski, 2003:1). “The idea behind the rule of law is that of universal 
compliance with the rules that define the political system and regulate its 
functioning.” (Sánchez-Guenca, 2003: 63). The rule of law can therefore be viewed as 
being in effect when those with the authority to make, administer and apply the rules 
in official capacity, do so consistently and in accordance with the rules. A valuable 
effect of the rule of law is that it enables individual autonomy. Rule of law makes it 
possible for individuals to predict the consequences of their actions and therefore plan 
their lives accordingly (Maravall and Przeworski, 2003:2).  
 
The rule of law also creates a framework that facilitates institutional stability. Astable 
system is characterised by the adherence to set laws and one wherein all conflicts are 
resolved according to rules (Sánchez-Guenca, 2003: 64).  The rule of law therefore 
creates a regulatory framework that governs, guides and normalises all forms of 
interaction in society, at individual and institutional levels. The universality of the rule 
of law in that it regulates all human interaction on a personal and institutional level, 
creating a social configuration that is guided by pre-determined rules and norms, 
increases freedom by perpetuating stability and predictability of human interactions. 
People can plan their actions according to laws as they know which actions will solicit 
certain consequences. It is argued that people are free because of the predictability 
and stability that the rule of law creates in their daily interactions.  
 
Thus far, only what is enabled or achieved through the rule of law has been discussed, 
not the principle of the rule of law as such. Sánchez-Guenca (2003:67-69) argues that 
the rule of law is a property of a political system. The rule of law only exists when 
there is compliance with the law and the law satisfies certain minimal requirements. 
The rule of law can be defined as compliance with the law when the law is general, 
public, prospective, clear, consistent, performable and stable (Sánchez-Guenca, 2003: 
69; Maravall, 2003: 261). In essence, the rule of law refers to the idea that all 
interactions, on an individual and institutional level, must be conducted within legal 
constraints placed on them by the law. For the principle of rule of law to be valid, it 
must rest on a system of laws that are consistent with the above criteria.  
 
If the above definition of the rule of law and law is accepted, it binds one to accepting 
that certain oppressive political configurations such as a dictatorship or a system such 
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as Apartheid, are totally acceptable under the principle of rule of law. There are those 
for whom such a conception of the law is appalling, whilst others might find this to be 
totally acceptable9. Sánchez-Guenca (2003: 70) argues that what is of concern here is 
the issue of compliance and that the sensibility of settling the issue lies in creating a 
distinction between two senses of the rule of law; one a weak and static, the other 
strong and dynamic. The differentiating element between the two lies in the 
distinction between obeying the law and being subject to the law. “The idea of 
obeying the law does not presuppose anything regarding the reasons that explain 
compliance.”. It is possible that “…someone could obey the law simply because he 
makes the law at will. The idea of being subject to the law is more demanding: now 
rulers face constraints that limit their capacity to change the law.”. Contrasting to this, 
the weak sense of the rule of law does not include the issue of changing the rules. It is 
static, “…because it does not make any assumptions about the fate of the rules.” 
(Sánchez-Guenca, 2003: 71). As the author notes, the strong senses dynamism lies in 
the fact that the assumption is made that rulers face certain constraints with respect to 
changing laws.10 The strong sense of the rule of law is therefore the one that we are 
concerned with, as it deals with the issue of compliance to the rules by the rulers. 
 
Within South Africa, with its legacy of oppressive state institutions, the principle of 
rule of law has taken on a distinct rights-based hue. In the Republic, the rule of law 
implies “… the need for the state to be guided by fundamental rights, and for the 
government to respect the individual’s basic rights … especially human dignity, 
equality, life and freedom. The concept of rule of law has both substantive and 
procedural aspects. The substantive aspect refers to its content, for example, the right 
to freedom of expression and precisely what this right entails. The procedural aspect 
refers to the way in which the protection of substantive rights is achieved. The rule of 
law requires a fair procedure to be followed when a human rights issue is decided in 
court. The rule of law requires that the law must be impartially enforced, by 
                                                 
9
 “Some doctrines of rule of law, notably in Germany, were born without any democratic pedigree” 
(Sánchez-Guenca, 2003:70). Rule of law can therefore be in force without the political system being 
democratic.  
10
 Robert Barros (2003: 188-190) also highlights the importance of this distinction. The author argues 
that there are two sense of the rule of law, one (instrumental or formal) is only concerned with formal 
characteristics necessary for laws to be seen as valid. The second implies the subjugation of lawmakers 
to the law and deals with the issue of compliance.  
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independent courts, in accordance with fair procedures that exclude arbitrary action 
by the courts.” (de Freitas, 2008: 246-247).11 
 
The rule of law therefore refers to the idea that the law is supreme — it cannot be 
refuted and all individuals in a given country, including those with the power to 
change laws, are subject to it. The emphasis on the impartiality of law and the 
subscription of everyone to it, implies that the rule of law principle can be more 
closely linked to low-context cultures than high-context cultures. It is not a principle 
that is incompatible within high-context cultures per se, but rather the implications 
and meanings that are usually associated with the principle are more closely aligned 
with the view of the law of in low-context cultures.  
 
The importance, impartiality and authority of the law in low-context cultures has the 
effect that the principle of rule of law is almost seen as the highest or most valued 
characteristic for maintaining social order in such societies. The principle has a lesser 
degree of significance to the high-context cultures due to the fact that authority is 
historically derived and strengthened and cannot merely take precedent without 
considering the entire fabric of social reality or the context of a situation (Cohen, 
1997). Supporting such a notion, Hofstede found that for collectivist cultures “laws 
and rights differ by group according to tradition and religion” contrasted to 
individualistic cultures which hold that “laws and rights should be the same for all” 
(2001:251). It should be evident that the law and rule of law can have differing 
meanings to those cultures influenced by an individual or communal ethos.   
 
3.2.4.3 Interpretations of the law 
 
A way in which to link the law and the rule of law more closely to the adopted 
cultural framework, is to investigate the ideological starting point of how the law, in a 
very general sense, is viewed. Natural law and positivism (legal positivism) are two 
main theories of law and are important ideologies that form the foundation of law. 
Natural law theorists subscribe to the idea of the existence of, not only, positive legal 
                                                 
11
 More attention will be given to the substantive aspect of the South African laws in the following 
chapter.  
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systems (human structures and laws), but also to that of a ‘deeper’ or ‘higher’ order of 
legal authority. This theory holds that natural law is valid universally, without the 
intervention of any human legislator or legal procedures and accommodates a system 
of values against which a specific legal system, values and norms can be measured. 
Another important aspect of natural law thinkers is that it does not separate law from 
morality, but views the two as part of an inseparable reality. This in turn, leads to the 
fact that natural law subscribers tend to view the law as it should be, or ought to be 
(lex ferenda). There exists no single ‘higher/deeper moral authorative source’ for 
natural law thinkers, with some grounding their ideas of the higher order of morality 
in religion, whilst others ground it in human rationality. The higher, or moral order, 
can also be constructed from historically derived notions of what is right or just (du 
Plessis, 1999: 35; Heywood, 2002:302; Meintjies-van der Walt, 2008: 17-18).  
 
Legal positivists do not speculate about a higher or deeper moral authority against 
which laws must be tested for validity. Rather, these jurists argue that ‘the law is the 
law’, irrespective of moral standards and that the law consists of facts that can be 
traced to formal sources of law such as legislation. Furthermore, legal positivists 
argue that the law can be deduced from certain social phenomena or principles. 
Positivist do not preoccupy themselves with whether the law is just or morally 
acceptable, they place greater emphasis on the systematic organisation of legal rules, 
concepts and norms. Legal positivists make a clear and definitive distinction between 
law and morality and they are concerned with the law as it is (lex lata) and not as it 
should be (du Plessis, 1999: 36; Heywood, 2002:302; Meintjies-van der Walt, 2008: 
19). It should also be noted that within the positivist interpretation, it is totally 
acceptable to uphold unjust laws. Under the Apartheid regime, discriminatory laws 
were deemed ‘legal’ and acceptable by legal positivists, due to the procedural and rule 
based nature of their creation.  
 
From the above it should be evident that the interpretations of law can also be 
connected to Cohen’s (1997) framework of culture. Naturalist interpretations of the 
law are more closely aligned to the high-context cultural perspective due to the fusion 
of law and morality. Morality can again be linked to the subjective notion of what is 
perceived to be just, right or morally acceptable. Also, the composition of ‘moral 
acceptability’ can be influenced by past experiences and an explicit notion of what 
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equality and justice mean, as they gain their significance from past occurrences, 
(highlighting the importance of history). In contrast to this, the legal positivist 
interpretation can be placed in the low-context cultural perspective that embodies the 
idea of the law as being applicable to all, irrespective of social context and includes 
the principle of ‘equality before the law’. The fact that morality and law are separated 
from each other, further ties it to the notion of the validity of an abstract notion of 
justice found in low-context cultures.  
 
3.2.5 The state 
 
The definition below by Martin van Creveld (1999) that describes the state in general 
terms is not exclusive and holds true for what the state is in an absolute sense. This 
definition of the state is also in accordance with how those within the low-context 
cultures tend to understand the term. The more specific definition of characteristics of 
the state is borrowed from Adrian Leftwich (2000) and his idea of a developmental 
state. The idea of a developmental state, it will be argued, can be more closely linked 
to those individuals who form part of the high-context cultures. It should be noted that 
these definitions are not mutually exclusive, they merely serve to illustrate the 
possible differing interpretations of the role of, and normative understandings 
associated with the state. 
 
“The state, then, is an abstract entity which can neither be seen, nor heard, nor 
touched. This entity is neither identical with the rulers or the ruled; neither President 
Clinton, nor citizen Smith, nor even an assembly of all the citizens acting in common 
can claim that they are the state. On the other hand, it includes them both and claims 
to stand over them both. This is as much to say that the state, being separate from both 
its members and its rulers, is a corporation, just as universities, trade unions and 
churches inter alia are. Much like any corporation, it too has directors, employees and 
shareholders. Above all, it is a corporation in the sense that it possesses a legal 
persona of its own, which means that it has rights and duties and may engage in 
various activities as if it were a real flesh-and-blood, living individual. The points 
where the state differs from other corporations are, first, the fact that it authorizes 
them all but is itself authorized (recognized) solely by others of its kind; secondly, 
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that certain functions (known collectively as the attributes of sovereignty) are 
reserved for it alone; and, thirdly, that it exercises those functions over a certain 
territory inside which its jurisdiction is both exclusive and all-embracing.” (van 
Creveld, 1999:1).    
 
This definition emphasises the notion that the state is an abstract entity that is not 
equated with any specific group in society and embodies the idea that the state exists 
independently of the type of regime in the country. The regime decides on the specific 
policy directives to be followed. The policy goals, or objectives, ultimately determine 
the characteristics of the state and define, more concretely, what the state is in a 
substantive sense. The idea that the state has a legal persona, but is not equated to any 
specific group in society, aligns it with the notion of abstract legal authority that is 
found in the low-context cultural framework.  
 
A further definition of the state is put forth by Leftwich (2000:155) who argues that 
“…developmental states are those states whose politics have concentrated sufficient 
power, autonomy, capacity and legitimacy at the centre to shape, pursue and 
encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether by 
establishing and promoting the conditions of economic growth (in the capitalist 
developmental states), by organizing it directly (in the ‘socialist’ variants), or a 
varying combination of both. Such states are not common.” 
 
Furthermore, Leftwich (2000:160-7) identifies a number of characteristics that a state 
must possess in order to comply with his model of a developmental state. Firstly, the 
state requires developmental elite that have a developmental determination, 
commitment to economic growth and transformation and the capacity to follow 
through on their goals. This is also characterised by a core policy circle surrounding 
the leadership that is usually relatively small. Secondly, relative autonomy of elites 
and the institutions the state commands is required. Leftwich is referring to the 
autonomy of well developed bureaucracies that are embedded in a web of ties with 
state and non-state actors in order to define, re-define and implement developmental 
objectives. Thirdly, a powerful, competent and insulated bureaucracy that can 
implement and shape broad economic and social development goals, specifically 
focussing on industrial and economic policy is required. Leftwich argues that a factor 
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that increases the probability of achieving this is through electoral dominance of a 
single party (Leftwich, 2000:160-3). 
 
The fourth factor cited by Leftwich (2000:163-4) is a relatively weak and 
subordinated civil society. He argues that the state could either be incepted prior to 
development of civil society, or could subsequently penetrate and bend civil society to 
its will. Fifthly is the capacity to effectively manage private economic interests and 
negate the importance of local and international capital. The state needs to develop 
capacity and place itself in a commanding position vis-à-vis private economic 
interests and command capital, and not be commanded by it.  
 
The final two factors Leftwich (2000:165-167) describes as an uneasy mix of 
repression, poor human rights, legitimacy and performance. The author argues that 
these states are not particularly attractive in terms of their adherence to human rights 
by western-liberal or socialist standards. The state must not hesitate to undermine 
those institutions in civil society that challenge its developmental purposes, so that it 
can pursue its broader developmental goals and in so doing, undermines its character 
as a haven for the upholding of human rights. Finally, the state requires a sense of 
legitimacy that is gained through widespread support, despite what may seem as an 
unenviable human rights record (Leftwich, 2000:166-167).    
 
The state as defined by Leftwich (2000), subscribes more directly with the high-
context framework. This is due to the fact that the state is not an abstract entity that 
does not form a direct part in society, but is rather the major actor in society. The 
state, in this sense, is geared towards achieving certain developmental goals and 
pursuing the good of the community. This pursuit of addressing inequalities within 
the framework of pursuing a public good has the effect that the ‘developmental state’ 
aligns more closely with the high-context culture, whilst the abstract and universal 
nature of the state as defined by van Creveld (1999) has closer ties to that of low-
context cultures, with the comparative emphasis on the role and universal application 
of the law. Also, the idea of a developmental state, with its focus on the attainment of 
hegemony by the ruling party, closely ties in to what Gagiano and du Toit (1996) 
view as a determining characteristic of the liberationist perspective on democracy. 
The developmental state theory, to some extent, calls for the subordination of civil 
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society to state needs, blurring the divide between political and economic elites in the 
pursuit of achieving a hegemonic power bloc capable of enforcing developmental 
objectives throughout society. Ultimately these objectives are geared towards a 
specific community and this further highlights the shared value of communal well-
being as expressed by high-context cultures, liberationist democracy and the 
developmental state in the expression of the developmental goals. 
 
3.2.6 Land reform 
 
The issue of land reform is one that straddles the political, social and economic 
spheres of society. Furthermore, land is an emotive issue in South Africa and has 
historical and cultural significance, independent of land reform. “Land reform is 
generally accepted to mean restitution, redistribution and/or confirmation of rights in 
land to the benefit of the poor or dispossessed. Land reform is therefore more than a 
mere land-claim driven process where ancestral land is claimed back to people who 
were dispossessed. Although it includes a land claim process, it is widened to refer 
also to the acquisition of land for distribution to the landless, as well as the changing 
and securing tenure to ensure protection for those who occupy it. In its broadest sense, 
land reform therefore entails a wide spectrum of options such as land claims, 
acquisition and distribution of land, access to land for certain purposes, land use 
planning, infrastructure development, farming and commercial support, resettlement 
programmes, security of tenure and training.” (de Villiers, 2003: 1-2).  
 
Land reform is therefore seen as a process of altering or changing land ownership, 
configuration and distribution. Broadly speaking two approaches to land reform can 
be identified. The first approach to land reform favours the use of the market in 
achieving land reform and can be termed market-led agrarian reform (MLAR) whilst 
the second approach favours state-led or interventionist methods to ensure land 
reform (De Villiers, 2003:3; Breytenbach, 2004: 46; Lahiff, Saturnino and Kay, 
2007:1418; Hall and Ntsebeza, 2007:17-19). These authors all argue that land reform 
can either be market driven, based on the idea of the willing-buyer-willing-seller 
(WBWS) and protected by individual property rights, or the state can take a more 
active role in land reform and redistribute land on the basis of an ideological drive to 
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ensure equal distribution of land or other developmental objectives are reached. It is 
argued that MLAR approaches uphold property rights and exclude the possibility of 
land expropriation, whilst approaches that advocate a more state-interventionist 
strategy endorse or implement land expropriations (Lahiff et al. 2007: 1422; De 
Villiers, 2003:3). 
 
James, Ngonini and Nkadimeng (2005:828) argue that the distinction of the two 
approaches can be also be labelled a ‘rights-based approach’ as apposed to a 
‘property-based/economic’ approach. The authors argue that the issue is whether 
more importance is given to ‘land rights’ or ‘property rights’. The former referring to 
the basic human right of access to land enshrined in the Constitution with the latter 
drawing credibility from the neo-liberal economic approach, resting on the principle 
of securing individual property rights. Lahiff et al. (2007:1420) argues that the basis 
for this distinction hinges on whether land reform is driven by social equity or 
economic efficiency.  
 
Regardless of how one chooses to draw the distinction between land reform 
programmes, MLAR vs. state led; equity vs. economic efficiency or land rights vs. 
property rights, the central theme is the same —there are those holding to the 
imperatives of the market and the individual right to private property and those 
favouring social equity. Usually one finds that land reform is a mixture of the two 
approaches, as is the case in South Africa (Lahiff et al 2007; Breytenbach, 2004; De 
Villiers, 2003). For the purposes of this study the defining feature of land reform 
centres around whether the land reform programme implemented is based on 
economic efficiency and market mechanisms, or whether it is driven by an ideological 
imperative of social equality.  
 
What separates these approaches most clearly, is whether land is expropriated. This is 
due to the fact that if expropriation is used, the right of the individual to own property 
is subordinated to the right of the state to pursue social equality. If expropriation 
occurs, it shows that the ‘will of the individual’ is subjected to the ‘will of the 
community’. The state expropriates land on the basis of, or in favour of, a community 
above the individual. Expropriation is the defining characteristic in determining 
whether land reform is compatible with the high-context or low-context cultural 
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perspectives. If expropriation occurs, then social equity is placed above or seen as 
more important to the individuals’ right to own private property and can be linked to 
high-context cultures. If expropriation is not an option within the land reform 
programme, then it aligns more closely with low-context cultures and the prevailing 
ethic of individualism. 
 
3.2.6.1 South African land reform programme 
 
The South African Constitution sets out a specific legal basis for land reform, 
particularly in the Bill of Rights. Section 2512 places a clear responsibility on the state 
to carry out land and related reforms, and allows for the expropriation of public 
property for a public purpose or in the public interest. The Constitution explicitly 
states that ‘the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources’ 
(Lahiff, 2007:1579).  
 
                                                 
12
 25. Property: (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application-- 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have 
either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, 
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having 
regard to all relevant circumstances, including- 
(a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(e) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficia1 capital improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the 
expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section- 
(a) the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about 
equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources; and (b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to 
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of 
section 36 (1). 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6) (Constitution of RSA, 1996). 
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Lahiff (2007:1577-1580) argues that since the transition to democracy, South Africa’s 
land redistribution programme has fallen entirely within the parameters of MLAR. 
This is due to conservative forces within the country, international backing of MLAR, 
and the adoption of neo-liberal policies by the ANC. The author argues that although 
the concept of WBWS entered into policy discourse during the period of 1993-96, it 
was entirely absent in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
documents and from earlier ANC policy statements, such as the 1992 Ready to 
Govern document. Although South Africa’s land reform programme is classified as a 
market led approach, it differs from standard MLAR programmes in that it is not seen 
as a single and coherent policy approach, but rather as an outcome of competing 
imperatives and contending political ideologies.  
 
The Republic’s land reform programme is more closely associated with MLAR, than 
other populist or state interventionist approaches to the problem. The land reform 
programme of the South African government is comprised of three specific policies: 
restitution (land restoration), redistribution and tenure reform. Each of these specific 
categories has accompanying legislation to guide the state in implementing the 
programme. Although there are constitutional provisions that provide for the 
expropriation of land, it has not been used by the state, due to constraints and 
prescription within this section of the Constitution. Expropriation of land under the 
current legal stipulations would not speed up land reform. It would actually slow the 
process down, due to the protection of landowner rights and their right to contest such 
matters in court. Expropriation cases would be held up in courts, further delaying the 
process of land reform (Hofstatter, 2009 (b)).  
 
Land restitution aims to return land that was taken away from South Africans during 
apartheid or to compensate claimants for their land by financial means. Land claims 
can be instituted against expropriation that occurred after the enactment of the 1913 
Native Land Act, or in any case where forced removals took place. Land claims are 
dealt with by the Land Claims Court and the Land Claims Commission (Bosman, 
2007:5) 
 
Redistribution attempts to increase black ownership of land by providing land to 
previously disadvantaged and poor individuals for residential and productive 
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agricultural purposes. The primary beneficiaries of this programme are the rural poor, 
farm workers, labour tenants and new participants in agriculture. Redistribution is 
primarily focused on rural beneficiaries, although it does include the urban poor 
(Bosman, 2007: 5). 
 
Settlement Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG) of R16 000 cash was the original means 
of encouraging redistribution and was granted to successful redistribution applicants. 
In 2002, SLAG was replaced by Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
(LRAD). The most notable difference between the two programmes was that 
beneficiaries did not require a specific minimum income in order to qualify for 
LRAD. The SLAG grant was also increased to between R20 000 and R 100 000 for 
the LRAD programme. These programmes were designed in order to enable black 
South Africans to enter the agricultural sector in a successful manner (Bosman, 2007: 
5; Lahiff, 2007:1580). 
 
Land tenure reform is aimed at providing secure tenure for all South Africans. The 
aim of this programme is to provide security to tenants of communal property and 
homes, in order to prevent arbitrary evictions (Bosman, 2007: 6). 
 
The legal framework within which the South African state attempts to address the 
land reform issue, through the above mentioned programmes, is that of a liberal-legal 
framework (James, 2007:17). Various legislative acts have been created to ensure the 
continued legal functioning of the land reform programme.  
 
The 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act provides for the restitution of rights in land 
to persons and communities disposed after 19 June 1913 or as a result of 
discriminatory practices. The Act also established the Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights and the Land Claims Court. In 1996, the Communal Property 
Associations Act was created to enable groups to acquire, hold and manage property. 
The Land Reform Act (Labour Tenants Act) of 1996 safeguards the rights of labour 
tenants who had been remunerated for labour primarily by the right to occupy and use 
land. The 1996 Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act protected people with 
informal rights and interests from evictions, pending more comprehensive tenure 
legislation. In 1997 The Extension of Security of Tenure Act was created to give farm 
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occupants rights on private land, establishing a procedure that must be followed 
before evictions of such people can occur. In 2004, The Communal Land Rights Act 
was enacted to provide legal security of tenure by transferring communal land to 
communities and to provide for its democratic administration by them (James, 2007: 
4).  
 
The South African government employs a market related approach to land reform, 
which is guided and controlled by legislation. The state therefore operates within 
standard western-liberal conceptions of the rule of law regarding land reform. To date, 
expropriation has not yet become an officially pursued means of achieving land 
reform. The state relies on MLAR which operates within the legal framework 
described above. The current land reform programme can therefore be aligned to a 
liberal democratic perspective, due to its adherence to legal constraints. 
 
3.2.7 Summary 
 
Presented above is a cultural framework which provides a theoretical perspective with 
which one can attempt to understand the complexities of the democratic project of 
South Africa. The basis for the distinction is grounded on cultural perspectives of 
high- and low-context cultures. Presented below is a tabular summary of the entire 
framework that will show how differing cultural orientations understand the different 
concepts.  
 
Table 3.2 Theoretical Framework 
 High-Context Cultures Low-Context Cultures 
The State Outcomes Based, Redistributive Impartial, Rule based 
Democracy Liberationist, Community prominence Liberal, Individual prominence 
Law Naturalist, Rule of law subjective  Positivist, Rule of law absolute 
Transformation  Serves communal interest Serves individual interests 
Land Reform  State-led; Expropriation acceptable MLAR; Expropriation unacceptable  
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3.3 Democratic consolidation 
 
The term democratic consolidation is as pervasive and ambiguous as the term 
democracy. It is a field of study wrought by conceptual elusiveness and 
equivocalness, and there is no academic or practical concurrence on the meaning of 
the term. Essentially the term refers to ensuring that democracy becomes the only 
conceivable way in which to govern or, more aptly, stated by Linz and Stepan 
(1996:15) “the only game in town”. More importantly it must be viewed as a 
continual process that occurs over a period of time and is dependent on many factors 
that are all case specific (Wnuk-Lipinski and Fuchs, 2006: 54-55). This implies that 
whatever consolidates the democracy in South Africa, will not necessarily hold true 
for consolidating democracies in other countries or regions of the world.  
 
Schedler (1998:91) argues that the term was originally meant to describe the 
challenge of not slipping back into authoritarian rule or undemocratic regimes. It was 
intended to describe the challenges of securing new democracies and extending the 
life expectancy of the democracy. Schedler (1998:96-98) highlights the importance of 
an independent state apparatus (bureaucracy, legislators and judiciary) as being of 
utmost importance for consolidating a democracy.  
 
Linz and Stepan (1996:14-18) make a more specific assessment of what is required to 
consolidate democracy. They identify civil society, political society, rule of law, 
independent state bureaucracy and an institutionalised economic society as the main 
requirements to consolidate democracy. The authors highlight the problem of 
simultaneously liberalizing the economy and political democratization as major 
threats to democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996:23).  
 
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (1996:39) found that for a country to have 
a successful democratic regime, certain conditions must be present. These are 
affluence, growth with moderate inflation, declining inequality, a favourable 
international climate and parliamentary institutions. Once a country has become a 
democratic regime, the level of economic development has a strong effect on the 
probability of democratic survival (Przeworski et al., 1996:40-42). The authors also 
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highlight the importance of political institutions and argue that a parliamentary system 
is more conducive to consolidating democracy than a presidential system (Przeworski 
et al., 1996: 44).  
 
Regardless of the widely held views on what the term means, there is some consensus 
surrounding democratic consolidation. Most prominently, that it is a process of 
entrenching the system of democracy where once other political systems reigned 
supreme and implying, as such, a time dimension. In the South African case, it is the 
transition from minority Apartheid rule to majority democratic rule. There are many 
other commonalities identified by authors on constraints towards, and conditions 
favouring, democratic consolidation. Economic development (affluence, reduction in 
income inequality), effective state bureaucracy and political institution, the rule of law 
and the importance of a vibrant civil society are some of the characteristics shared by 
authors (Schedler, 1998; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Przeworski et al, 2000; Leftwich, 
2000). Ethnic, cultural and religious diversity make for a more difficult situation for 
democratic consolidation and pose a major threat to consolidating democracy (Linz & 
Stepan, 1996; Leftwich, 2000).  
 
The problem of simultaneous economic liberalization and political democratization is 
sited by Leftwich (2000) and Przeworski et al. (1996) as a major constraint for 
democratic consolidation and Leftwich (2000:129-130) makes the argument that this 
is the single most difficult issue facing developing democracies. Leftwich (2000: 135) 
argues that a democracy can seen to be consolidated when “…people, political parties 
and groups pursue their interests according to peaceful, rule-based competition, 
negotiation and cooperation, and where there is agreement that the succession of one 
government by another is decided by these means.”.  
 
Leftwich (2000:136-145) argues that there are five main conditions for democratic 
consolidation. Firstly, the regime must be legitimate, which in a practical sense, is that 
it must be acceptable to the public. Legitimacy, it is argued, has three categories that 
Leftwich defines as geographical legitimacy in that the state governs a specific area; 
constitutional legitimacy that refers to the ascription to the constitution as the supreme 
document of law; and political legitimacy that refers to the extent to which the public 
feels the current government is entitled to being in power (Leftwich, 2000:136-8).  
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The second condition is what the author calls ‘adherence to the rules of the game’ and 
this is comprised of a sense of agreement about the rules and procedures of the 
democratic system. All parties within a multi-party system must subscribe to the same 
rules and adhere to them regardless of electoral outcomes. This can be seen as the 
subscription to the rule of law and the consequent institutionalization of democratic 
practises and procedures. Policy restraint by the winning parties is seen as the third 
condition to consolidating democracies and refers to the winners of the elections not 
changing the rules dramatically in order to stay in power or to, in any way, draw 
greater benefits from the system (Leftwich, 2000:138-142). 
 
Poverty, as an obstacle to democratic consolidation, is identified as the fourth 
condition pertaining to consolidating the democracy. This includes that the economy 
must be healthy and show a reasonable growth rate, and also that the state must not be 
seen as a vehicle to procure wealth and power. Furthermore poverty implies that there 
are low literacy and education levels, both of which are not conducive to 
consolidating a democracy (Leftwich, 2000:142-3). Finally, Leftwich (2000: 143-5), 
identifies ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages, particularly when they align with 
material inequalities, as major constraints to democratic consolidation.  
 
Parallel to these five highlighted, though essentially structural conditions, the author 
also argues that there are broader factors that enable democracies to consolidate. 
Firstly, the simple fact that the longer a democracy exits, the greater the chance of 
consolidating the democracy becomes. Furthermore, democracies have a higher 
probability of consolidation if the economy does not contract or stagnate and, 
concurrent to this, is the idea that material inequalities should diminish. Chances of 
consolidation decline when inequalities, in material terms, increase. The author also 
argues that parliamentary systems tend to have a greater chance of consolidation than 
presidential systems. Finally, a rich and pluralistic civil society greatly increases the 
chances of democratic consolidation (Leftwich, 2000:145-7). 
 
 
 
 81
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to create an interpretive framework within which South Africa’s 
prospects for consolidating democracy will be assessed. The chapter proposed a 
cultural framework within which to place concepts such as democracy, 
transformation, the state, the role of law and land reform. It was proposed throughout 
that the shared value that links differing understandings of these concepts to a specific 
cultural framework is whether the individual or community gains prominence.  
 
Low-context cultures, with the emphasis on the role of the individual, align with the 
liberal model of democracy which argues democracy’s goal is to enhance individual 
freedom and choice. Transformation for low-context liberals is the process of 
ensuring this freedom through the separation of institutional spheres of society 
(economic, social and political). Law is considered an abstract entity that holds all 
equal before it with the rule of law principle being crucial in maintaining democracy 
and transformation. The state is seen as a neutral referee acting on the behalf of all 
citizens to ensure that everyone under its jurisdiction enjoys the freedoms and rights 
associated with the law and democracy. It is believed within this framework that land 
reform should always honour the rights of the individual to private property and 
his/her willingness to partake in land reform.  
 
High-context cultures place the emphasis on the community above the individual, and 
align closely to the liberationist model of democracy which argues that the 
emancipation of the oppressed community is the goal of democracy. Transformation 
for high-context liberationist is the process of ensuring the previously oppressed 
community is rescued from economic, social and political deprivation. Law is not 
seen as the ultimate important principle and is not void of context. The state in this 
view is seen as an active role player in realising the goals of a certain community. The 
state is not viewed as an abstract legal entity or referee, but rather as an active agent 
in the development of specific goals for the benefit of a specific group within society, 
and can be aligned to the idea of a developmental state. This cultural perspective does 
not necessarily hold to the principle that all are equal before the law. Law is rather 
viewed as another institution that can facilitate emancipation. Land reform is assumed 
 82
to be geared towards the needs of the previously disenfranchised community, and 
these needs supersede the individual right to private property.  
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Chapter 4: The South African democratic project 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will build on the theoretical framework of the previous chapter. It serves 
to illustrate how democracy is understood within the South African context and more 
specifically, focuses on the ANC’s definition of democracy and transformation. It will 
be the aim to place the ANC within the theoretical framework described, and 
investigate whether the ANC is in alignment with liberationist democracy or with the 
liberal perspective on democracy. Attention is also paid to the relevance of using 
culture in explaining variances in normative ascriptions of democracy. Contemporary 
issues surrounding land reform conclude the chapter.  
 
4.2 Democracy in South Africa13 
 
A discussion of democracy in South Africa is in part guided by two major factors. The 
first being the nature of the Republic’s negotiated transition from Apartheid to a 
democracy. This process, however, with negotiation being completed, is still 
galvanizing the current democratic dispensation. Otherwise stated, South Africa is 
still in the process of deepening or consolidating its relatively young democracy. The 
assumption in this dissertation, that South Africa is in the process of achieving a 
stable democratic order, is one that is found throughout the literature on South African 
politics14. During the South African negotiation and transition period, the negotiating 
parties held different views of meanings, methods and goals of the negotiations. The 
priority was however on moving negotiations forward and, as a result, fundamental 
disagreements about issues such as the normative meanings associated with the 
Constitution and underlying principles were ignored at the expense of successfully 
completing the negotiations. These diverging opinions remain today and pose a 
serious threat to the durability of the democratic project (du Toit, 2003; du Toit, 
2004). 
                                                 
13
 This section and sections 3.2.2.2, and 3.2.3 from the previous chapter are complementary with 
relation to describing democracy in South Africa and are closely linked.  
14
 Works that argue South Africa’s democracy is still the process of consolidating include: R, Southall 
(ed), 2001; U, van Beek (ed.) 2005; Saul, 2005; Mangcu, 2008; F, Slabbert, 2006; Gumede, 2008. 
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The second factor to consider when discussing the nature of democracy in South 
Africa, is the dominance of the political sphere by the African National Congress. The 
ANC enjoys such an overwhelming electoral dominance and consequently 
representation in parliament, that some commentators have argued that the dominance 
of the party is one of the most defining features of the South African political 
system15. It is this dominance by the ANC and the fact that it was the major 
organisation responsible for negotiating the transition from Apartheid to democracy, 
which makes it the central player in our fledgling democracy. Therefore, any 
discussion of democracy in South Africa, is necessarily a discussion of ANC 
discourse and doctrine on democracy. The table below shows the number of seats 
parties held in the National Assembly and currently hold, highlighting ANC 
dominance. 
Table 4.1 Composition of the National Assembly 
Party 
Pre floor-crossing 
2004-05 
Post floor-crossing 
2005-09 
2009 
1 African National Congress 279 (69.75%) 293 (73.25%) 264 (66%) 
2 Democratic Alliance 50 (12.5%) 47 (11.75%) 67 (16.75%) 
3 Congress of the People - - 30 (7.5%) 
4 Inkatha Freedom Party 28 (7%) 23 (5.8%) 18 (5.75%) 
5 United Democratic Movement 9 (2.25%) 6 (1.5%) 4 (1%) 
6 Independent Democrats 7 (1.75%) 5 (1.25%) 4 (1%) 
7 African Christian Democratic Party 7 (1.75%) 4 (1%) 3 (0.75%) 
8 Freedom Front Plus 4 (1%) 4 (1%) 4 (1%) 
9 United Christian Democratic Party 3 (0.75%) 3 (0.75%) 2 (0.5%) 
10 Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 3 (0.75%) 3 (0.75%) 1 (0.25%) 
11 Minority Front 2 (0.5%) 2 (0.5%) 1 (0.25%) 
12 Azanian People's Organisation 1 (0.25%) 1 (0.25%) 1 (0.25%) 
13 National Democratic Convention - 4 (1%) - 
14 United independent Front - 2 (0.5%) - 
15 United Party of South Africa - 1 (0.25%) - 
16 Federation of Democrats - 1 (0.25%) - 
17 Progressive Independent Movement - 1 (0.25%) - 
18 New National Party  7 (1.75%) - - 
19 African People’s Convention - - 1 (0.25%) 
Source: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
                                                 
15
 Mattes, (2002: 25); Butler, (2005: 735); Giliomee, Myburg and Schlemmer, 2001.  
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Another major aspect that requires mentioning, is the nature of the democratic project 
in South Africa, with specific reference to the transformation project. Terms such as 
transformation, black Economic Empowerment and Affirmative Action are 
inseparable from the democratic reality in South Africa. Transformation is also a 
central theme in this dissertation, as it serves as a link between the theoretical and 
empirical components of the study.  
 
4.2.1 The ANC’s democracy and the role of the democratic state 
 
 
The following section must be viewed as a discussion of an interpretation of a 
conception of democracy and interrelated concepts, as held by the ANC. A discussion 
of democracy in South Africa includes concepts such as ‘the people’, ‘the public or 
common good’, ‘equality’, ‘transformation’ and ‘the rule law’. It should be noted that 
all these concepts are interrelated, and in some senses are used to define one another, 
as will become evident when discussing an important aspect of ANC doctrine such as 
the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). The concepts will be discussed within 
the specific frame of ANC doctrine, as the political dominance by the organization 
leans itself towards hegemony and overarching guidance of the organs of the state. 
 
Before we commence such a discussion, a few notes are important. Firstly, this 
section will lean heavily on the work of Louwrens Pretorius (2006), and it is 
necessary to state that while this discussion of democracy is meant to assert a specific 
interpretation of democracy, it is not as Pretorius (2006: 746) states “… intended to 
support a claim to some sort of ‘objectively valid’ understanding of ‘how the ANC 
itself thinks, or what ‘meaning’ its leaders or members themselves attach to 
democracy.”. It merely serves as an exposition of what appears to be the ideological 
stance and normative definitions of democracy as purported by dominant ANC 
rhetoric, and serves as a “defensible interpretation” (Pretorius, 2006: 746).  
 
In addition, it is necessary to acknowledge, albeit on a somewhat theoretical level, the 
distinction between the procedural and substantive nature of ideal type democracies as 
put forward in the previous chapter (Dahl, 1971). Mattes (2002: 23) touches on this 
distinction in his analysis of South Africa’s democracy when he asserts that “…South 
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Africa’s democracy in form appears to be relatively healthy, but in substance shows 
signs of early decay.”. The distinction between the ‘form’ and the ‘substance’ in the 
South African is not as clearly identifiable due to the definition of democracy adopted 
by the ANC and the nature of the Constitution of 1996. The merger of ‘substance’ and 
‘procedure’ is articulated through practices such as Affirmative Action, the definition 
of equality, the goal of the transformation project, the Limitations of Rights clause 
and the inclusion of socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution of the 
Republic (Hudson, 2000; Stacey, 2003; Pretorius, 2006). Due to the nature of ANC 
ideology, the organisation’s conception of democracy differs from standard western-
liberal models. It is the nature of the ANC’s ideological starting point that allows the 
organisation to merge procedural and substantive aspects of democracy, and thus 
prompts the researcher to treat the distinction between ‘procedure’ and ‘substance’ in 
the South Africa’s case with some trepidation. 
 
Pretorius (2006: 747) also notes this merger when he asserts that, although the ANC 
subscribes to what has become known as liberal-democracy, “… its conception entails 
much more than formal procedural denotations that are commonly stipulated for this 
type. In ANC ideology, democracy is also substantive. It entails not only the 
mechanisms for selection of leaders, but also commitment to a National Democratic 
Revolution – through peaceful and constitutional means”. The National Democratic 
Revolution (NDR) is defined as “…a process of struggle that seeks the transfer of 
power to the people. When we talk of power we mean political, social and economic 
control . . . The objectives of the NDR include the transformation of South Africa into 
a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and united South Africa where all organs of the 
state are controlled by the people”. As a basic principle, the NDR looks at 
“…removing the barriers that have been set by apartheid in terms of black people and 
Africans’ access to the economy and services.” (Netshitenzhe, 1996). 
 
There are a few aspects of the above that warrant further explanation before moving 
on to the definition of democracy as adopted by the ANC. The first is the nature of 
ideological subscription followed by the ANC and the consequent merger of the 
procedural and substantive aspects of democracy within the ANC lexicon. The merger 
of the procedural and substantive aspects of democracy are clearly evident in the 
pursuit of the NDR, which promotes the transformation of society into a more equal 
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one, to control all organs of the state (hegemony) and to remove the barriers and 
inequalities created by Apartheid (Pretorius, 2006:747). This view on transformation, 
the pursuit of hegemony and addressing material hardships, places the ANC within 
the liberationist school on democracy, as discussed earlier. The blurring of the 
boundaries between party and state, and state and society is highlighted through the 
assertion that the state apparatus must be controlled by the people. Furthermore, the 
above does not stipulate what is meant by equality, whether it refers to the idea of 
equality of all or equality in communal decision making. One can however, postulate 
that the equality referred to has a distinct material connotation and group character to 
it, based on the focus of the transformation project towards righting past injustices 
that manifest in material inequality amongst a specific community or group, namely 
Africans.  
 
Another important aspect is that of the role for the democratic state in achieving the 
goals set by the NDR. It shows the primacy of the transformation project for the ANC 
and the willingness of the organisation to use state apparatus to achieve 
transformation. The role of the state is described through the NDR as defending 
“…the aspirations of the majority who have been disadvantaged by the many decades 
of undemocratic rule. Its primary task is to work for the emancipation of the black 
majority, the working people, the urban poor, the rural poor, the women, the youth 
and the disabled. It is the task of this democratic state to champion the cause of these 
people in such a way that the most basic aspirations of this majority assumes the 
status of hegemony which informs and guides policy and practice of all the 
institutions of government and state” (ANC, 1996). The ANC furthermore argues that 
“[W]while formal democracy may present opportunities for some blacks and women 
to advance, without a systematic national effort, led by the democratic government, to 
unravel the skewed distribution of wealth and income, the social reality of apartheid 
will remain.” (ANC, 1997 a). It is clearly articulated in ANC documents, that the goal 
of democracy is to eradicate the legacies of unequal distribution of resources left by 
Apartheid. It is also expressed in the quotations above, that the pursuit of hegemony 
and the control of all organs of the state is an active goal of the NDR, and 
consequently the project of democracy, further highlighting the link between the 
ANC’s conception of democracy and that of the liberationists perspective on 
democracy. 
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It is clear the ANC envisions a role for the state that cannot be equated to the neutral 
state, as defined in the previous chapter. ANC documents argue that the state should 
in fact champion the aspirations of the majority, in other words, a specific group of 
people. Pretorius (2006: 749-750) notes that there is a firm assertion by the ANC that 
the pursuit of hegemony is a task of the state. The ANC argues that the aspirations of 
the majority must be achieved through the pursuit of hegemony by not only the state, 
but also the movement as a whole. Pretorius (2006: 750) argues that hegemony in the 
ANC vernacular not only refers to the controlling of all organs of the state, but also to 
that which is labelled the “hegemony of ideas” (ANC, 1998). The dominance strived 
for is one where all institutions, including but not limited to, all organs of the state, 
the media, public debate, universities, research and policy institutes and culture must 
be controlled by the ANC and organs of the state. The merger of party and state and 
the pursuit of hegemony is a clear objective of the ANC16. The above clearly 
illustrates that the ANC wishes to merge the boundary between society and state. 
Such a strategy, decreases the possibility of the creation and maintenance of an 
effective and robust civil society, and decreasing population interaction and the basis 
to challenge and contest dominant ideas within society. This further places the ANC 
within the liberationist camp, as the project of hegemony pursued aims at blurring or 
merging the boundaries between political and social institutions, instead of fostering 
the separation of the spheres as the liberals advocate.  
 
The ANC labels its interventionist state a developmental state. The organisation also 
rejects the notion of a neutral or referee state, and argues that the state machinery 
represents class interests and is an active role player in defining social relations 
(Pretorius, 2006: 760). The ANC’s version of the developmental state “…prioritises 
the interests of those who are in need of development – the poor and disadvantaged. It 
is therefore a state which should reflect, in its composition, doctrines and cultures, the 
classes and strata which stand to benefit from transformation. These forces should be 
in command of state power.” (ANC, 1998). It is therefore a specific type of 
developmental state and, as Hudson (2000: 99) notes, the state in South Africa 
                                                 
16
 Not only is there a clear policy drive by the ANC to pursue hegemony, the party is beset by 
increasing levels of centralism and decreasing levels of internal democratic debate. The drive towards 
greater centralism has been noted by, amongst others, McKinley (2001:203) and Gumede (2008:263-
264).  
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pursues and officially promotes a specific conception of the common good and 
consequently strives to achieve the goals set for a specific group of people.  
 
The ANC’s view that democracy is as much about a substantive outcome as it is about 
procedural norms is articulated through the role ascribed to the state, as described 
above. The organisation furthermore envisions democracy and the state as serving the 
aspirations of the majority. These ideas about the role of the state and the outcomes of 
democracy, serve as a good precursor to understanding the definition of democracy as 
put forward by the ANC. According to Pretorius (2006:748) the most concise 
definition of democracy within the corpus of ANC documents states that: “A 
fundamental condition for liberation is democracy and an abiding culture of human 
rights. All citizens should be guaranteed the right to elect a government of their 
choice, freedom of expression, freedom from discrimination, and other rights 
entrenched in the Constitution. They should have a government not only formally 
based on their will, but one that is open and transparent, and one that consults and 
continually involves the people in policy formulation and implementation. Consistent 
with these principles is the task of ensuring equality among the racial, ethnic, 
language, cultural and religious communities; and equality between women and men: 
to build a united nation of free individuals with the right to associate with whomever 
they wish on the basis of equality.” (ANC, 1997 b). 
 
4.2.2 The ANC’s definition of ‘the people’ 
 
An important aspect of the above definition of democracy and the preceding 
quotations, is the reference towards the ‘people’. Who the people are, as conceived by 
the ANC, is a primary question for Pretorius (2006). The author notes that “…[B] 
both the procedural and the substantive dimensions of the ANC’s conception of 
democracy have as their primary subjects the people.” (Pretorius, 2006:479). He finds 
that the ANC has a specific criteria of whom the bill fits, and that the people are 
primarily thought to be “…the black majority and Africans in particular.” (Pretorius, 
2006:479). The ANC does, however, view itself as an inclusive multi-class 
organisation, and therefore allows for a variety of groups to be included under the 
ambit of the people. This is particularly the case in designations of the ‘motive forces’ 
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of the NDR that are defined as “…the African majority and blacks in general, 
democratic whites and in class terms . . . the unemployed and landless rural masses; 
unskilled and semi skilled workers; professionals, entrepreneurs and small business 
operators . . . black women, . . . African women, . . . the working class . . . the 
unemployed . . . women . . . the black middle class (also the middle strata and petty 
bourgeoisie) . . . black business/capitalists . . . the youth.” (ANC, 2000a; see also 
Netshitenzhe, 1996 cited in Pretorius, 2006: 749). Despite the variability and relative 
comparative social pluralism, the primary motive forces of the NDR are the African 
majority and blacks in general (Pretorius, 2006: 749).  
 
If the main motive force for the democratic project, as described by the NDR and 
consequently the transformation project is the African majority, what then of those 
people who do not fall under the ambit of the majority? Pretorius notes that the term 
minority has various references within ANC texts, with two being of special 
relevance. The first relates to the procedural aspect of democracy, through the 
recognition of rights of citizenship as enshrined in the Constitution. These include the 
right of association, freedom of speech and thought, freedom of political association 
and the right to partake in electoral practices. These rights are not abridged or harmed 
by specific conceptions of democracy, or the goal of transformation. These are 
however, related to rights that do not have bearing on the substantive nature of 
democratic practices and are viewed by some as fundamental rights. The primary 
significance of the use of the term minority, resides in its association with substantive 
conceptions of democracy — that is in its goal of emancipating the African majority 
(Pretorius, 2006: 750). In this regard, the salient category is usually the white minority 
and gains expression in statements dealing with “white minority rule” and “the 
national contradiction… between historically disadvantaged black majority (Africans, 
coloureds, Indian) and whites” (ANC, 2000a cited in Pretorius, 2006: 750).  
 
The privileging of the majority over minority groups is expressed in the definition of 
the national question. “In the South African context, the national question is not 
principally about the rights of minorities or ethnically motivated grievances. It is, in 
fact, principally about the liberation of the African people. The main content of the 
present stage of the South African revolution is the liberation of the largest and most 
oppressed group - the African people. Hence, the main measure of the progress made 
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on the national question is the extent and depth of the liberation of African people in 
particular - and blacks in general. This point must not be lost as a result of the 
excessive discourse in the media about ‘minority fears’.” (ANC, 2005)17. 
 
Pretorius finds that in its substantive meaning, the ANC’s conception of democracy is 
one that defines the people as ‘the black and African majority’. This is a contradictory 
conception because it both recognises the “…ultimate equality in rights of all citizens 
but simultaneously privileges the majority in terms of … allocative functions of the 
state which are of material significance. The privileging is justified with reference to 
historical legacies of colonialism and apartheid.” (Pretorius, 2006:751).  
 
The ANC clearly wishes to serve the needs of a specific group of people. They hold 
that the democratic project is in fact geared towards serving the needs of Africans and 
not about upholding the rights of all, irrespective of group affiliation. This strengthens 
the argument that the ANC subscribes to the liberationist model of democracy in its 
view that democracy is principally concerned with the development of a specific 
group. This also links the organisation to the described high-context cultural 
framework in that the favouring of a specific group of people in the ANC’s 
conception of democracy is justified with reference to historical injustices. In 
addition, the specific notions of the ‘public good’, ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ that can 
be justified by positive liberty, link the ANC to a specific strand of liberal thought.  
 
4.2.3 Freedom, equality and the public good in ANC doctrine 
 
How can it be possible for the NDR to claim to pursue the goal of creating an equal 
society if the entire project of the NDR, that of transformation, is geared towards 
serving the interests of a specific group of people? How can it be that political 
scientist and authors label the South African democracy as embodying liberal 
democratic practises when such contradictions exist?18 Hudson (2000: 96) argues that 
                                                 
17
 “Comparison between the definitions of the NDR and the national question show that the terms are 
indeed similar.” (Pretorius, 2006: 751).  
18
 Mckinley (2001:183) argues that the ANC has “…become the standard-bearer of liberal democracy 
in South Africa.”; Krista Johnson (2003) finds the ANC’s strand of rule to be compatible with that 
which has become known as standard liberal conceptions.  
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the transformation project can be accommodated by the theory of individual liberty, 
as described in the previous chapter, once certain conceptual adjustments are made. If 
liberals are willing to acknowledge that socio-economic conditions can prevent 
individuals from pursuing their right to negative liberty, it becomes possible to justify 
the transformation project on “impeccably liberal grounds”.19 If negative liberty is 
viewed as a fundamental right and socio-economic conditions prevent individuals 
from pursuing that right, then the preferential treatment and redistribution 
encapsulated by the transformation project can be deemed justifiable on liberal 
grounds. The socio-economic impediment requires a more interventionist strategy by 
the state, in order for all to enjoy the basic rights associated with negative liberty.  
 
Hudson (2000: 98-100) argues that what is at issue, with reference to the 
transformation project, are two qualitatively different and incommensurable 
conceptions of equality. The one prioritises individual freedom and views the equal 
distribution of such freedom as constituting equality. The other prioritises the 
collective freedom, giving the majority the right to represent the collective and views 
equality as consisting of equal weight attributed to individual inputs for collective 
decisions. Hudson (2000) argues that in the pursuit of the current transformation 
project, the state in South Africa officially promotes a specific conception of the good 
and that this notion of the good is one based on a communal interpretation of equality. 
The ANC actively pursues the transformation project based on such a collective 
interpretation of the good and freedom. Consequently, their view of equality is one 
that prioritises the equality of individuals in contributing to collective decision 
making, and not that of individual autonomy. It must however, be noted that although 
certain freedoms are subjected to those of the majority within the transformation 
project, it is done under the guise of a constitutional order. Even though a specific 
conception of the good is pursued, which in terms of the theory of negative liberty 
infringes upon the rights of the individual to pursue their own conception of the good, 
it is done under a constitutional framework which preserves the fundamental rights of 
all. These include the rights of freedom of association, thought and expression, which 
are not harmed by the transformation project.  
 
                                                 
19
 The author notes that not all liberals are willing to make such a conceptual adjustment. 
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Stacey (2003:135-138) echoes the sentiments of Hudson (2000) regarding the ANC’s 
conception of equality. The author finds that the ANC’s view of equality consists of 
all individuals having an equal amount of influence in determining the public good 
(positive liberty). Individuals have an equal amount of influence in the determination 
of what constitutes the good life, and this ‘equal input’ constitutes equality. This is 
opposed to the idea of negative liberty, which holds that equality is comprised of all 
individuals being able to pursue their version of the good as long as it does not hinder 
others from pursuing their version of the good. Within the theory of negative liberty, 
equality is equated to individuals having equal freedom to pursue the good life. In 
contrast, the theory of positive liberty holds that equality consists of equal influence in 
determining the public good. The former therefore prioritises the needs of the 
individual above that of the collective in determining the good life. Stacey (2003) 
argues that affirmative action policies can be constructed along such lines that are 
acceptable within the ambit of negative liberty, but that the transformation project is 
only justifiable if the ANC’s strand of positive liberty is employed. It can therefore be 
concluded that the conception of equality embodied in the Constitution, and accepted 
by South Africans, is not the same as the one adopted by the ANC in pursuing 
policies of Affirmative Action and black Economic Empowerment policies, which 
form a crucial part of the transformation project. 
 
The idea of equality that is subscribed to by the ANC in the pursuit of the democratic 
project further places it within the liberationist school described in the previous 
chapter. The idea that the community is more important than the individual is clearly 
articulated through the conception of democracy, the people, the blurring of 
state/society boundaries and the ultimate goals of the democratic project.  The idea 
that equality consists of all individuals enjoying equal rights to pursue their own life 
goals is aligned to the idea of increasing individual autonomy. This is what the 
liberals hold as being fundamental to achieving successful democracy. The 
liberationists and the ANC hold that the democratic project must promote a specific 
conception of what is good and desirable. The ANC subscribes to this vein of 
democracy due to the nature of equality and the importance of the community over 
the individual. The democratic project for the ANC is not equated to increasing 
individual freedom and autonomy, but rests rather on a more substantive notion of 
what must be achieved by the democratic project through policies such as 
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transformation. By equating equality to equal weight given to collective decision 
making, and the focus of the transformation project being the material emancipation 
of a specific group, places the ANC squarely within a liberationist model of 
democracy.  
 
The preceding paragraphs enable one to place the ANC within the theoretical 
framework adopted. The views held by the ANC on the role of the state and 
democracy, places it within the liberationist model of democracy. This is due to the 
merging of the boundaries between party and state, as well as the pursuit of hegemony 
and the control, of not only all functions of state, but also of all institutions that may 
influence society. The ANC’s democratic project is also geared towards serving the 
needs of a specific group of people, black Africans. It therefore has a distinct group- 
based character to it. Furthermore, he organisations’ view of equality, as articulated 
through the transformation project, in placing the normative priority on the group 
above the individual, further strengthens the ties to the liberationist perspective on 
democracy and the high-context cultural framework. There is also a distinct 
retrospective character to many of these formulations, in that democracy is viewed as 
a means of righting past injustices, and not viewed as securing the creation of a stable 
rule-based order. All of these aspects align the ANC closer to the liberationist model 
of democracy and the high-context cultural orientation. 
 
4.3 The South African Constitution, the Limitations clause and 
Socio-economic rights 
 
What was described in the preceding paragraphs could be viewed as an interpretation 
of democracy and how to achieve the establishment of successful democracy (through 
transformation) as adopted by the ANC. Along with the term transformation, the other 
important component of this study is the principle of ‘the rule of law’20. What will 
follow, investigates neither the weak nor the strong sense of the principle. Instead, the 
focus will be on specific inclusions in the Constitution. This will hopefully show that 
although the ANC does subscribe to a somewhat substantive notion of democracy that 
                                                 
20
 Respondents are questioned about their views regarding the functioning of courts and the 
constitution, and therefore the principle of ‘rule of law’ in its practical sense.  
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has a distinct group character, it is still in line with particularities of our Constitution, 
in the sense that if the Constitution is viewed as the supreme document of law, it sets 
the precedent or dictates the norm for the nature of laws in South Africa. There are 
aspects of the Constitution that also have a distinct retrospective and material quality 
to them, with focus being placed on rectifying past injustices and the subordination of 
individual to communal rights.  
 
Thus far attention has been paid to a possible interpretation the ruling party could 
have towards democracy, and how to achieve this project (though transformation) 
successfully. In doing so, the researcher showed that the current strand of democracy 
employed by the ANC is more closely associated with the liberationist perspective on 
democracy. The role of the law and the principle of the rule of law have thus far not 
been discussed with reference to the South African case. It was argued in the previous 
chapter, that the rule of law is a central principle in standard definitions of democracy, 
as it codifies the procedures of democracy in legal principles. It is held by the liberals 
as creating the very environment through which individual autonomy is increased and 
in a sense, is viewed as the most important institution that facilitates the functioning 
of a democratic society. It was also shown that the principle of rule of law centres 
around the issue of compliance with the law, and also that the law must adhere to 
minimum requirements in order to be deemed lawful.  
 
To investigate the functioning of the principle of ‘rule of law’, one would therefore 
have to investigate the issue of compliance by the rulers and, in the South African 
case, the compliance by the ANC. This could be done by tracking constitutional 
development and changes throughout the last thirteen years, and by investigating the 
way in which laws are made and passed by parliament. In addition, one would also 
have to study all relevant cases involving the Constitutional Court, the judgements 
and the subsequent adherence to the judgments by the state. This would be a 
monumental task, and had the researcher decided to start down such a path, would 
lead to a different focus for the present study.21 
 
                                                 
21
 I acknowledge that such an investigation will be the only way to successfully determine the type of 
normative legal order in South Africa as created by the Constitution and Constitutional case law.  
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It will instead be assumed that in South Africa the principle of rule of law remains in 
tact, based on formal adherence to the changing and making of laws (compliance and 
formal characteristics) and also, taking as a given, that all are subject to the law22. The 
merits of the principle will not be investigated in the strong or the weak sense —
attention will rather be paid to the type of normative legal order that is created by the 
Constitution. If the Constitution is the supreme document of law and all laws and 
actions must be consistent with it, then the Constitution can be seen as the legal 
canvas upon which all laws are enacted. Attention will be paid to the substantive 
nature or specific aspects of the Constitution. In the previous chapter, it was 
highlighted that in South African, the principle of ‘rule of law’ has taken a distinct 
rights-based flavour. This does not make it incompatible with normative associations 
of the principle in either a static or a dynamic sense. As long as rulers comply with 
laws, and laws are consistently formulated based on the principles of what defines a 
law, it can be argued that the rule of law is in force.  
 
The researcher will argue, that although the ANC subscribes to a liberationist strand 
of democracy, it has retained a very important principle from the liberals, that of the 
rule of law. It is not that the rule of law is inconsistently applied in South Africa, but 
rather the very nature, the very substance of the law in the Republic allows the ANC 
to adopt such a communal interventionist strategy on transformation and democracy, 
and still be clothed in the guise of a Constitutional order. If we therefore view South 
Africa as a Constitutional democracy, the Constitution creates the ultimate legal 
framework for the functioning of all spheres of society. The unique character of the 
Constitution is articulated through the Limitations Clause and the inclusion of 
justiciable socio-economic rights. These sections in the Constitution set the precedent 
to legally adopt more interventionists and developmental strategies. It could be argued 
by defendants of the ANC’s transformation project that the project is consistent with 
the precedent set by the Constitution and the rule of law. 
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 The researcher is well aware of the problems of such assumptions. It can be argued that the 
independence of the South African judiciary is indeed under threat, as examples of President Zuma’s 
prosecution, and the Judge Hlophe case illustrate. Furthermore, the parliamentary dominance of the 
ANC, and the party’s consequent ability to pass laws through parliament with little credible objection 
by opposition parties, does raise issues of compliance to the rule of law.  
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There are two aspects of the South Africa Constitution upon which there will be 
briefly elaborated to illustrate this point and defend such a stance. These are the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights and the Limitations of Rights 
clause. As was argued in the previous chapter, the rule of law principle has no 
universal definition that can be ascribed to it. The principle is however, commonly 
associated with the adherence to the laws by not only ordinary citizens, but also by 
those with the powers to amend laws. The principle says nothing about the substantive 
nature of the laws, except that laws must adhere to a number of minimum 
requirements in order to be deemed a law. The principle says nothing about what the 
laws should, or should not encompass. The substantive aspects of what laws include 
or are meant to cover are therefore left undefined under normative associations with 
the principle of the rule of law.  
 
These two aspects of the Constitution of 1996, highlight that the law in South Africa 
is not only geared towards serving the role of creating a stable institutional framework 
that governs all interactions according to laws, but has a distinct outcomes-based 
prerogative. The Limitations Clause makes it possible for the fundamental rights of 
citizens to be limited if such a limitation can be justified in terms of the clause itself. 
This shows that rights are not absolute and it is possible for state interests to trump 
that of the individual. The socio-economic rights included highlight that there are 
laws that mandate the state to deliver goods and services to the public. The regulatory 
framework created by the inclusion of socio-economic rights, forces the state in South 
Africa to be actively involved in realising the social and economic development of the 
people of South Africa. The inclusion of these rights goes beyond the scope of merely 
creating a legal framework that guides and regulates all actions of the state, as is 
delineated by standard conceptions of the rule of law and western conceptions of the 
Rechtsstaat. 
 
The General Limitations Clause (section 36)23 in the South African Constitution sets 
out specific criteria for the justification of the restrictions of rights enshrined in the 
                                                 
23
 36. Limitation of rights. -(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in 
terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including - 
(a) the nature of the right; 
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Bill of Rights. This clause shows that constitutional rights are not absolute and 
fundamental rights can be infringed upon by state actions, if the restriction takes place 
in accordance with the criteria set out in section 36 (s36). The Limitations Clause 
does not however, mean that rights can be suspended on the basis of a simple cost-
benefit analysis. Rights cannot be limited merely for the benefit of others or in the 
pursuit of a public interest at the expense of the person whose rights are being limited 
— the limitations must be justifiable and the reason for set limitation exceptionally 
strong (Currie and de Waal, 2005:164).  
 
Limiting a right in the Bill of Rights through the Limitations Clause, forces the 
Constitutional Court to decide which right must be subjected to another. The Clause is 
therefore premised on the fact that one right will have to yield to another (Iles, 
2007:79). In deciding on limitations of rights cases, the Constitutional Court follows a 
specific approach to rights adjudication, known as the two-stage approach. The 
Constitutional Court is therefore balancing different interests when deciding on s36 
cases. In addition, s36 cases only come under consideration when an important state 
interest is taking precedent over an individual interest. The minimum requirement for 
the limitation of rights clause to be applicable is that there must be a state interest 
involved in the rights infringement case (Iles, 2007:82). The court has argued that 
“…the limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and 
necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and 
ultimately an assessment based on proportionality.” (Sweet and Mathews, 2008: 38). 
For this reason, adjudication on matters involving s36 is done on a case-by-case basis. 
There is no universal way of determining when rights may or should be infringed, nor 
is there any hierarchy of rights in the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Court weighs 
the merits of each case based on proportionality and then applies the two-stage 
approach to rights disputes.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
(Constitution of RSA, 1996) 
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Briefly stated, the first stage involves defining the content and boundaries of the right. 
The right under scrutiny is determined and the scope of the right defined in order to 
determine whether the conduct falls within the scope of the protected activity. Once 
the boundaries and scope of the activity and the right are determined, the second stage 
commences. In the second stage, the courts progresses to determining whether the 
infringing law under consideration is justified in terms of s36. The infringing law is 
tested against s36 (1) ss a-e in order to determine whether it is justifiable under the 
Limitations Clause (Iles, 2007: 74-75).  
 
The relevance to this dissertation of the above lies in the second-stage of the 
adjudication process and the connection to the principle of rule of law. According to 
s36, rights may only be limited in terms of a law of general application24which is of 
interest as it arises from the principle of the rule of law. An interesting point with 
regard to this is that the Constitutional Court has not yet given a general description of 
a ‘law of general application’. Statutory, common and customary law are all included 
under laws of general application. An example of what does not fall under law of 
general application would be specific employment practises by companies and 
unauthorised conduct by public officials (Currie and de Waal, 2005:169; Iles, 
2007:76).  
 
It is therefore possible for laws in South Africa to infringe upon the rights of 
individuals provided such incursions of rights fall under the stipulated formal 
constraints set out in s36. Furthermore s36 states that all limitations must be 
justifiable in an ‘open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom’ (Constitution of RSA, 1996). Limitations of rights must also involve 
important state interests and is always the case of the state versus other interests. It is 
possible to conceive a hypothetical scenario in which state interest trumps that of 
individual interest and individual rights are consequently limited. What is important is 
that such scenario can take place whilst fully complying with the principle of the rule 
of law, as it will be in compliance with criteria set out in s36. Laws that limit the right 
                                                 
24
 All the criteria set out by s36 for limiting rights through applying the two-stage approach will not be 
discussed in relation to ss36 a-e as this falls outside the scope of the argument. For detailed explanation 
of the functioning of ss 36 a-e see: Iles, 2007: 80-86; Currie and de Waal, 2005: 175-185.  
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of the individual in order for a state interests to prevail, can be legally enacted and 
form part of the laws that make up the South African legal system. 
 
The Constitutional Court is ultimately comprised of individual judges that decide on 
Constitutional matters. They are constrained not only to operate within the bounds of 
the Constitution, but also previous adjudications on matters pertaining to the 
judgement at hand. Earlier in the chapter, a description was given of differing ways of 
interpreting the notion of equality and the difference between what was termed 
positive and negative liberty. This illustrates that matters decided by the 
Constitutional Court will be subject to differing interpretations of notions such as 
equality and freedom, both of which form part of the cornerstone of the democratic 
dispensation as enshrined in our Constitution. It is not stipulated by the Constitution 
that specific notions of concepts such as equality and freedom must be used. There is 
therefore ample room for interpretations when considering whether rights can be 
limited in terms of a society based on equality and freedom, especially since the terms 
equality and freedom are not explicitly defined. A way to illustrate the complexities of 
the limitations of rights cases, is in considering how s36 applies to laws that are 
geared towards substantive goals. An example of this is the relationship between the 
Limitations of Rights clause and the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights, as they cover tangible outcomes of principles enshrined in the formal law. 
Before the relationship between sections 25, 26, 27 and 36 can be explored, the socio-
economic rights included in the Bill of Rights must first be examined in their own 
right, as the inclusion of such rights in the Bill of Rights have implications for the 
functioning of a democratic society.  
 
The South African Constitution of 1996 became the first constitution in the world to 
include entrenched and justiciable socio-economic rights along with the more 
conventional civil and political rights in the Bill of Rights (Iles, 2004: 449). 
Conventionally, a Bill of Rights only includes traditional liberal rights to equality, 
personal liberty, property, free speech, assembly and association. These rights are 
usually termed civil and political rights and are referred to as first-generation rights. 
These rights are thought of as ‘negative rights’ in that they take power away from the 
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state and impose a duty on the state not to act in a certain way.25 Second-generation 
rights, such as socio-economic rights can be termed ‘positive rights’ in that they 
impose obligations on the state to act in a certain way and not merely to restrict state 
action (Currie and de Waal, 2005: 567). In South Africa, the government is 
constitutionally mandated to provide protection and access to property and land, 
health care, food, water, social security and housing to all citizens under sections 25, 
26 and 27 of the Constitution of RSA of 1996, all of which, in order to realise, require 
the allocation of resources by the state (Constitution of RSA, 1996).26 
 
The important distinction between negative and positive obligations placed on the 
state by certain rights lies in the implications they have for state actions. Negative 
rights restrict the state from infringing on certain rights held by individuals. Laws 
cannot be created that prohibit people from forming organisations, or impinge the 
right to free speech. Positive rights impose duties on the state in order for people to 
realise the rights that are afforded to them by the Constitution. The issue with the 
realisation of positive rights lies in the commanding of state resources. From a 
political and economic point of view, the implication of enforcing or ensuring that all 
people have access to the rights in Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution implies 
that resources must be allocated in a certain way to allow citizens to enjoy these rights 
(Currie and de Waal, 2005:567-568).  
 
Currie and de Waal (2005:569) argue that the justiciability of socio-economic rights 
will require courts to direct and to a degree, determine the way in which the state 
allocates resources and is therefore beyond the scope of judicial function. The issue 
                                                 
25
 The state is negatively limited in that, for example, the state may not prevent individuals from 
joining or forming political parties.  
26
 26. Housing: (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 
27. Health care, food, water and social security.-(1) Everyone has the right to have access t o - 
(a)health care services, including reproductive health care;(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate 
social assistance. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment. 
 (Constitution of RSA, 1996) 
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here revolves around the separation of powers relating to the judiciary and the 
executive. The judiciary is an elite and undemocratically appointed branch of state. It 
therefore “…lacks the democratic legitimacy necessary to decide the essentially 
political question of how to apportion public resources among competing claims and 
between individuals, groups and communities in society.” (Currie and de Waal, 
2005:567-569). Conventionally it is thought of as legitimate for the judiciary to 
implement negative rights, in that it prevents the state from imposing particular duties 
or conditions on groups and individuals. When the judiciary enforces positive rights 
through socio-economic rights based grievances, it is commanding state resources to 
be allocated in a certain fashion. It is therefore an issue that deals with the relationship 
of the judiciary and the executive, and the very core of democracy.  
 
The Constitutional Court discussed the inclusion of socio-economic rights and the 
issue of justiciability in the First Certification judgement. The inclusion of socio-
economic rights was objected to on the basis that the application of these rights 
conflicted with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution of 
1996. The Constitutional Court acknowledged that the inclusion of socio-economic 
rights may result in courts making orders which have budgetary implications. The 
Court argued however that, when civil and political rights are enforced, the orders 
often have the same implications. The provisions of state benefits to those who were 
previously not beneficiaries under Apartheid, implies the allocation of state resources 
in a certain way in the South African context, in order for all citizens to realise their 
civil and political rights. The Court found that the inclusion of socio-economic rights 
does not breach the principle of the separation of powers, and argued that socio-
economic rights would be included and be justiciable (Currie and de Waal, 2005:570-
571).  
 
The Constitutional Court stipulated that socio-economic rights must, at the very 
minimum, be negatively protected. Negative protection is a form of judicial protection 
conventionally given to civil and political rights. There is a negative obligation to not 
interfere with an individual who is doing something they have a constitutional right to 
do. The right to free speech would be infringed by a law prohibiting individuals from 
reporting negatively on government action. Applied to socio-economic rights, 
negative protection means that the Constitutional Court can prevent the state from 
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acting in ways that infringe upon socio-economic rights directly. Examples include 
forced evictions or the suspension of water supply due to outstanding bills (Currie and 
de Waal, 2005:572). 
 
4.4 The ANC’s democratic project: Justification through 
constitutional embodiment 
 
It is hoped that the preceding section, has shown that the rule of law in the South 
African context takes on a somewhat different nature than the standard normative 
associations of the principle. There are obligations placed on the state by the 
Constitution that to some extent determine how public resources be appropriated in 
order to ensure that all citizens can enjoy the rights awarded to them by the 
Constitution. The limitations clause furthermore creates a scenario where individual 
rights can be subordinated to particular state actions.27 The legal order in the RSA, or 
perhaps more aptly labelled, the normative legal framework, is one that mandates the 
state to appropriate funds that allow South Africans tangible public goods.  
 
The Limitations clause allows for individual interests to be subordinated to that of 
state interests, whilst complying with the principle of the rule of law. That a law exists 
which allows individual rights to be subordinated to that of the community, creates an 
association with the law whereby such actions are deemed legal. This has severe 
implications on what is understood to constitute normative legal functioning in the 
Republic.  
 
If one then takes into account how the ANC views its role and function, with specific 
reference to the controlling of all state organs and how the organisation conceptualises 
democracy, it can be argued that the transformation project pursued by the ANC falls 
within the normative legal framework created by the Constitution of 1996. If the 
Constitution is taken as the ultimate ‘yardstick’ against which policies and practices 
such as the transformation project must be measured, then ideas and practises 
                                                 
27
 The occurrence of such instances has been limited and do not frequently occur. The importance 
however, lies in the creation of a normative legal order that can allow such infringements of communal 
rights over that of the individual and allocation of state resources in a certain fashion. For detailed 
discussions see, Iles, 2004 and Iles 2007.   
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embodied by the ANC’s transformation project are not completely out of touch with 
the normative legal framework created by the Constitution.28 The idea that no rights 
are absolute and the individual can be subordinated to the community, finds resonance 
in the Constitutional and legal order of South Africa. What is important is that the 
Constitution creates a normative legal framework which allows for such particularities 
as is shown through the inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights and the 
Limitations clause.  
 
It must also be made clear that the researcher is by no means trying to justify or 
defend the ANC’s strand of democracy or the transformation project. What can 
however not be ignored, is that the legal order in South Africa has a distinct rights-
based and socio-economic character that allows for such a policy to be enacted, whilst 
still complying with the normative legal framework of South Africa as created by the 
Constitution. Whether such an interpretation of and subscription to democracy and the 
rule of law is conducive to consolidating the democratic regime is highly debatable. It 
is postulated that such an interpretation of democracy runs a grave risk of easily 
severing ties with other important aspects of democracy, such as the scope of civil 
society to function and the ability of all individuals to have equal access to and 
protection of rights enshrined in the Constitution.  Even though it can be argued that 
the ANC’s strand of democracy is compatible with the legal order in South Africa, 
and therefore the principle of rule of law, an important aspect in the consolidation of 
democracies, it is unclear whether such a path is conducive in creating sustainable 
democratic dispensation and consolidating our young democracy. 
 
4.5 The relevance of culture  
 
This study holds that culture is an important conceptual component in understanding 
the nature, future and normative meanings associated with South Africa’s fledgling 
democracy. Such a proposition subsumes the idea that culture, or a cultural 
orientation, does indeed influence the creation and maintenance of normative 
                                                 
28
 There are authors that would disagree with such a finding. Notably Richard Stacey (2003) who finds 
inconsistencies with the particular strand of equality adopted by the transformation project and the one 
enshrined in the Constitution.  
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meanings associated with political, social and economic institutions. This stance 
should be investigated, and evidence provided from social science literature that 
culture does indeed play a role in constructing and maintaining normative meanings 
associated with these institutions. It must be reiterated that the researcher is not 
arguing for a causal relationship between culture and democracy, nor is the claim 
made that culture is the ultimate independent variable. The researcher is merely 
highlighting the importance of culture in understanding the creation and maintenance 
of normative meanings associated with, and future of democracy in the Republic of 
South Africa.  
 
This section will therefore not only argue the importance of culture in studying 
democracy, but also the merits of the definition and distinctions adopted in this study. 
It is therefore necessary to elaborate on the merits of the cultural framework used in 
this study as proposed by Cohen (1997), and also place the relevance of culture when 
studying political institutions as a whole. This section will also highlight some of the 
criticism levelled against authors who view culture as a major contributing factor in 
democratic theory. 
 
The basic premise behind Cohen’s definition of culture, that of shared meaning 
derived from shared historical experience prevalent in a given society, is one that 
other authors share (Hofstede, 2007:1,9; Huntington and Harrison 2000; Licht, 
Goldschmidt and Schwartz, 2007: 662; Rubenstein, 1993:550; Greif, 1994: 915; 
Esmer and Pettersson, 2007:3; Schwartz, 2007:34-35). These authors all argue that 
culture influences the way in which human beings organise their societies, and more 
specifically institutions (economic, political or social) that are prevalent within these 
societies. Although there are subtle differences in their work regarding the casual 
relationship that can be attributed to culture and human development, and differences 
concerning the specific dimensions that constitute culture, there is an underlying 
agreement regarding the fundamental nature of what culture, in a minimal sense, is 
understood to be; that of shared meanings and beliefs derived from a community that 
has shared experiences. Although the authors cited above range from the field of 
psychology, modernization theory, economics, conflict studies and political studies, 
there is an implicit agreement that culture has an effect on all institutions, regardless 
of the area of focus of the specific author.  
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The second aspect of Cohen’s (1997) framework that requires some elaboration is the 
dimensions used to draw a distinction between high-context and low-context cultures. 
As argued in the previous chapter, the main basis for the distinction between the two 
cultural frameworks is the role or the importance of the individual in society. All the 
specific differences between the cultural frameworks will not be repeated here. Other 
relevant authors who echo Cohen’s identified dimensions of culture will be cited and 
will hopefully show the reader that the framework chosen in this thesis finds 
commonality with other authors in cultural studies. 
 
Within the field of psychology, Geert Hofstede (2001) in his voluminous work on 
dimensions of culture identifies five main independent dimensions to culture. This is 
done by primarily relying on data from the IBM Corporation and its global and 
culturally diverse workforce, along with other international surveys. The two 
dimensions that echo those of Cohen are individualism versus collectivism, relating to 
the integration of individuals within groups and long-term versus short-term, relating 
to whether the present or the future is the focus of a society (Hofstede, 2001:29). 
 
Although his work relates more specifically to the organizational culture of a 
corporation, the author successfully links this to what he labels ‘national culture’ and 
argues that there is a distinct link regarding the nature of national cultures between his 
work and those of other authors (Hofstede 2001:11-15; 373-391). Hofstede’s work is 
also extensively referenced within modernization literature such as Inglehart and 
Schwartz (2007) and Inglehart and Welzel (2006) in their work which relies on the 
World Values Survey as primary data29.  
 
As in the work of Cohen (1997), Hofstede (2001:209-212) argues that how a society 
views the role of the individual influences how such a society will structure societal 
institutions, from family structures through consumer behaviour to political systems. 
Primarily the distinction between individual and community orientated societies is 
how the individual views her/himself within society. In societies that are more 
                                                 
29
 The authors themselves have argued extensively for similarities and robustness checks in their work 
and extensively reference each others’ work, see: Inglehart and Welzel, 2006: 136-138; Esmer and 
Pettersson, 2007: 3-5; Schwartz, 2007: 34, 38-41, 45-49, Licht et al. 2007; Inglehart, 2007: 21-23; 
Hofstede, 2001: 11-15, 29-34, 219-225, 373-391.  
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orientated to the individual ethos, the individual is seen as an autonomous being, 
acting solely on his/her own personality. In such societies, the good of the individual 
is of prominence, and the greater good of the society is subordinated to the wishes, or 
the will, of the individual. In more communal societies, the individual hardly sees 
himself as being separate from the community. The individual defines himself purely 
in terms of his/her group affiliation and role. Personal gains and whims are therefore 
subordinated to the needs of the group, and within these societies the individual views 
what is good for the group, as being good for her/him-self. This correlates strongly, 
albeit on a theoretical level, with how Cohen (1997:29-31) draws the distinction 
between individual orientated low-context cultures and communally oriented high-
context cultures.  
 
Another point of correlation between the authors is the manner in which a given 
society views ‘time’. Hofstede (2001:351-355) found that a distinction can be drawn 
between those societies that focus on the present and those with their focus on the 
long-term future. Although this does not strictly correlate with the distinction of time 
within high- and low-context cultural orientations as identified by Cohen (1997: 31-
36), it does show that how a society views time and that the future is of consequence 
for how such a society organises itself. As in Cohen’s work, there are those societies 
that are focused towards the future (low-context), and are always planning for the 
future, and those that choose to savour the present (high-context). Hofstede (2001) 
and Cohen (1997) therefore both share the view that how time is viewed (i.e. 
importance of either the present or future), and the role of the individual within 
society is of significance in determining the cultural makeup of a society.  
 
A further body of work that extensively relies on the notion of dimensions of culture 
is that of The World Values Surveys (WVS). This is a research project that comprises 
a worldwide network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on 
social and political life. The core assumption of the WVS studies is that culture 
matters. The surveys conducted in this research project covers 97 societies over 
roughly 90% of the world’s population and is comprised of five rounds of surveys 
from 1981 to 2007 (World Values survey, 2008; Esmer and Pettersson, 2007:3). The 
WVS research holds that values constitute culture and that the two main dimensions 
or value dimensions of culture are traditional vs. secular values and survival vs. self-
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expression values. The WVS research argues that these two dimensions explain more 
than 70% cross-national variance on key variables which include the type of political 
institutions within a given society (World Values Survey, 2008: 5-6).  
 
It should be noted that the work by Inglehart and Welzel (2006), Inglehart (2000) and 
Esmer and Pettersson (2007) advocate a revised version of modernization theory and 
use the WVS data to test their hypothesis regarding this theoretical starting point. The 
core argument of these authors is that they interpret contemporary social change as a 
process of human development that is comprised of socioeconomic modernization, a 
cultural shift towards a rising emphasis on self expression values and greater tolerance 
and need of the individual for a responsive system of government, articulated through 
democracy. They argue that as socioeconomic development deepens and penetrates 
further into society, so to does the peoples’ cultural orientation that leads to the 
process of democratization with an emphasis on political and civil liberties, equality 
and the maximization of human choice. Furthermore, as development progresses, the 
cultural emphasis shifts from the collective good to individual liberty, human choice 
and individual autonomy, all of which are values strongly associated with democratic 
systems of government. The authors argue that a shifting balance between 
modernization and tradition shapes human values, and that these affect political 
institutions, generating a human development sequence in which modernization gives 
rise to self-expression values that are more favourable to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions (Inglehart and Welzel, 2006: 2-5).   
 
As has been noted above, these authors argue that almost 70 % variance on key 
variables can be attributed to just two dimensions of culture. The first, traditional 
versus secular emphasises orientations towards authority. Traditional societies 
highlight the importance of religion as a crucial aspect for maintaining social order. 
Emphasis is furthermore placed on the role of family ties and family allegiance in 
achieving social cohesion as opposed to the importance of individual achievement. 
Another important aspect is how authority is viewed. In traditional societies deference 
to authority is valued over challenging of authority as a lubricant for social cohesion 
which stands in contrast to challenging of authority, as this may give rise to conflict 
within the society. Traditional societies also tend to adopt an absolute moral standard 
which, as an impartial arbiter between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, influences their views on 
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the role of the law. Secular societies place emphasis on the exact opposite to the 
above mentioned value dimensions of culture (Inglehart, 2000: 83-84; Inglehart, 
2007: 14-18).   
 
It should be evident that there are some major correlations between Cohen’s (1997) 
high-context and low-context cultures and Inglehart (2000; 2007) traditional and 
secular/rational societies respectively. Corresponding views of deference to authority, 
the prominence or role of the individual and the idea of a moral standard, as opposed 
to the rule of impartial law, are apparent similarities for creating the above mentioned 
distinction. This illustrates further correlation between the cultural framework adopted 
in this study and those used by prominent authors in modernization theory.   
 
What is relevant of this strand of modernization theory which relies heavily on 
culture, is that one of the two main dimensions identified (traditional versus secular) 
has a strong theoretical correlation to the high- and low-context cultural framework as 
espoused by Cohen (1997) regarding similar views on the role of the individual, 
relations to authority, the importance of maintaining group harmony and social 
cohesion and notions of time. These aspects are all used to draw a distinction between 
what Inglehart (200, 2007) labels survival versus self expression and Cohen’s (1997) 
distinction between high- and low-context cultures.   
 
Another author that has done extensive work on dimensions of culture is Shalom 
Schwartz. What distinguishes Schwartz theory from previous authors cited above, is 
that he arrives at his dimensions of culture from a priori theorising, and then tests 
these theoretical orientations to empirical data (Schwartz, 2007:34). Schwartz 
(2007:36-38) identifies three bipolar dimensions of culture that he labels 
embeddedness versus autonomy, hierarchy versus egalitarianism and mastery versus 
harmony.  
 
Embeddedness versus autonomy concerns the desirable relationship between the 
individual and the group. “Embeddedness refers to a cultural emphasis on the person 
as embedded in the group and committed to maintaining the status quo, propriety, and 
restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt group solidarity or the traditional 
order. The opposite pole of autonomy describes cultures in which the person is 
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viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own 
uniqueness.” (Licht et al. 2007: 662). Schwartz also draws a distinction between 
intellectual autonomy that refers to individuals pursuing their own ideas and 
intellectual directions independently and affective autonomy that refers to individuals 
pursuing positive experiences for themselves (Schwartz, 2007:36). The “… [H] 
hierarchy versus egalitarianism [This] dimension concerns the ideal way to elicit 
cooperative, productive activity in society. Hierarchy refers to a cultural emphasis on 
obeying role obligations within a legitimately unequal distribution of power, roles, 
and resources. Egalitarianism refers to an emphasis on transcendence of selfish 
interests in favour of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others whom 
one sees as moral equals.” (Licht et al. 2007: 662).  
 
Again, the likeness to Cohen’s (1997) theory can be attributed to the role of the 
individual within society, and the manner in which authority and compliance with 
group harmony is viewed. There is a correlation between high-context cultures and 
cultures leaning towards embeddedness based on the role of the individual. The same 
is true for the autonomy and low-context poles. The second dimension, that of 
hierarchy versus egalitarianism, is not as straight forward when correlating with high- 
and low-context cultural frameworks. Rather, one should focus on the aspect of this 
dimension, authority and the manner in which it is viewed, as underlying Cohen’s 
(1997) views on authority in his framework.  
 
A final author that needs to be cited in defence of Cohen’s (1997) cultural distinction 
is Daniel Etounga-Manguelle (2000). Etounga-Manguelle is essentially trying to 
explain the lack of development in Africa by relying on culture as a major 
independent variable. The author argues that although there are many differing 
cultures in Africa, depending on how we choose to define culture, through language, 
geographical location or traditional ethnic groupings, a common African culture does 
in fact exist (2000:67).  This common culture, it is argued, is characterised by a 
number of elements. The first is the manner in which hierarchy is viewed. It can either 
be seen as part of the natural order of being, not to be challenged and always 
accepted, or authority figures can be seen as equals, whose authority and power can 
be challenged. Africa, it is argued, belongs to the group that views hierarchy and 
authority as unchallengeable, and it is seen as the ‘nature of how things are’.  Control 
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over uncertainty is another factor of importance. There are those societies that are 
geared towards conquering and mastering the future, and consequently institutions are 
orientated towards change and the limitations of risk. Other societies, of which Africa 
is one, accept the future and the uncertainties it holds rendering themselves powerless 
to change or influence it. Such societies tend to live on a day to day basis due to a 
belief that the deep rooted status quo cannot be altered (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000: 
68).  
 
Africans tend to exalt the past and live life while forever honouring and remembering 
the ancestors and forefathers. This view of time, does not allow for the preparation for 
the future with focus being placed solely on the past, and as the author argues, 
Africans tend to believe the past is only set to repeat itself, and preparation for the 
future therefore futile. The power of the community over the individual is the final 
point of commonality the researcher would like to emphasise. Etounga-Manguelle 
argues that in African societies, the individual is deeply rooted in family ties. The will 
of the community and the communal good takes precedence over individual 
autonomy and freedom of choice. Actions are taken that will advance the well-being 
of the community and often this communal good is defined by a single ruler. This 
however is of no consequence to African communities, as they believe wholly in the 
good of their group and individual identity is, to a large extent, derived from group 
affiliation (Etounga-Manguelle, 2000:69-72). 
 
Once again, the parallels to Cohen (1997) can be clearly seen. The role of the 
individual within the group, the manner in which authority is viewed in terms of 
deference towards authority figures and the fact that the past is seen as more 
important as the future, correlates with the aspects used by Cohen (1997) to 
distinguish between high- and low-context cultures. It should be noted that Etounga-
Manguelle (2000) is not arguing that these features of a common African culture can 
be applied universally or uniformly to all African societies. The author is merely 
stating that these are common elements in many African societies, which impede their 
development in terms of political, economic and social institutions that will enable 
them to emancipate themselves from material, psychological and political hardships.  
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This section hopefully showed that the distinctions drawn by Cohen (1997) between 
high- and low-context cultures has precedence in other social science disciplines and 
finds support in the literature as a whole. The role of the individual within society, 
deference to authority, maintaining the status quo, focussing on the past to the 
detriment of preparing for the future and the focus on group harmony and social 
cohesion, all of which form the basis of Cohen’s high-context low-context distinction, 
are highlighted by other authors.  
 
4.5.1 Critiquing culture 
 
 
The above is a relatively extensive defence of Cohen’s (1997) cultural dichotomy that 
is advocated in this study. Przerworksi (2003:118) argues that a fundamental 
limitation in studies relying on culture in explaining the survival of democratic 
systems of government, is the issue of direction and the chain of causality. It is 
unclear whether material progress drives cultural and political institutions, or whether 
cultural transformations advance material progress and specific forms of government. 
Przerworksi asserts that studies in the vein of new modernisation theories such as 
those by Inglehart, suffer from serious methodological shortcoming. Such surveys 
determining attitude on preferred systems of government do not advance any evidence 
that these attitudes do anything for the actual survival of democracy (2003: 119).  
 
The aspect of religion is also frequently cited by culturalists as having an impact on 
the prospect of achieving and sustaining democracy. Przerworski however challenges 
this assertion, arguing that there are conflicting findings amongst scholars regarding 
cultural beliefs and the effect of religion on the survival of democratic systems. 
Conflicting views exist amongst scholars for whom cultural aspects are important and 
the implications that culture may have on democracy. Many culturalist scholars hold, 
for example, that Confucianism has anti-democratic elements which include a total 
lack of the idea of a civil society, individual rights or the rule of law. Yet 
Confucianism has deep traditions about the ideas of limited government, a key to 
democratic practices (2003: 125). 
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The most telling critique levelled against culturalists by Przerworksi (2003: 128) is 
that of the lack of empirical evidence, as it is near impossible to test the importance of 
cultures in the survival of democracy. The author argues that for the three religions 
for which data exists, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam, no link can be found 
between them and the durability of democracy. Cultures do not lend themselves to be 
easily classified, and as such, the opportunity for statistical analysis is limited. “But 
the evidence we do have does not support the claim that some cultures are 
incompatible with democracy. They seem to have no effect on whether democracy 
endures.” (Przeworski, 2003:129).  
 
4.6 Land reform in South Africa 
 
As has been discussed previously, for the purposes of this study, the most important 
aspect of the land reform programme is whether it is guided by market and economic 
principles, or whether it is guided by a social equity imperative. This is most clearly 
expressed in the manner in which the government addresses land reform and, more 
specifically, whether the rights of the property owner are respected. Adherence to the 
WBWS principle can be seen as the proverbial litmus test when the normative priority 
is placed on individual property rights or social equity. If the principle is upheld, and 
the WBWS principle employed, it gives the property owner the ultimate and final 
word in whether the land must be sold or not. If this principle is disregarded and land 
is expropriated, the social and equality aspect of land reform is shown to take 
precedence over formal adherence to property rights.  
 
Land reform has been an important issue for many South Africans for a long period of 
time. The importance of land reforms was emphasised by some exiled members 
during the period of ANC exile, with land issues having played a role in mobilising 
the liberation movement. During the early 1990’s, whilst a policy on land reform was 
being developed, the significance of the issue was highlighted in terms of the 
implications it may have on future government policies and as a means of ensuring 
social transformation. During the formulation period in the early 90’s, it became 
evident to those involved that the significance of the issue was largely due to the 
combination of moral and material concerns. Land reform had to address past wrongs 
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by restoring property and citizenship rights, and in so doing help solve the economic 
and social problems of poverty and social exclusion experienced by many Africans 
(James, et. Al. 2005: 827).   
 
The importance of land reform in South Africa must be understood against the 
backdrop of a long history of institutionalised African dispossession of land. Land 
reform provides a way in which to address past injustices and constitutes an important 
part of South Africa’s transition from an Apartheid to a constitutional state. Land is 
seen as playing a crucial role in restoring citizenship due to the fact that, under the 
apartheid regime, denial of land to many South Africans played a central role in 
casting Africans as second class citizens. Apartheid denied citizenship recasting 
Africans as second class citizens through a planned legal order controlling peoples’ 
relation to space. Undoing such an institutionalised legacy of second rate citizenship, 
therefore requires the constitutional state to address the issue of ownership and land 
distribution (James, 2007:11).  
 
Space and territory were central to the Apartheid regime’s plans for segregation and 
the functioning of the apartheid state. “Land rights became indissolubly connected in 
the public mind, partly because of clashes which became increasingly fierce towards 
the end of the 1980s between the state and the people whose property, land and 
citizenship rights it was threatening to destroy.” (James, 2007:12). Dispossession of 
land and citizenship through such practices left a deep imprint on the social 
consciousness of Africans, and the importance of the land reform programme to right 
these injustices must therefore not be neglected.  
 
It is argued by Ntsebeza (2007: 109) that although the liberation struggle was not 
overtly fought around the land question, the expectation was always there amongst 
members of the struggle that the unravelling of centuries of land dispossession and 
oppression would be amongst the priorities of a democratic South Africa. Land 
reform is therefore an issue that is held very dearly by African’s who were 
dispossessed thereof and denied access to land and subsequently forced to comply 
with the spatial restriction placed on them by the Apartheid state. It is an issue that 
forms part of the social reality from many poor and landless South Africans. 
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The ANC were saddled with the obligation of implementing far reaching land reforms 
when they achieved electoral victory in 1994 and assumed control of the government. 
It is against this background that the ANC set an initial target of transferring 30% of 
agricultural land within five years, in an environment where virtually all commercial 
land was owned by white South Africans (Williams, 1996:139). This figure has 
subsequently been revised numerous times due to the slow pace of land reform, and 
the current date set for reaching the 30% target is 2014. This is however, still a highly 
unrealistic goal, with just under 5% of agricultural land being redistributed by 2009 
(Hall, 2009).  
 
There are numerous reasons cited for the poor pace of land reform and the inability of 
the government to come close to the target of transferring 30% of agricultural land. 
Some of these include poor administrative management, vacant posts, inability to 
spend budgets, lack of capacity of Department of Land Affairs and insufficient 
budgets (Bosman, 2007: 39). Many reform projects that have been initiated are also 
struggling or have completely failed, and would require millions of Rands to revitalise 
so as to be termed successful (van Wyk, 2009). The capitulation of the Land Bank, 
and rampant corruption at the institution, is another example of administrative 
ineptness at an institution appointed to facilitate land reform (Hofstatter, 2009).  
 
Despite the slow pace, land reform and redistribution have remained key ANC 
election promises in all past electoral victories. President Zuma is quoted as stating 
that in order for the land reform project to move forward, “…significant changes will 
have to be made to the willing buyer, willing seller model of land redistribution.” (du 
Plessis, 2009). It is argued by some commentators that such rhetoric is nothing more 
than politicking and does not signal the state’s intention to use large scale 
expropriation to speed up land reform. A policy document prepared for the presidency 
earlier in 2009, recommended that the state become the catalyst in developing a 
smallholder sector if it wants to increase the rate and success of land reform. This is in 
line with resolutions adopted at the 2007 ANC Polokwane conference, where it was 
decided to speed up land reform through different approaches, not necessarily large 
scale expropriation (Hofstatter, (b) 2009).  
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Land reform is frequently used as a means of mustering political support and 
mobilising voters prior to elections. Although it is an important and prominent issue 
within South African politics, compared to other pressing issues such as HIV/AIDS, 
unemployment and housing, it is understandable that land reform has been met with 
contesting and considerable ideological debate since the transition of democracy 
began in the early 1990s. Much of this debate has occurred on a relatively abstract, 
theoretical level, in which politicians and activists call for speedier land reform. In 
such rhetoric on the process of reform, landowners and the poor and landless are 
frequently treated as homogeneous abstract categories, with unclear and few 
identifiable boundaries between groups that could mobilize to acquire specific pieces 
of land for particular purposes. There is a general tendency for the issue to draw 
attention as a political headline issue of land acquisition, rather than as more mundane 
and practical components that will ensure success (Lahiff, 2007: 1583, 1591).  
 
It is argued that the failure of MLAR and the WBWS principle does not necessarily 
hinge only upon the unwillingness of landowners to part with land, although this 
forms part of the problem. Other issues of the failed experiment include that the 
WBWS principle, although advanced as functioning within normal market 
parameters, does not comply with normal functioning of market trading. This is in 
part due to bureaucratic processes that include complexities in identifying 
beneficiaries and conservative and unrealistic planning models based on questionable 
assumptions about economic viability. The lack of credible information about 
beneficiaries, participants, size and scope of transfers, success and failures of 
transferred land and a general absence of information gathering by the government 
has further hindered the ability of analysts and policy makers to contribute 
meaningfully to the land reform programme. There is also a general lack of 
enthusiasm by the political and social forces within South Africa around the issue of 
land reform (Lahiff, 2007: 1591).  
 
Not only has the government failed to reach ambitious targets, estimations place the 
amount of agricultural land transferred at less than 5% in the first 15 years. 
Concurrent to this, it is estimated that between 1994 and 2004, some 2.3 million farm 
dwellers, including farm tenants engaged in independent production, have been 
displaced. This figure exceeds that of those people who were displaced during the last 
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decade of Apartheid, with an estimated 1.8 million displacements from 1984-1993 
(Wegerif, Russel and Grundling, 2005:7).  
 
Against such a backdrop of government failure in the implementation of land reform, 
it is therefore not surprising that the WBWS principle has come under severe pressure 
of late. In late August 2008, the National Assembly was set to consider the 
Expropriation Bill, which would have allowed land to be expropriated in order to 
speed up the pace of land reform (Steward, 2008). The Bill was however shelved by 
Parliament’s Public Works committee in August of the same year, amidst severe 
criticisms and pressure from public and private sectors of society. The committee 
cited insufficient consultation as the main reason for the shelving of the Bill. A 
spokesperson for the ANC, Kgotso Khumalo argued that the ANC felt too little 
deliberation and public contestation was allowed, and that the Bill would be reviewed 
and extensively debated before it would be tabled again (Donnelly, 2008).  
 
The purpose of the proposed Expropriation Bill is to provide for the expropriation of 
property, including land, in the public interest and for public purposes, and include all 
forms of property. It strikes at the very hart of the negotiated accord through the threat 
it poses to the protection of property rights and the resultant implication on the rule of 
law (Steward, 2008). The provisions of the Bill are alarming, and include that: 
• the Minister can expropriate property (which could include shares) on behalf 
of a “juristic person” (i.e. a private or public company) if it reasonably 
requires the property in the ‘public interest’ and has failed to reach agreement 
with the owner; 
• the expropriating authority will determine the amount of compensation (that 
may, according to the Bill, be below market value), and the dates of 
expropriation, possession and payment; 
• the courts cannot overturn compensation awarded by the expropriating 
authority but can simply refer it back for reconsideration. Thus, if property 
holders reject the offer of compensation and go to court, they might be 
deprived of their property and income for an indefinite period while the matter 
is referred to and fro between the court and the expropriating authority; 
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• courts involved in expropriation matters must be presided over by a judge 
from a special panel that will be appointed by the Chief Justice.  If the Chief 
Justice is ‘executive-minded’ it is possible that judges involved might also 
share the government’s broad views concerning the public interest (Steward, 
2008). 
The Bill finds resonance in the ANC’s views of the redistribution of wealth and social 
and economic transformation as called for by the NDR. “A critical element of the 
programme for national emancipation should be the elimination of apartheid property 
relations. It requires the elimination of the legacy of apartheid super-exploitation and 
inequality, and the redistribution of wealth and income to benefit society as a whole, 
especially the poor - and in particular the de-racialisation of ownership and control of 
wealth, including land.” (Steward, 2008).  
 
Although the 2007 Polokwane conference was highly critical of current land reform 
progress, a call for large scale and immediate expropriation was not initiated. It did 
however mark a change in tone in ANC rhetoric concerning the land reform issue. 
Steward (2008) argues that the conference was highly critical of organised agriculture, 
which was described as the outcome of centuries of oppression and dispossession, and 
that a fundamental change was required in order to achieve the target of transferring 
30% of agricultural land by 2014. The adopted resolution called for the need for the 
expropriation of property in the public interest and for public purposes, and that such 
measures must be in accordance with the Constitution, with special emphasis on 
equality, redress and social justice. It was proposed that MLAR be revived and the 
principle of WBWS come under scrutiny, together with the realignment of such 
practices with legislation relating to expropriation.  
 
Steward (2008) notes that the authors of the Draft Policy on expropriation was in 
complete accord with the general tone of the NDR. The draft paper commences with 
the analysis of land dispossession dating back to the seizure of Khoi land in the 
1650’s. The role of the market was played down and support for departure from the 
WBWS approach and MLAR was evident, advocating that compensation for 
expropriated land need only occur after expropriation. The role of the Courts are to be 
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minimised in determining equitable balance between public interest and affected 
parties, whilst decision making authority was to be vested in the Minister.  
 
Although the Bill was subsequently shelved, there is a tendency in ANC rhetoric for a 
shift in priorities where land reform is concerned. This entails that the priority is to be 
placed on social justice, transformation and the public good, at the expense of 
honouring private property rights. This is a fundamental departure from the terms of 
the negotiated transition to democracy, that holds dearly the values of private property 
and the supremacy of protecting of property rights through legal means. The departure 
from such a standpoint and the move towards the proposed expropriation, may have 
grave implications on the survival of the South African democracy. 
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Chapter 5: Public opinion of the land reform project: 
Data presentation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will present the survey results from Ipsos-Markinor public opinion 
surveys held in 2004, 2007 and an Elite survey conducted in 2007. The results enable 
one to gauge South Africans’ opinion on land reform and its relationship with 
transformation and the rule of law. The chapter is guided by the main hypothesis of 
the study —that there is an identifiable correlation between the independent variables 
selected and the respondents’ opinions on land reform, with specific groups tending to 
support land reform whilst other groups tend to reject it. The data presentation will be 
guided by the statements posed to respondents and their agreement or disagreement 
with the statements. 
 
The four statements used are:  
S1: All land whites own they stole from blacks 
S2: Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist 
S3: Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court, are fairly using the rights 
awarded to them by the constitution 
S4: Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court, are blocking 
transformation 
 
It is proposed, that those respondents who support the governments’ land reform 
programme, will have certain levels of agreement with the statements posed. It is 
proposed that the respondents who support the land reform programme will: agree 
with the statement that landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
racist (S2); disagree with the statement that landowners who dispute land claims by 
going to court are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the constitution (S3); 
and agree with the statement that landowners who dispute land claims by going to 
court are blocking transformation (S4). This is due to the fact that such patterns of 
agreement identifies respondents as either placing the normative priority on the 
substantive effects of democracy (reforms in land ownership) or on the procedural 
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aspect of democracy through the impartial functioning of the rule of law where 
reforms in ownership must guided by the law and the impartial functioning thereof, 
together with the protection of individual property rights. In addition, the response to 
the statement that all land whites own they stole from blacks (S1), enables one to 
gauge whether there is a racial and group connotation to ownership and land 
acquisition in South Africa. This in turn, allows one to gauge the level of congruence 
with responses to the statements, and the theoretical framework described in the 
previous chapters.  
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
Four items will be presented in this study, as was presented to respondents in 2004, 
2007 and Elites in 2007. The items are all framed as statements to which respondents 
must list their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale. The response categories 
are ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly 
disagree’. There were also ‘don’t know’ and ‘refused’ categories.  The data presented 
in figures 1-8 have been recoded into three categories of ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ and ‘disagree’. This was done to facilitate the presentation and interpretation 
of results.  
 
5.2.1 Public opinion surveys 
 
The public opinion surveys were conducted in 2004 and 2007 by Ipsos-Markinor, a 
private research company. The surveys consisted of 3500 nationally representative 
respondents from urban (2000) and rural (1500) populations. All respondents were 
over 16 years of age and data was acquired through personal interviews. Men and 
women are represented equally in the sample. The findings are weighted and 
projected onto the national demographic profile, on the basis of which they can be 
asserted to be nationally representative. What applies to the respondents, it can be 
assumed, applies with equal validity to the South African population as a whole. All 
sample surveys are subjected to statistical error and the results of these polls have to 
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be evaluated against this background. Depending on the response rate, the sample 
error for the polls as a whole is between 0.72% and 1.66% (du Toit, 2004 (c):13). 
5.2.2 Elite survey data 
 
Elites are defined as “…those people who fill top positions in the largest and most 
resource rich political, governmental, economic, professional, communications and 
cultural institutions in society.” (Kotze and Steenkamp 2009:12). The elite survey was 
conducted in 2007 by Iposo-Markinor for the Centre for International and 
Comparative Politics (CICP) using face to face interviews with a structured 
questionnaire. Furthermore, elite respondents are representative of five key sectors, as 
is shown in the table below (Kotze and Steenkamp, 2009:12).  
Table 5.1 Composition of elite respondents 
Sector Composition of sample No. of 
respondents 
% of 
respondents  
Parliament Weighted to be representative of the National Assembly 95 31.88 
Civil Servants Senior officials in government departments 51 17.11 
Churches 
Senior church leaders from, amongst 
others, the South African Council of 
Churches and the National Religious 
Leaders' Association 
50 16.79 
Media 
Managers, editors, senior journalists and 
parliamentary correspondents in the print 
and electronic media 
51 17.11 
Business Chief executive officers and directors of top South African companies 51 17.11 
Total Survey  298 100 
Adapted from Kotze and Steenkamp (2009:13) 
 
5.3 Discussion of dependent variables 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the data and test the main hypothesis of the study: 
that there is an identifiable correlation between the independent variables selected 
and the respondents’ opinions on land reform, with specific groups tending to support 
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land reform whilst other groups tend to reject it. This will be done by presenting the 
level of agreement to specific statements. It is possible to link the level of agreement 
to statements S1-S4 to the adopted cultural framework and the models of democracy 
as discussed in the previous chapters. As will be explained below, the specific racial 
connotation attached to ownership creates a dichotomy of groups. One group, who are 
in favour of the land reform programme, are predominantly of opinion that 
transformation and the rule of law in the land reform programme must be geared 
towards serving the needs of the landless and finds congruence with the high-context 
cultural framework that subscribes to the liberationist model of democracy. The other, 
who reject the government’s land reform programme, favours the protection of 
property rights and the impartial functioning of the rule of law, can be inked to the 
low-context cultural framework and liberal perspective of democracy. Each statement 
will be discussed separately in relation to the theoretical framework.  
 
5.3.1 Statement S1: “All land whites own they stole from blacks” 
 
The above is derived from a statement made by former ANC parliamentary chief 
whip, Tony Yingeni, who is reported to have stated that “Everything whites own, they 
stole from blacks.” Similarly, the Landless Peoples Movement have produced 
pamphlets with the slogan “Landlessness = racism. Give us our land now.” These 
statements define ownership in terms of race and theft and aim to nullify the 
importance of contractual title deeds (du Toit, 2003: 113). Statement S1 defines 
ownership in terms of race and theft.  
 
This sets a racial bias for the other statements, as statement S1 is posed to respondents 
first. Statement S1 sets a racial stage wherein there is an implicit assumption that 
landowners, under purview of statements S1 through S4 are white, and that landless 
people are black. Consequently, statement S1 sets the tone for the following 
statements and covertly implies that all land reform policies are constructed along the 
racial dichotomy sketched by statement S1. As statement S1 deals with the issue of 
property rights, it further implies that property tights are seen as protecting white 
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interests30. The statement implies group affiliation through race and ownership 
through unjust means of acquisition. The leading nature of the statement and its effect 
on the statements that follow should not be ignored, as it can be seen to have an 
influence on respondents’ responses to the statements that follow, in that it creates a 
racial connotation between owners and non-owners. Even if respondents do not agree 
with the statement, it does not detract from the implication of whites being 
landowners and blacks being deprived of land through theft.  
 
The level of agreement to statement S1 refers to respondent’s belief of whites being 
‘thieves’. The issue of ownership is already assumed and not being questioned. What 
is being questioned is the belief of respondents on how whites became owners of set 
land, and how blacks became landless (i.e. through theft). It therefore tests whether 
respondents believe that white landowners own property on fair and just terms, as the 
use of the word theft implies the abrogation of fairness and justice. 
 
The issues of justice and fairness that are hinted at with the use of the word theft are 
echoed in respondents’ views on transformation. The transformation project is 
grounded in specific notions of what constitutes justice, equity and fairness31. This 
does not mean that statement S1 is in any way a means of verifying opinion regarding 
transformation, (that is dealt with by statement S4). It can, however, be seen as a 
statement that can find congruence in respondents’ views on statement S3 and 
statement S4. It is possible that those respondents who agree with statement S1, will 
be inclined to agree with statement S2 and statement S4 and disagree with statement 
S3, and will therefore be in support of the ANC’s transformation project. Those with 
opposite views on the statements will oppose the transformation project with 
opposing levels of agreement to statements S2, S3 and S4. The underlying justification 
of the transformation project through specific conceptions of equality and justice, 
further strengthens the connection between the empirical and theoretical components 
of the study and allows the researcher to establish congruence between respondents 
views of the rule of law and democracy and the adopted theoretical framework.  
                                                 
30
 It is acknowledged that this view of land ownership and property rights may be the belief amongst 
respondents in South Africa had the statements been framed differently or had the statements been 
leading to a lesser degree. 
31
 As was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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5.3.2 Discussion of statements S2-S4 
 
The statements S2 (landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist), 
S3 (landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are fairly using the rights 
awarded to them by the constitution) and S4 (landowners who dispute land claims by 
going to court are blocking transformation) have a number of shared assumptions that 
require some elaboration. These are that: 
 
1. statements S2-S4 hold the view that the courts are the highest authority in 
South Africa, and that their jurisdiction and power (authoritative rule) are 
incontestable. This is implied in the statements by asserting that “Landowners 
who dispute land claims by going to court…”. The statements assume that 
respondents have a shared normative ascription on the authority and 
sovereignty of courts in deciding matters of contestation in the public sphere. 
The respondents are not asked about their views on the court or the importance 
and role of the court, rather it is implied that the court is the supreme diviner 
of law. This statement therefore implies a belief in the ‘rule of law’ by 
respondents. The rule of law as a procedural aspect of democratic theory is 
expressed through the decisions of the courts. In other words, the rule of law 
as a procedure, gains substance when the courts deliver judgements.  
 
2. the agreement\disagreement with statements S2-S4 is not on the issue of 
people being able to dispute issues in court, but rather whether using the courts 
to contest land claims have significant impact on landowners being perceived 
as racist, fairly using the constitution or blocking transformation. The 
procedural aspect of democracy, (that of the rules applying to all), is therefore 
assumed as being credible. The respondents are not asked about their 
agreement\disagreement of the act of going to court, but rather on the effects 
on using the courts with relation to specific and different aspects of land 
reform (racism, constitutional supremacy and transformation).  
 
3. the respondents’ views on statements S2-S4 therefore gauges how they view 
the functioning of the principle of ‘rule of law’. The relevance of the principle 
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in conceptual terms is not questioned, it is assumed. What is questioned is how 
the principle (rule of law) should find expression in substantive terms. That is 
to say, whether it should be preferentially applied based on race and 
ownership, or whether it should be universally and impartially applied. The 
respondents’ opinion on justifying preferential application of the rule of law 
places them in a specific paradigm on democracy (liberal/liberationist) and 
within a specific cultural orientation (low- and high-context cultures). The 
principle of ‘rule of law’ is seen as a fundamental condition in both procedural 
and substantive conceptions of democracy. It is only in how the principle is set 
to function that the distinction is created between preferential and universal 
application, and not in the principle being present in any set definition or 
conception of democracy. This allows one to gauge whether or not 
respondents place the normative priority on the impartial application of the 
rule of law, or on substantive gains facilitated by its application. If the rule of 
law is interpreted as serving all people, irrespective of group or ownership, it 
falls under the ambit of liberal democracy. If the principle can be interpreted 
as to represent the needs of a specific community or group, it can be closely 
aligned with liberationist views on democracy.  
 
4. statements S2-S4 assume the importance of property rights in that it implies 
that land claims can be contested in courts. Property rights are therefore taken 
as being a fundamental right that can be protected through the courts. The 
level of agreement enables one to gauge whether respondents place the 
normative priority on all being able to use the court, or that courts should 
protect only specific aspects of public life or serve the needs of a specific 
group.  
 
Statement S2 (landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist) tests 
how respondents view the application of the ‘rule of law’. It tests whether respondents 
see landowners (defined as white per above explanation) are acting in a racist fashion 
by contesting land claims in court. It therefore tests whether respondents think the 
principle should be preferentially applied based on race and ownership, as being cast a 
racist is not an enviable characteristic. The greater the level of agreement with the 
statement, the greater the implied belief that the principle of ‘rule of law’ should serve 
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the interest of a specific group of people, and should be applied preferentially and not 
universally. By implication then, those respondents that agree with the statement can 
be grouped as subscribing to the liberationist perspective on democracy and the high-
context cultural orientation and those opposing it to the liberal and low-context 
perspective.  
 
Statements S3 (landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are fairly using 
the rights awarded to them by the constitution) and S4 (landowners who dispute land 
claims by going to court are blocking transformation) are seen by the researcher, to 
most directly create the dichotomy between groups. This is due to the fact that 
democracy, as an analytical construct, is viewed as being comprised of differing yet 
interrelated empirical processes. On the one hand there is democracy-as-process, with 
the parallel being democracy-as-substance. Statement S3 has direct bearing on 
democracy-as-process, with statement S4 referring to democracy-as-substance. This is 
due to statement S3 referring not only to the implied importance of the rule of law 
(supremacy of courts), but also the importance of the supreme document of law, the 
Constitution. Statement S4’s relevance to democracy-as-substance is derived from the 
term transformation32. 
 
Although it has already been argued that statements S2-S4 deals with the implied 
subscription to the ‘rule of law’ principle, the principle (and therefore democracy-as-
process) is most clearly articulated in statement S3. Statement S3 can be seen as 
testing respondent’s agreement on the normative priority of the rule of law in 
procedural terms. If respondents agree with this statement, it shows that they are of 
opinion that using the courts as an arena for contestation is a fundamental right that 
landowners (perceived as white) should have access to. Statement S3 tests the 
respondents’ belief on whether all are equally protected by the law, regardless of race 
or ownership.  
 
It is also necessary to state that when statement S3 refers to “rights awarded to them 
by the Constitution”, it is not stipulated what rights are referred to. A possible 
reference could be to assume that the Constitutional rights that are referred to be those 
                                                 
32
 The role of the transformation project as described in the previous chapters is conterminous with 
democracy in South Africa. 
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of Section25 (Property rights) and Section 34 (Access to courts) (RSA Constitution, 
1996). Both these rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights, and are therefore rights 
awarded to all citizens of South Africa regardless of race or class. It is however, not 
stipulated that statement S3 refers only to these rights, but as they have direct bearing 
to the statement, these rights seem to be those that the statement is referring to. 
Statement S3 has reference to protection of property and the right to equal access to 
the judicial system, both of which are fundamental rights in the liberal approach to 
democracy. 
 
It can therefore be deduced that agreement to this statement shows that respondents 
are of opinion that the rights enshrined in the Constitution, and their arena for 
contestation (courts), are open to all irrespective of race and ownership. Disagreement 
with the statement implies the exact opposite. Agreement to statement S3 would 
therefore place the respondents in the liberal perspective on democracy and low-
context cultural orientation, whilst those who disagree would fall in the liberationist 
camp of democracy and high-context cultural orientation.  
 
Whereas statement S3 refers to the procedural aspect of democratic systems, (the rule 
law and supremacy of constitution), statement S4 is squarely placed within the 
substantive conceptions of democracy due to its testing the rule of law principle with 
a clearly stated goal of democracy in South Africa, that of transformation. Those 
respondents that think using the courts blocks transformation can be grouped as 
liberationist and high-context cultural orientation as they are of opinion that the 
outcome of democracy (transformation) is more important than the procedures 
allowing democracy to exist (rule of law). The opposite is true for those who disagree 
with the statement and places them in the liberal perspective on democracy and low-
context cultural orientation.  
5.4 Data presentation 
5.4.1 Responses to the statement “All land whites own they stole 
from blacks” 
The data presented below, obtained from three datasets illustrate the level of 
agreement across the general population and across elites in response to S1. The 
 129
categories for response were recoded from the five categories to three categories, for 
ease of representation. The broad level of responses illustrated below in Figure 1, and 
shows that there is a marked increase in level of agreement between the 2004 and 
2007 in the public opinion datasets. In 2004, 47.6% of the sampled population 
‘agreed’ with statement S1, 14.6% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, whilst 36.9 % 
‘disagreed’. In 2007, 64.6% ‘agreed’, 14% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’ while 21% 
‘disagreed’ with the statement. There is a 16% increase in level of agreement with 
statement S1 and a corresponding 16% decrease in level of disagreement with the 
statement.33 
Figure 1 
Responses to: "All land whites own they stole from blacks",
2004 and 2007
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The picture for the elite group as shown in Figure 2 is markedly different. Amongst 
elites, 25.8% ‘agreed’ with the statement, 13.2% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’ with 
60.9% ‘disagreeing’ with the statement. The level of agreement is noticeably lower 
                                                 
33
 In both 2004 and 2007 less than 1% of respondents fell in the categories did not know or refused to 
answer clearly showing that most respondents do have an opinion about S1.  
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amongst elites than amongst the general population, as the bar graph below clearly 
illustrates.  
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
In order to assess the level of agreement/disagreement across the general population 
and across elites for the three datasets, the influence of the independent variables, 
race, language and political orientation on responses to S1 “All land whites own they 
stole from blacks” were determined using the five original categories which are 
tabulated and depicted below. 
5.4.1.1 The association of race with the response to the statement “All 
land whites own they stole from blacks” 
 
Datasets from 2004 and 2007 were analysed according to race, shown in Table 5.2, 
illustrating differences amongst the South African population groups and the changes 
in responses over this period with respondents in the “don’t know” category never 
exceeding 1%. 
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It is clear that blacks have the highest level of agreement with statement S1 in both 
2004 (74.5%) and 2007 (80%). Blacks are likely to have a greater tendency to 
‘strongly agree’ with statement S1 instead of falling in the category of ‘agree’.  
 
Within all the racial categories, the level of agreement has increased from 2004 to 
2007. Even for whites, who have the highest level of disagreement with statement S1, 
the level of agreement has increased dramatically. In 2004, only 3, 1% of whites 
‘agree’ while in 2007 the corresponding figure is 9%. There is a 32.8% decrease in 
those white respondents that ‘strongly disagree’. This is counteracted by the fact that 
the ‘disagree’ category amongst whites has increased by 20.6%. The level of 
disagreement has therefore shifted somewhat amongst white respondents from 
primarily ‘strongly disagreeing’ in 2004, to just ‘disagreeing’ in 200734. 
 
 
The level of agreement amongst coloured respondents has remained largely the same 
for 2004 and 2007. There is an interesting increase in the level of agreement in the 
Indian category, with both ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ responses showing a twofold 
increase to 24.8% and 11.5% respectively. There is also a dramatic decrease amongst 
Indians who ‘strongly disagree’ with statement S1 with the percentage changing from 
21.2% to 4.8% in the ‘strongly disagree’ category and from 43.5% to 31.5% in the 
‘disagree category’. It would appear from the data presented above, that the number 
of whites and Indians who agree with the statement have increased, and blacks and 
coloureds have remained at similar levels of agreement as shown in 2004. The 
responses are highly polarised with relation to racial categories.  
                                                 
34
 The racial categories employed are those used in the surveys that were conducted and their use is not 
the researcher’s classification of respondents into racial categories 
Table 5.2 Response to “All land whites own they stole from blacks” by Race 
(column percentage) 
 
white black coloured Indian 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
Strongly 
disagree 59.1 26.3 1.1 1.7 10.0 4.5 21.2 4.8 
Disagree 29.7 50.3 6.8 6.0 38.7 36.3 43.5 31.5 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 6.9 13.9 16.7 12.0 21.3 22.9 17.1 26.7 
Agree 2.1 4.6 32.4 35.7 20.0 23.7 12.9 24.8 
Strongly agree 1.0 4.4 42.1 44.3 9.2 12.6 4.7 11.5 
Don't know 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 
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5.4.1.2 The association of language with the response to the statement 
“All land whites own they stole from blacks” 
 
The data depicted in Table 5.3 shows that Afrikaans and English respondents fall 
overwhelmingly into categories of disagreement with statement S1. Within Afrikaans 
speaking respondents, there has been a shift in views on statement S1. There is a 
substantial decrease, 45.4% in 2004 to 18.3% in 2007 amongst those who ‘strongly 
disagree’. This is offset by an increase amongst Afrikaans respondents in the 
‘disagree’ and ‘neither disagree nor agree’ categories. There is also a substantial 
decrease amongst English respondents who ‘strongly disagree’ with the 37.4% in 
2004 falling to 10% in 2007. Amongst Xhosa respondents, there has been an increase 
from 29.4% in 2004 to 45.3% in 2007in the ‘agree’ category. The Venda and Swazi 
speaking respondents show an increase in level of agreement with statement S1, 
whilst the Ndebele speakers show a marked increase in disagreement with three fold 
increases in the ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ categories. 
 
Table 5.3 Response to “All land whites own they stole from blacks” by Language 
(row percentage) 
 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/ 
Disagree 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
English 37.4 10 35.4 39.8 13.4 22 9.3 18.2 3.8 9.5 0.7 0.2 
Afrikaans 45.4 18.3 32.3 42.7 10.7 17.1 7.2 13.5 3.4 8.2 0.7 0.2 
Zulu 0.7 1.5 5.1 5.1 16.2 11.7 34.3 30.5 43.1 51 0.6 0.3 
Xhosa 1.4 1 7.3 3.9 22.1 10.1 29.4 45.3 38.8 39 0.9 0.8 
N.Sotho 1.9 2 8 6 11.3 11.2 35.4 36.3 42.5 44.4 0.9 0 
S.Sotho 0.8 2 9 8.1 15.5 11.8 31.8 35.8 41.6 41.9 1.2 0.3 
Tswana 0.4 2 6.9 9.3 13.9 15 33.5 33.3 41.2 40.2 2 0 
Tsonga 2.6 0 11.7 10.6 13 17.3 27.3 26.9 42.9 45.2 2.6 0 
Venda 1.9 3.5 5.8 1.8 21.2 5.3 30.8 35.1 40.4 54.4 0 0 
Swazi 0 3.2 4.4 3.2 8.9 24.2 24.4 33.9 62.2 35.5 0 0 
Ndebele 0 3.8 4.5 15.4 18.2 11.5 31.8 19.2 45.5 50 0 0 
Other 9.1 6.3 18.2 31.3 18.2 12.5 27.3 18.8 18.2 25 9.1 0 
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It must be noted that the linguistic groups mentioned last have a small number of 
speakers amongst the sampled population, and the results are therefore misleading as 
they are presented in a percentage format with a small number of respondents 
accounting for a large percentage change. There is a large degree of differentiation 
between Afrikaans and English speaking respondents and those respondents speaking 
a Bantu language35. 
5.4.1.3 The association of political orientation with the response to the 
statement “All land whites own they stole from blacks” 
 
There is a strong level of differentiation amongst the respondents based on the 
political party they would vote for and their level of agreement towards statement S1, 
shown in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4 Response to “All land whites own they stole from blacks” by Political 
Party affiliation (row percentage) 
                                                 
35
 Bantu languages referring to Zulu, Xhosa, North and South Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga, Venda, Swazi 
and Ndebele. The author acknowledges that there are numerous ways of classifying linguistic groups, 
with a more technically correct term for the language family spoken in South Africa being the Niger-
Congo-South family. Bantu languages is a recognized family name for the languages spoken in the 
RSA (Lewis, 2009). 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
ANC 2.3 1.7 9.1 7.9 17.1 13 37.1 35.1 38.9 42.2 0.7 0.2 
DA 50.9 19.6 29.9 42.2 8.5 15.3 5.3 12.4 4.6 10.8 0.7 0 
IFP 7.1 2.8 11.6 2.8 17.9 10.1 23.3 30.3 40.2 54.1 0.9 0 
ID 35.6 7.6 30.5 42.2 13.6 19.7 13.6 22.7 5.1 7.6 1.7 0 
ACDP 37.9 8.8 33.3 17.6 16.7 8.8 6.1 26.5 4.5 35.3 1.5 2.9 
UDM 8.1 0 10.8 7.1 10.8 7.1 35.1 57.1 32.4 28.6 2.1 0 
FF+ 63.2 30.8 26.3 53.3 5.3 7.7 2.6 7.7 2.6 0 0 0 
PAC 12.5 0 16.7 14.3 16.7 14.3 12.5 38.1 41.7 33.3 0 0 
UCDP 12.5 0 37.5 10 0 30 12.5 20 37.5 40 0 0 
MF 0 0 66.7 60 16.7 10 16.7 30 00 0 0 0 
Azapo 0 0 50 28.6 25 28.6 0 28.6 25 14.3 0 0 
NNP 27.4 - 7.4 - 14 - 6.1 - 8.5 - 0 - 
Don't 
Know 29.7 7.4 29.3 26 12.9 16.3 13.7 26.5 12.2 23.3 1.9 0 
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The ANC supporters overwhelmingly agree with statement S1, with more respondents 
voting for the ANC that fall in the ‘strongly agree’ than ‘agree’ categories in both 
2004 and 2007. An interesting shift has occurred amongst those respondents who 
support the DA. Although most of the DA supporters still ‘disagree’ with statement 
S1, there was a change in their level of agreement. In 2004, 50.9% of DA voters 
‘strongly disagreed’ and 29.9% ‘disagreed’. In 2007, the DA supporters have altered 
their level of agreement somewhat with only 19.6% ‘strongly disagreeing’, and 42.2% 
‘disagreeing’. There is a shift from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘agree’ amongst the parties 
whose supporters overwhelmingly disagree with statement S1, especially amongst DA 
and FF+ supporters. 
5.4.1.4 Elite responses to the statement “All land whites own they stole 
from blacks” 
 
As was seen in Figure 2, the elite sample has a distinctly different view on statement 
S1 in comparison to the public opinion section of the survey. Table 5.5 shows the 
overall level of agreement amongst elites. It is possible to see that most members of 
the elite group are in disagreement with the statement, with more elite respondents 
‘disagreeing’ than ‘strongly disagreeing’. 
 
Table 5.5 Response to “All land whites own they stole from blacks” by Elites 
 
Table 5.6 shows how respondents in the different sectors amongst the elite population 
responded to statement S1. It is evident that the groups with the highest levels of 
agreement are parliamentarians (39.9%) and civil servants (29.4%), whilst the 
statement is most vehemently opposed by the business sector (86.3%)  followed by 
the media  (64%) and the church sectors (62%).  
 
 
 
 
 Count Percent 
Strongly Agree 35 11.7 
Agree 42 14.1 
Neither agree/disagree 39 13.2 
Disagree 107 36.2 
Strongly Disagree 73 24.7 
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Table 5.6 Response to “All land whites own they stole from blacks” by Elite 
sector (row percentage) 
 
5.4.2 Responses to the statement “Landowners who dispute land 
claims by going to court are racist” 
 
The data presented, obtained from three datasets, depicts the level of agreement across 
the general population and across elites in response to S2. The categories for response 
were recoded from the five original categories to three categories, for ease of 
representation. Illustrated in Figure 3 below is the broad level of response amongst the 
general population and shows that in 2004 30.5% ‘agreed’, 24.2% ‘neither agreed nor 
disagreed’ and 43.8% ‘disagreed’.  
Figure 3 
Responses to: "Landowners who dispute land claims by
going to court are racist", 2004 and 2007
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 Parliament Media Civil Servant Business Church 
Strongly Agree 14.7 6 17.6 5.9 12 
Agree 25.2 16 11.8 - 8 
Neither agree/disagree 15.1 14 9.8 7.8 18 
Disagree 29.9 40 431 41.2 32 
Strongly Disagree 15.1 24 17.6 45.1 30 
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The corresponding percentages in 2007 were 42.1%, 24.3% and 33.1%. There is 
therefore an overall shift in agreement over this period, with the number of 
respondents agreeing with S2 showing an increase of 11.6% in 2007. 
Correspondingly, the level of disagreement has decreased by 10.7%. 
 
Again, the picture for the elite population group (figure 4) is different from the 
general population. Amongst elites, 12.5% ‘agree’, 15.4% ‘neither agree nor disagree’ 
and 72.1% ‘disagree’ with the statement. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
The data presented below shows the level of agreement/disagreement of responses to 
S2 “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist” which was 
assessed across the general population and across elites for the three datasets. The 
influence of the independent variables, race, language and political orientation on the 
responses were determined using the five original categories which are tabulated and 
depicted below. 
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5.4.2.1 The association of race with the response to the statement 
“Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist” 
 
Data sets of responses to S2 were subsequently analysed according to race with Table 
5.7 showing how the different racial categories responded. The trend is roughly 
similar to that of found for statement S1.  
 
Table 5.7 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are racist” by Race (column percentage) 
 
The statement is most vehemently opposed by the white group (72%) followed the 
Indian and then the coloured group. Amongst whites, there is a decrease in the amount 
of respondents who ‘strongly disagree’ from 32% to 24%. This is offset by an 
increase in white respondents who ‘disagree’ from 40% to 48.3%. There are increases 
amongst the black proportion in both categories of agreement. This is also the case 
amongst the coloured sector of the sample. The Indian sector also shows a decrease in 
those who ‘strongly agree’, and a relatively large increase amongst those who ‘neither 
agree nor disagree’. 
 
5.4.2.2 The association of language with the response to the statement 
“Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist” 
 
One is able to see that there is also a strong linguistic dimension to the level of 
agreement with statement S2 as is evident from the data presented in table 5.8. 
Amongst the Afrikaans and English speaking respondents, there is a downward trend 
in the percentage of those who ‘strongly disagree’ with a concomitant increase in the 
‘disagree’ category (1.8% and 1.3%, respectively). There is also an increase in the 
 
white black coloured Indian 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
Strongly 
disagree 32 24 5.7 5.4 6.2 5 6.5 6.7 
Disagree 40 48.3 22.3 18.3 43.6 42.7 52.9 37 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 16.9 17.8 27.1 24.6 27.9 24.3 21.8 37.6 
Agree 6.1 8.1 27.4 30.3 14.4 20.9 14.1 17 
Strongly agree 2.3 1.4 16.7 21 4.6 6.4 4.7 1.8 
Don't know 2.3 0.5 0.9 0.4 3.1 0.6 0 0 
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‘agree’ category amongst Afrikaans speaking respondents of 6.8%and English 
speaking respondents of 4.1%.  
 
The overall level of agreement is much higher amongst those speaking a Bantu 
language. There is an interesting shift amongst Zulu speakers with fewer respondents 
‘disagreeing’ (31.5% in 2004 and 19.4% in 2007), and an increase in both categories 
of agreement (44.3% in 2004 and 55.9% in 2007). There is also a marked increase of 
11.3% in the North Sotho speakers who ‘strongly agree’. The Tsonga language 
category also shows considerable increases in overall levels of agreement.  
 
Table 5.8 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are racist” by Language (row percentage) 
 
5.4.2.3 The association of political orientation with the response to the 
statement “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
racist” 
 
The difference between ANC supporters and DA supporters is evident when studying 
Table 5.9. Again, it is ANC supporters that show the highest level of agreement with 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
English 20.9 11.1 43.2 44.5 21.4 28 9.5 13.6 3.3 2.7 1.6 0 
Afrikaans 23.5 16.6 41.6 43.4 19.7 19.6 9 15.8 3.2 3.8 2.6 .8 
Zulu 7.3 5.1 24.2 14.3 23.2 24.6 25.2 32.7 19.1 23.2 0.9 0.1 
Xhosa 5.9 5.6 23.8 25 34.8 24.9 27.1 29.7 8.5 13.8 0 1 
N.Sotho 6.6 4.7 21.7 10.5 23.6 26.8 27.4 27.8 18.9 30.2 1.9 0 
S.Sotho 2.9 6.4 19.2 21.3 26.9 19.6 35.1 31.4 15.1 20.9 0.8 0.3 
Tswana 4.9 4.5 20 20.3 26.9 22.8 29.8 32.5 16.3 19.5 2 0.4 
Tsonga 3.9 5.8 23.4 11.5 37.7 28.8 18.2 28.8 15.6 25 1.3 0 
Venda 3.8 8.8 11.5 33.3 26.9 17.5 30.8 19.3 26.9 21.1 0 0 
Swazi 2.2 1.6 26.7 14.5 13.3 33.9 22.2 25.8 35.6 24.2 0 0 
Ndebele 4.5 3.8 18.2 11.5 22.7 46.2 13.6 15.4 40.9 23.1 0 0 
Other 0 0 27.3 31.3 18.2 31.3 36.4 6.3 9.1 25 9.1 6.3 
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statement S2, while FF+ supporters show the highest level of disagreement. There is 
an increase amongst ANC supporters in the ‘agree’ category of 4.5% and ‘strongly 
agree’ by 3.8%. Amongst DA supporters, there is a decrease of those who ‘strongly 
disagree’ down from 28.3% to 17.9%, and a concurrent increase in the ‘disagree’ 
category from 38.2% to 45.2%. Despite the increased level of agreement amongst DA 
supporters, the polarisation between supporters of the ANC (agreement, 50.1%) and 
of the DA (disagreement, 63.1%) on the statement remains high.  
 
Table 5.9 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are racist” by Political Party affiliation (row percentage) 
 
 
5.4.2.4 Elite responses to the statement “Landowners who dispute land 
claims by going to court are racist” 
 
From table 5.10 it is visible that more elites are in disagreement (72.1%) with 
statement S2 than are in agreement (12.5%) with the statement. Table 5.11 shows that 
the sectors amongst elites with the highest level of agreement to the statement are 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
ANC 5.1 5.5 23.6 19.4 28.1 24.6 26.1 30.6 15.7 19.5 0.8 0.3 
DA 28.3 17.9 38.2 45.2 18.1 19.8 8.5 13.4 4.9 3.7 1.5 0 
IFP 8.9 5.5 32.1 13.8 29.5 29.4 18.8 23.9 8.9 27.5 1.8 0 
ID 20.3 4.5 49.2 53 18.6 19.7 5.1 18.2 3.4 4.5 3.4 0 
ACDP 15.2 11.8 45.5 23.5 21.2 17.6 12.1 23.5 4.5 23.5 1.5 0 
UDM 10.8 0 48.6 42.9 10.8 7.1 21.6 50 8.1 0 0 0 
FF+ 36.8 23.1 44.7 61.5 15.8 15.4 2.6 0 0 0 0 0 
PAC 8.3 4.8 29.2 28.6 29.2 28.6 16.7 19 16.7 19 0 0 
UCDP 12.5 0 62.2 10 12.5 60 12.5 20 0 10 0 0 
MF 16.7 10 833 50 0 10 0 20 0 10 0 0 
Azapo 25 0 50 42.9 0 19.8 25 0 0 28.6 0 0.3 
NNP 46.5 - 43.3 - 21.3 - 14 - 3 - 1.8 - 
Don't Know 18.6 8.8 32.7 32.6 24 30.2 12.5 18.6 8 9.8 3.8 0 
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parliamentarians (23.6%), followed by civil servants (15.6%). The sectors with the 
highest levels of disagreement are the business sector (84.4%) followed by the media 
(80.4%) followed by the church sector (75.5%). 
 
Table 5.10 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are racist” by Elites 
 
Table 5.11 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court” 
by Elite sector (row percentage) 
 
5.4.3 Responses to the statement “Landowners who dispute land 
claims by going to court are fairly using the rights awarded to 
them by the Constitution” 
 
The level of agreement across the general population and elites in response to S3 were 
analysed for the three sets of data, 2004 and 2007 and 2007 for the elites. The 
categories for response were recoded from five to three for ease of representation. 
Figure 5 below represents the overall level of agreement amongst the general 
population and figure 6 the elite responses to the statement. Amongst the general 
population, more than half of the respondents were in agreement with the statement, a 
response that did not change over the survey period  — 56% ‘agreed’ with statement 
S3 in 2004 and 56.7% in 2007. The non-commitant group of respondents remained 
constant with 28.3% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’ in 2004, whilst the corresponding 
figure in 2007 was 29.4%. Only 14% of respondents ‘disagreed’ in 2004, with 13.6% 
‘disagreeing’ in 2007.  
 Count Percent 
Strongly Agree 14 4.6 
Agree 23 7.9 
Neither agree/disagree 45 15.4 
Disagree 153 52.1 
Strongly Disagree 59 20 
 Parliament Media Civil Servant Business Church 
Strongly Agree 7.2 - 7.8 - 6.1 
Agree 16.4 2 7.8 5.9 - 
Neither agree/disagree 19.8 17.6 7.8 9.8 18.4 
Disagree 43.8 64.7 58.8 47.1 53.1 
Strongly Disagree 12.8 15.7 17.6 37.3 22.4 
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Figure 5 
Responses to: "Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court
are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution", 2004 and
2007
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Amongst the elite population, 88.7% were in agreement, 6.7% ‘neither agreed nor 
disagreed’, with only 4.6% disagreeing with the statement. Statement S3 is the 
statement that has the highest level of agreement amongst elites, and the second 
highest level of agreement amongst the general population, second only to statement 
S1. 
Figure 6 
Elite response to "Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court
are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution"
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Responses to S3 “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are fairly 
using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” was assessed across the general 
population and across elites for the three datasets. The influence of the independent 
variables, race, language and political orientation on the level of 
agreement/disagreement of the responses were determined using the five original 
categories which are tabulated and depicted below. 
5.4.3.1 The association of race with the response to the statement 
“Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are fairly using 
the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” 
 
Table 5.12 presents the responses to statement S3 by racial category. Amongst all 
races, there is a high level of ‘agreement’ with the statement. Interestingly, more than 
half of respondents amongst the black, coloured and Indian sectors of the sample were 
in agreement with the statement in 2004 showing a 5% increase by 2007 with 
percentages ranging from 54.5%, 66.7% and 56.4% respectively. The white group, 
showed a decrease by 6.6% in the same category — 68% in 2004 and period to 
61.4%. This group also shows the highest number of respondents who fall in the 
‘disagree’ category (13.4% in 2007). Furthermore, the ‘neither agree/disagree’ 
category remained consistent except for the coloured group that has shown a 5% 
decrease to 24%.  
 
Table 5.12 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” by Race (column 
percentage) 
 
  
   
 
white black coloured Indian 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
Strongly 
disagree 3.6 4.8 4.4 4.2 1.8 0.3 0.3 1.3 
Disagree 6.1 13.4 12.7 9.7 6.2 7.8 11.2 5.5 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 19.4 20.3 31.9 31.2 29 24 32.9 36.4 
Agree 35.6 45.5 30.5 35.4 50 51.1 47.1 47.3 
Strongly agree 32.4 15.9 19.4 19.1 9.5 15.6 5.9 9.1 
Don't know 2.5 0 1.3 0.4 4.4 1.1 2.4 0.6 
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5.4.3.2 The association of language with the response to the statement 
“Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are fairly using 
the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” 
 
In Table 5.13 the category ‘disagree’ has show a decrease amongst Zulu and Xhosa 
speaking respondents with a greater decrease in disagreement amongst the Zulu 
(7.4%) than amongst the Xhosa respondents (3.9%). Interestingly, amongst Xhosa 
speaking respondents there are fewer respondents who fall in the ‘neither 
agree/disagree category’ (40% in 2004 and 30.7% in 2007), with an increase of 29.4% 
to 43.7% in the ‘agree’ category. 
 
5.13 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” by Language (row 
percentage) 
 
Amongst both English and Afrikaans speaking respondents there is an increase in the 
‘agree’ category and a decrease in the ‘strongly agree’ category. The number of 
English respondents in agreement remained constant (63%). The slight decrease in 
Afrikaans respondents (3.6%) in this category together with the 2.6 decrease in the 
‘don’t know’ category accounts for the 5.7% increase in the disagree category 
amongst Afrikaans speaking respondents. 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
English 1.6 1.1 8.2 7.7 25.1 27.3 42.1 50.7 20.6 13 2.3 0.2 
Afrikaans 3.2 3.6 5.7 11.4 22.3 22.7 39.5 45.9 25.6 15.6 3.4 0.8 
Zulu 5.7 3.9 14.3 8.7 28 35.4 32.3 32.2 18.2 19.3 1.5 0.5 
Xhosa 3.3 3.4 12 8 40 30.7 29.4 43.7 14.4 14 .9 0.3 
N.Sotho 5.7 5.1 11.3 8.5 28.8 26.8 29.7 32.9 22.6 26.8 1.9 0 
S.Sotho 4.5 5.1 11 10.5 31.8 29.1 28.6 35.1 23.7 19.6 .4 0.7 
Tswana 2.4 4.5 15.5 16.7 33.1 27.6 28.6 32.1 18.4 19.1 2 0 
Tsonga 1.3 2.9 5.2 10.6 29.9 28.8 40.3 28.8 22.1 28.8 1.3 0 
Venda 3.8 5.3 1.9 3.5 32.7 24.6 34.6 29.8 26.9 36.8 0 0 
Swazi 4.4 6.5 20 21 24.4 32.3 8.9 35.5 42.2 4.8 0 0 
Ndebele 4.5 11.5 4.5 7.7 22.7 46.2 50 19.2 18.2 15.4 0 0 
Other 0 6.3 27.3 12.5 36.4 25 36.4 37.5 0 12.5 0 6.3 
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5.4.3.3 The association of political orientation with the response to the 
statement “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” 
Amongst ANC supporters, feelings towards statement S3 have remained relatively 
consistent, with a small increase in the ‘agree’ category and a decrease in the 
‘disagree’ category (Table 5.14). There is a marked increase in the amount of DA 
supporters who ‘disagree’ with the statement, from 6.1% to 10.8%. There is also a 
decrease in the percentage of DA supporters who ‘strongly agree’, down from 28.8% 
to 15.3%. There is an overall increase in disagreement of 2.7% and a decrease in 
agreement of 4.5% in the DA group. It is interesting to note that a greater percentage 
of ANC supporters ‘strongly disagree’ (4%) than DA supporters (3.5%), and that 
there is a larger proportion of DA supporters who ‘disagree’ (10.8%) than their ANC 
counterparts (9.6%).  
 
Table 5.14 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” by Political 
Party affiliation (row percentage)  
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
ANC 3.5 4 12.2 9.6 31.9 30.4 32.3 36.4 18.9 19.3 1.2 0.2 
DA 3.8 3.5 6.1 10.8 19.3 22 39.1 48.1 28.8 15.3 2.2 0.4 
IFP 3.6 3.7 13.6 10.1 30.7 33.9 31.4 26.6 18.6 25.7 2.1 0 
ID 0 0 3.4 12.1 24.1 18.2 41.4 53 27.6 16.7 3.4 0 
ACDP 1.9 0 3.8 8.8 17 29.4 52.8 44.1 22.6 17.6 1.9 0 
UDM 5 0 7.5 0 27.5 7.1 55 85.7 5 7.1 0 0 
FF+ 4.8 30.8 2.4 15.4 33.3 15.4 14.3 30.8 45.2 7.7 0 0 
PAC 0 0 15.6 28.6 46.9 14.3 25 52.4 12.5 4.8 0 0 
UCDP 0 10 22.2 0 11.1 40 55.6 30 11.1 20 0 0 
MF 0 0 16.7 0 16.7 40 44.4 60 16.7 0 5.6 0 
Azapo 20 14.3 0 0 20 14.3 60 71.4 0 0 0 0 
NNP 2.7 - 6.6 - 26.4 - 48.4 - 14.3 - 1.6 - 
Don't Know 4.7 2.8 8.8 11.2 28.5 36.7 31.8 35.3 21.9 13.5 4 0.5 
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5.4.3.4 Elite responses to the statement “Landowners who dispute land 
claims by going to court are fairly using the rights awarded to them by 
the Constitution” 
 
From the tables below it is clear that the overwhelming majority of elites are in 
agreement with statement S3. There is a very small percentage of elites who ‘strongly 
disagree’ with the statement, 0.7%, with 88.9% of the respondents being in agreement 
(Table 5.15). In Table 5.16 the sectors with the highest level of agreement with the 
statement are the media (94.1%), church (92%), parliamentarians (90.8%), civil 
servants (86.3%) and the business sector with 78.4%. Disagreement with the 
statement is low, with the parliamentarians and business sectors exhibiting the highest 
levels, 5.9%.  
 
Table 5.15 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” by Elites 
 
Table 5.16 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the Constitution” by Elite 
sector (row percentage) 
 
5.4.4 Responses to the statement “Landowners who dispute land 
claims by going to court are blocking transformation” 
 
The data presented below, obtained from three datasets, depicts the level of agreement 
across the general population in 2004 and in 2007, and across elites in 2007, in 
response to S4. The categories for response were recoded from the five original 
categories to three categories, for ease of representation. Figure 7, displaying 
 Count Percent 
Strongly Agree 93 31.3 
Agree 172 57.6 
Neither agree/disagree 20 6.7 
Disagree 12 3.9 
Strongly Disagree 2 0.7 
 Parliament Media Civil Servant Business Church 
Strongly Agree 33.3 21.6 33.3 41.2 24 
Agree 57.5 72.5 45.1 45.1 68 
Neither agree/disagree 3.2 2 17.6 7.8 6 
Disagree 5.9 3.9 3.9 2 2 
Strongly Disagree - - - 3.9 - 
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responses to statement S4, shows a different picture than that of responses to 
statements S1 and S3 and is similar to that of statement S2, in that the sampled 
population is dispersed amongst all the response categories. What is apparent is that 
there are substantial responses in each of the three categories. In 2004, 33.5% 
‘agreed’, with the corresponding response in 2007 increasing to 41%. Those 
respondents who ‘neither agree nor disagree’ have remained largely unchanged at 
28.3% in 2004 and 28.7% in 2007. In 2004, 36% of respondents ‘disagreed’ whilst in 
2007 a decrease to 29.9% was recorded. The overall level of agreement has increased 
somewhat (7.5%) over the period under review, but at the smallest percentage of all 
the statements with a 6.1% decrease in the level of disagreement.  
 
Figure 7 
Responses to: "Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are
blocking transformation", 2004 and 2007
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The response to S4 by the elites, illustrated in Figure 8, shows 24.6% ‘agreed’, 21.1% 
‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, whilst 54.2% ‘disagreed’.  
 
Figure 8 
Elite response to: "Landowners who dispute land claims by
going to court are blocking transformation"
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The level of agreement/disagreement of responses to S4 “Landowners who dispute 
land claims by going to court are blocking transformation” was assessed across the 
general population and across elites for the three datasets. The influence of the 
independent variables, race, language and political orientation on the responses were 
determined using the five original categories which are tabulated and depicted below. 
5.4.4.1 The association of race with the response to the statement 
“Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are blocking 
transformation” 
 
Table 5.17 shows that the lowest level of agreement to the statement can be found 
amongst white respondents at 9.3% in 2004 and 8.7% in 2007. There is a sharp 
decrease of 7.6% amongst white respondents who ‘strongly disagree’ with statement 
S4, whilst there has been an increase of 8.6% in the ‘disagree’ category. Amongst the 
Indian group, the proportion of respondents who ‘neither agree/disagree’ has 
increased by 10.8% as well as the number of respondents in this group who disagree 
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decreasing by 6.8%. Amongst the other segments the levels have remained relatively 
consistent.  
 
Table 5.17 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are blocking transformation” by Race (column percentage) 
 
5.4.4.2 The association of language with the response to the statement 
“Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are blocking 
transformation” 
 
Amongst English and Afrikaans speaking groups there is a slight decline in the 
percentage of respondents that ‘strongly disagree’, and a slight increase in the 
category of ‘disagree’, shown in Table 5.18. Within the English and Afrikaans 
sectors, there are also slight increases in the overall level of agreement to the 
statement. Interestingly, while the English speaking group shows an increase of 1.6%, 
the Afrikaans speaking group showed an increase of 4.5%. Despite these changes, 
respondents who speak English and Afrikaans remain those who have the highest 
levels of disagreement to the statement, 49.1 and 53.4%, respectively. There is an 
increase amongst Zulu speaking respondents in the ‘strongly agree’ category of 4.4% 
and amongst North Sotho speaking respondents of 6.1%. Interestingly, Xhosa 
speaking respondents show increases in both the ‘strongly disagree’ (0.6%) and 
‘disagree’ category (5.7%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
white black coloured Indian 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
Strongly 
disagree 27 19.4 5.2 6.1 2.3 5.3 4.1 4.2 
Disagree 37.4 46 16.3 15.6 37.2 37.4 36.5 29.7 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 23.2 25.4 29.3 28 32.6 29.9 34.7 45.5 
Agree 7.4 6.2 31.9 32.5 19.7 19.3 19.4 19.4 
Strongly agree 1.9 2.5 15.8 17.5 3.3 6.7 2.9 1.2 
Don't know 2.9 0.5 1.5 0.3 4.6 1.4 2.4 0.4 
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5.18 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
blocking transformation” by Language (row percentage) 
 
5.4.4.3 The association of political orientation with the response to the 
statement “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are 
blocking transformation” 
 
Table 5.19 presents the analysis of responses by political party affiliation. In 2007, the 
highest level of disagreement to statement S4 were those of the DA (55.4%) and FF+ 
(69.2%) respondents. Amongst DA supporters, there is a shift in level of agreement, 
with a decline of 7.2% in ‘strongly disagree’ category and an increase of 3.6% in the 
‘disagree’ category. There is also a small increase of 1.5% in those DA supporters 
who agree with the statement.  Furthermore, a large number of DA supporters tend to 
be neither in agreement nor disagreement, with this category rising by 4.7% to 27.7% 
in 2007. Respondents affiliated to the ANC show the highest support for the statement 
(48.3%) which, since 2004, has increased by 1%. Amongst ANC supporters, the 
levels of disagreement have remained relatively consistent at 23%, and slightly lower 
than those neither agreeing nor disagreeing (28%). Amongst IFP supporters, there is a 
 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
English 15.8 7.3 38.7 41.8 27.9 34.1 12.2 13.9 2.8 2.7 2.4 0.2 
Afrikaans 19.6 14.7 35.9 38.7 26.4 27 11.7 13.3 2.2 5.1 3.9 1.1 
Zulu 5.4 5.2 16.4 12.8 28.6 29.8 32.5 31.9 15.6 20 1.5 0.3 
Xhosa 6.6 7.2 16 21.7 32.2 24.7 34.4 34.2 10.6 11.9 0.2 0.3 
N.Sotho 8 4.7 18.4 10.8 25 31.5 29.7 30.8 15.6 21.7 3.3 0.3 
S.Sotho 2.9 5.7 13.1 16.6 32.2 27.4 32.7 32.4 18.4 17.2 0.8 0.7 
Tswana 2.4 7.3 18.4 15 29 26 30.2 35.8 17.6 15.9 2.4 0 
Tsonga 13 7.7 19.5 5.8 22.1 26.9 24.7 40.4 16.9 19.2 3.9 0 
Venda 0 12.3 9.9 29.8 36.5 21.1 28.8 22.8 25 14 0 0 
Swazi 0 1.6 15.6 9.7 28.9 37.1 31.1 24.2 24.4 27.4 0 0 
Ndebele 0 3.8 22.7 7.7 18.2 38.5 37.3 19.2 27.3 30.8 4.5 0 
Other 0 12.5 36.4 25 9.1 37.5 36.4 12.5 18.2 6.3 0 6.3 
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substantial decrease in the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category of 13.6% and an 
increase of 21.2% in the ‘strongly agree’ category.  
 
Table 5.19 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are blocking transformation” by Political Party affiliation (row percentage) 
 
 
5.4.4.4 Elite responses to the statement “Landowners who dispute land 
claims by going to court are blocking transformation” 
 
Table 5.20 shows that the majority of the elites ‘disagree’ with statement S4 at 54.2%. 
24.6 % of elites ‘agree’ with the statement, a percentage that is slightly higher than 
those who ‘neither agree nor disagree’ at 21.1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree/Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don't 
Know 
 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 04 07 
ANC 4.9 5.8 18.7 17.1 28.8 28.5 30.9 31.8 15.2 16.5 1.4 0.2 
DA 23.5 16.3 35.5 39.1 23 27.7 11.3 12.8 3.8 3.5 2.6 0.6 
IFP 8 6.4 16.1 18.3 38.4 24.8 28.6 23.9 5.4 26.6 3.6 0 
ID 13.6 4.5 40.7 42.4 30.5 27.3 8.5 16.7 1.7 6.1 5.1 0 
ACDP 12.1 5.9 33.3 20.6 36.4 20.6 13.6 38.2 3 14.7 1.5 0 
UDM 13.5 14.3 21.6 21.4 16.2 7.1 29.7 50 18.9 7.1 0 0 
FF+ 28.9 15.4 50 53.8 15.8 15.4 5.3 7.7 0 7.7 0 0 
PAC 4.2 4.8 12.5 13.3 20.8 33.3 54.2 33.3 8.3 14.3 0 0 
UCDP 25 0 25 20 50 60 0 10 0 10 0 0 
MF 0 10 33.3 20 33.3 30 16.7 40 16.7 0 0 0 
Azapo 0 14.3 25 42.9 25 14.3 50 28.6 0 0 0 0 
NNP 9.8 - 31.1 - 36.6 - 17.1 - 2.4 - 3 - 
Don't Know 16 5.1 31.2 30.2 25.9 34.9 14.1 20.9 8 8.8 4.6 0 
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Table 5.20 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are blocking transformation” by Elites 
 
 
Table 5.21 Response to “Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are blocking transformation” by Elite sector (row percentage) 
 
 
A sectored breakdown of elite response (Table 5.21) shows that the highest level of 
agreement with statement S4 is by the parliamentarians, 43.7%, followed by civil 
servants, of whom 23.5% agree. Amongst the media, 17.7% agree and the church 
sector shows a 14% level of agreement. The lowest level of agreement with the 
statement tis seen in the business sector, 7.8%. It is also the latter group that shows 
the highest level of disagreement at 78.4%, followed by the media 58.8%, church 
54%, civil servants 53% and parliamentarians at 39.4%.   Interestingly, amongst the 
civil servants and parliamentarians who are in disagreement only 11% and 16%, 
respectively disagree strongly.   
 
5.5 Data analysis 
 
5.5.1 Analysis of public opinion 
 
 
It is possible that public opinion on land reform forms distinct trends that can be 
associated with the selected independent variables of this study – demographic factors 
(race, language), party affiliation and social standing – and may correlate with 
respondents’ support or rejection of the government’s land reform policies.  
 
 Count Percent 
Strongly Agree 21 7 
Agree 53 17.6 
Neither agree/disagree 63 21.1 
Disagree 132 44.4 
Strongly Disagree 29 9.8 
 Parliament Media Civil Servant Business Church 
Strongly Agree 14.7 2 7.8 - 4 
Agree 29 15.7 15.7 7.8 10 
Neither agree/disagree 16.9 23.5 23.5 13.7 32 
Disagree 33 52.9 47.1 52.9 46 
Strongly Disagree 6.4 5.9 5.9 25.5 8 
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Analysing and assessing whether these independent variables correlate with the level 
of agreement or disagreement to the government’s land reform programme will allow 
the researcher to investigate trends in public opinion surrounding land reform and 
explore these avenues in terms of the role of the rule of law and transformation within 
this process.    
 
As has been argued previously, land reform forms part of the larger process of 
transformation espoused by the ANC led government. It is held by the researcher that 
if a respondent is in favour of supporting the government’s land reform programme, 
they will be more inclined to support the transformation project as a whole, and the 
current democratic project purported by the ANC. Support or rejection of land reform 
is therefore taken as a means of determining support or rejection of the democratic 
project espoused by the ANC. The level of agreement with land reform and 
democracy is in turn used to place respondents in specific models of democracy and 
cultural frameworks described in the previous chapters. As has been argued 
throughout, those who support the transformation project, as embodied in the land 
reform programme can be grouped as falling under the liberationist model of 
democracy and high-context cultural framework, whilst those opposed can be labelled 
as ascribing to the liberal model of democracy and the low-context cultural 
framework. Agreement with statements S1, S2 and S4 and disagreement with 
statement S3, identifies a respondent as supporting land reform and subscribing to the 
liberationist model of democracy and a high-context culture. Disagreement with 
statements S1, S2 and S4 and agreement with statement S3, places a respondent in the 
liberal model of democracy and the low-context category, as such respondents are not 
in favour of the land reform project. 
 
5.5.1.1 All land whites own they stole from blacks 
 
The influence of the race of the respondents on the level of agreement and 
disagreement with the statement, ‘all land whites own they stole from blacks’ was 
analysed to determine a possible correlation between this independent variable and 
support or rejection of the government’s land reform policies. 
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A positive link could be established with the black category having the greatest 
number of respondents who fall in category of agreement with the statement, while 
the white category showed the highest level of disagreement. In addition, black 
respondents have a tendency to ‘strongly agree’ with statement S1, instead of to 
simply ‘agree’. This could point to the fact that they feel strongly about the issue of 
ownership and means of acquisition of land. It points to a pertinent belief amongst 
blacks that white people are indeed thieves, and thus that ownership is defined in 
terms of race and theft. 
 
Figure 1 also gives one the impression that the general level of agreement with the 
statement has increased from 2004 to 2007. There are a number of reasons that can 
account for such an increase. The first is the composition of the sample. In 2004, 
approximately 26% of the sample consisted of whites, whilst the corresponding figure 
in 2007 was 12%. As whites are the population group with the highest level of 
disagreement to S1 in both the 2004 and 2007 surveys, the significant reduction in 
white representation could account for some of the increase in the overall level of 
agreement to statement S1 as depicted in Figure 1. In addition, the overall level of 
disagreement also decreased by 12.5% in the white respondents. The representation of 
the black population group has also increased by 15% from 2004 to 2007. The black 
population group is the group with the highest level of agreement with the statement. 
This also contributes to the overall rise in level of agreement to statement S1 as seen 
in Figure 1. 
 
Although statement S1 does not fall under the scope of the main hypothesis, it serves 
to illustrate the differing views on ownership of land in South Africa — whether 
respondents attach a racial connotation to ownership as well as a criminal element to 
acquisition. Figure 1 shows that the overall trend amongst the respondents is an 
increased level of agreement (17%) with the statement from 2004 to 2007. It is also 
the statement that shows the greatest degree of difference between racial groups, 
especially between white and black categories. It is the statement of which the 
response reflects the greatest degree of polarisation between the two groups, and the 
statement that has the lowest and constant response rate in the ‘neither agree nor 
disagree category’, 14.6% in 2004 and 14% in 2007. The low response rate in the 
category of ‘neither agree nor disagree’ highlights that most respondents do have an 
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opinion about the issue of ownership and means of acquisition. It is therefore an issue 
that invokes a strong response and shows the lowest level of indifference, highlighting 
that land and land ownership are indeed important issues to all South Africans, 
irrespective of race, language or party affiliation.  
 
It is interesting to note, that even amongst those who are most vehemently opposed to 
statement S1, white respondents, there is a change in the level of agreement. More 
white respondents are now inclined to merely ‘disagree’, with the 29.7% in 2004 
increasing to 50.3% in 2007, or to feel ambivalent towards the statement seen in the 
7% increase in the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category. This is in contrast to those 
white respondents ‘strongly disagreeing’ showing a decrease from 59.1% to 26.3% 
from 2004 to 2007. The coloured and Indian groups tend to overwhelmingly 
‘disagree’ with S1, although not to such an acute extent as the white group. The 
change in white sentiment could show that whites have a greater degree of 
understanding and sympathy for the plight of landless Africans and their struggle to 
obtain land. 
 
The analyses of the datasets to determine a possible relationship between the language 
spoken by the respondents and the level of agreement/disagreement with the 
statement, ‘all land whites own they stole from blacks’ showed a correlation with the 
different language groups and specific responses. Afrikaans and English speaking 
respondents showed the highest level of disagreement, whilst respondents amongst 
the Bantu languages agreed overwhelmingly with the statement. Again, there is an 
interesting trend amongst Afrikaans and English speaking respondents, whose views 
have shifted from primarily ‘strongly disagreeing’ in 2004, to merely ‘disagreeing’ in 
2007. In the ‘strongly agree’ category, both decreased by 27% with Afrikaans 
speaking respondents declining from 45.4% to 18.3% while the English speaking 
respondents declined from 37.4% in 2004 to 10% in 2007. In the category of ‘agree’ 
there is an increase amongst Afrikaans speaking respondents from 32.3% to 42.7% 
with English speaking respondents increasing from 35.4% to 39.8%. Despite this 
trend, English and Afrikaans respondents still overwhelmingly ‘disagree’ with the 
statement, whilst their Bantu speaking counterparts agree overwhelmingly. Language 
therefore does correlate with a respondents’ level of agreement or disagreement with 
the statement. 
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The second independent variable analysed was that of the affiliation of the 
respondents to the different political parties in South Africa. Data generated supported 
a correlation with the level of agreement/disagreement with the statement, ‘all land 
whites own they stole from blacks’ with respect to the preferred political party. The 
level of agreement amongst ANC supporters has remained relatively stable, with the 
majority of ANC supporters falling in a category of agreement with the statement 
(76.5). ANC supporters tend to ‘strongly agree’, a figure that has increased from 
38.9% to 42.2%. The interesting change is amongst those respondents who do not 
support the ANC, shifting their responses from ‘strongly disagreeing’ in 2004 to 
‘disagree’ in 2007. This is most clearly shown in the supporters of the DA, ID and 
FF+. The respondents who do not know for whom they will vote, amongst whom the 
intensity and level of disagreement has subsided, have to a lesser degree remained 
unsure with the majority boosting the ranks of those in agreement. A person’s 
preferred political party does therefore correlate with the level of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement.  
 
A Chi-square test of significance and a Cramer’s V strength of association test were 
employed to verify trends of independent variables on statement S1. For race, 
language and party affiliation the null-hypothesis (that there is no relationship 
between statement S1 and the independent variables) was rejected by the low values 
garnered when employing a Chi-square test, showing that in all cases there is a 
significant correlation between the independent variables and the statement in both 
the 2004 and 2007 surveys. The rejection of the null-hypothesis was reinforced by 
corresponding values of strong association found using Cramer’s V test of 
association. The correlation between language (.303 and .250) and political party 
(.273 and .219) and statement S1 varies between moderate and strong, pointing to a 
definite level of association between the dependent and independent variables. 
Correlation between race and statement S1 garnered the highest values in both the 
2004 and 2007 surveys, yielding values of .377 and .45, indicating a very strong level 
of association.  
 
Analysis of these data therefore confirmed that demographic factors and party 
affiliation do correlate to the level of agreement with the statement that all ‘land 
whites own they stole from blacks’.  
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5.5.1.2 Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist 
 
The level of agreement and disagreement with the statement, that ‘landowners who 
dispute land claims by going to court are racist’ was analysed in terms of the race of 
the respondents to determine a possible correlation between this independent variable 
and support or rejection of the government’s land reform policies. 
 
The results of responses to the statement show that there is an overall increase of 
11.6% in agreement with the statement, as shown in Figure 3. Once again, there is a 
great degree of differentiation amongst racial groups, with the white sector 
disagreeing overwhelmingly (72%) and black respondents predominantly agreeing 
(51.3%). The Indian and coloured sectors show closer similarity to that of white 
respondents, but with a lower level of agreement, and higher response rates in the 
‘neither agree nor disagree’ category. There is an increase in the number of 
respondents who are in agreement with the statement in the black (7.2%) and coloured 
(8.3%) sectors with the Indian respondents remaining constant. The interesting shift is 
again found amongst white respondents, who have shifted away from the ‘strongly 
disagree’ from 32% to 24% to be more inclined to merely ‘disagree’, up from 40% to 
48.6%.  
 
In the categories of disagreement there is a decrease among the black (3.3%), 
coloured (2.1%) and Indian (15.7%) sectors. This decrease, together with the decrease 
seen in the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category of black and coloured respondents 
has led to increased levels of agreement with the statement. Although the majority of 
Indian respondents (37.6%) fall in the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category, they 
nevertheless, together with the black and coloured sectors, show higher levels of 
agreement with the statement than white respondents, showing that these respondents 
feel that contesting a land claim in court labels one a racist. A respondent’s race does 
therefore correlate with the level of agreement or disagreement with the statement.  
 
The analysis of independent variable of language to determine a possible relationship 
between the respondents’ language and the level of agreement/disagreement with 
statement S2, that ‘landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist’, 
yielded similar results as that of race. The Bantu languages show the tendency to 
 157
‘agree’ overwhelmingly with statement S2, with the tendency amongst Bantu 
languages to show increases in both categories of agreement from 2004 to 2007. 
Amongst English and Afrikaans speaking respondents, a similar trend as seen 
amongst white respondents is also evident in the language categories. More English 
and Afrikaans speakers are inclined to ‘disagree’ as opposed to falling in the category 
of ‘strongly disagree’. There is also an increase in the category of ‘agree’ for both 
languages, up from 9.5% to 13.6% for English, and from 9% to 15.8% for Afrikaans 
speaking respondents.  
 
Despite the increase in agreement amongst English and Afrikaans speaking 
respondents, and a decrease in the ‘strongly disagree’ category (9.8% and 6.9%, 
respectively), these language categories still show overwhelming disagreement with 
the statement (55.6% and 60%, respectively). From the data presented, it is evident 
that the language of a respondent does indeed correspond to the level of agreement or 
disagreement with the statement. Afrikaans and English respondents tend to disagree, 
whilst their Bantu speaking counterparts tend to agree with the statement.  
 
Analysis of the correlation between the political party affiliation and the level of 
agreement/disagreement with the statement that ‘landowners who dispute land claims 
by going to court are racist’ yielded a trend similar to that found with the race and 
language variables. Amongst ANC supporters, agreement with the statement has 
increased from 2004 to 2007 by 4.5% in the category of ‘agree’ and 3.8% in the 
‘strongly agree’ category. The DA and FF+, parties with an overwhelmingly white 
support base, show decreased levels in the category of ‘strongly disagree’ (10.4% and 
13.7%, respectively) with an increase in the category ‘disagree’ (7% and 16.8%, 
respectively). There is therefore a downward trend amongst white English and 
Afrikaans speaking respondents who support opposition parties in the intensity of 
their level of disagreement. They no longer vehemently oppose the statement to such 
a strong degree, but rather tend to simply disagree. Taken together, a person’s 
preferred political party does however show a correlation with the level of agreement 
with the statement. There are marked differences between ANC supporters and those 
of the opposition parties in agreement with the statement, with the former having 
50.1% respondents in the agreement categories and the DA and FF+ having 63.1% 
and 84.6% respondents, respectively in die disagreement categories.   
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A Chi-square test for significance and a Cramer’s V strength of association test were 
employed to verify trends of independent variables on statement S2. For race, 
language and party affiliation, the Chi-square test values enables one to reject the 
null-hypothesis in both the 2004 and 2007 surveys, showing that there is a significant 
relationship between the statement and the independent variables. The values obtained 
from the Chi-square test were confirmed by the Cramer’s V strength of association 
test. For race, the Cramer’s V test showed a moderately strong association with values 
of .284 and .240 in the 2004 and 2007 surveys respectively, pointing to a moderate to 
moderately strong level of association. Language association showed a weak level of 
association with minimally acceptable values of .188 and .185 in 2004 and 2007 
respectively. Political party supported also shows a weak level of association, with 
values of 0.170 and 0.167 in 2004 and 2007 respectively.  
 
Although these values are somewhat lower than those obtained for the same tests on 
statement S1, it reflects the higher percentage of respondents from all sectors whom 
‘neither agreed nor disagree’ with the statement at 24.2% in 2004 and 24.3% in 2007. 
More respondents, in all categories, were ambivalent towards statement S2, than 
towards statement S1. This could show that many respondents are unsure as to 
whether disputing land claims in court identifies one a racist. It may also show that 
respondents do not attach such a specific and strong racial connotation to the use of 
the courts as is attached to the land ownership and acquisition statement (S1). The 
findings confirm the hypothesis and show that race, language and party affiliation do 
correlate with responses to statement S2. 
 
5.5.1.3 Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are fairly 
using the rights awarded to them by the constitution 
 
The response to the statement, ‘landowners who dispute land claims by going to court 
are fairly using the rights awarded them by the constitution’, was subsequently 
analysed in terms of a respondents’ race to ascertain a possible correlation between 
race and the level of agreement/disagreement.  
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There are a few interesting aspects about responses to this statement. The most 
notable of these, is the low levels of disagreement with the statement, regardless of 
the race of respondent. Black respondents show the second highest levels of ‘neither 
agree nor disagree’, surpassed only by the Indian sector in this category, both of 
which comprise approximately one third of the respondents.  Interestingly, the black 
sector of respondents shows the highest level of ‘strongly agree’ in the 2007 survey, 
at 19.1%, negligibly lower than the 2004 figure of 19.4%. Blacks have the lowest 
percentage of respondents who ‘agree’ with the statement at 30.5% in 2004 and 
35.4% in 2007. The tendency amongst black respondents shows that there is increased 
levels of agreement (4.6%) with the statement, and decreased levels of disagreement 
(3.2%). Despite the increase in agreement, they remain the group with the lowest 
overall level of agreement in the 2007 survey at 54.5%.  
 
The Indian and coloured sectors also show increasing levels of agreement with the 
statement from 2004 to 2007. Coloured respondents are the response group with the 
highest percentage of agreement in 2007 at 66.7%, and have the greatest increase in 
this category of 7.2%. The second highest level of agreement is found amongst white 
respondents at 61.4%, followed by the Indian sector at 56.4%. Interestingly, both the 
coloured and Indian respondents increased in number in those strongly agreeing 
(6.1% and 3.2%, respectively) to the statement. 
 
Amongst all the racial categories, except white, there is a net increase amongst the 
overall levels of agreement to statement S3 from 2004 to 2007. Blacks show an 
increase of 4.6%, coloureds 7.2% and Indians 3.4%. Whites are the only group of 
respondents that shows a net decrease of 6.6% in categories of agreement, from 68% 
to 61.4%, and have the highest percentage of respondents who ‘disagree’ with the 
statement at 13.4%. There is also an increase in the ‘strongly disagree’ category to 
4.8% of white respondents, giving whites the highest level of disagreement amongst 
all racial categories. Despite this increase in disagreement, whites remained the 
population group with the lowest level of ‘neither agree nor disagree’ and the second 
highest level of agreement at 61.4%. They are however, the only racial group that 
shows a decrease in level of agreement and an increase in the level of disagreement.  
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The exploratory premise of whether race correlates to responses to statement S3, is 
therefore somewhat ambiguous, and cannot be as easily returned in the positive as the 
previous discussed variables. Race to some extent does still, to a certain degree, 
correlate with responses to the statement, with blacks showing lower levels of 
agreement than the other racial categories. There is however, a common trend 
amongst black, coloured and Indian respondents, who all show increased levels of 
agreement with the statement from 2004 to 2007. Whites are the only category that 
shows decreased levels of agreement to the statement. This result is anomalous to 
what was observed in statements S1 and S2 in relation to racial patterns.   
 
The correlation between the language spoken by respondents and the level of 
agreement/disagreement with the statement, ‘landowners who dispute land claims by 
going to court are fairly using the rights awarded them by the constitution’ was 
investigated and showed that the different language groups portrayed a somewhat 
different picture than the different racial groups. Afrikaans respondents show an 
increase in levels of disagreement, so do the Tswana, Tsonga, Venda, Swazi and 
Ndebele. English, Zulu, Xhosa, North- and South Sotho speaking respondents show a 
decrease in respondents who disagree with the statement.  English and Afrikaans 
respondents however, remain the categories with the highest percentage of 
respondents that ‘agree’, 50.7% and 45.9%, respectively, followed closely by Xhosa 
speaking respondents, 43.7%. Furthermore, the language groups with the highest 
percentage of respondents whom ‘strongly agree’ are the Venda 36.8%, Tsonga 
28.8%, North Sotho 26.8% and Zulu 19.3%. English and Afrikaans speaking 
respondents whom ‘strongly disagree’ amount to only 13% and 15.6% respectively. 
Among these six language categories, only Afrikaans and English show a decrease in 
respondents who ‘strongly disagree’.  
 
The correlation between language and the statement S3 must therefore be viewed in 
the negative, as there is no distinct pattern visible between the language spoken and 
level of agreement towards statement. There is no discernable pattern of increase or 
decrease amongst language groups, as there is great differentiation amongst the 
respondents speaking the Bantu languages and English and Afrikaans respondents in 
relation to change of sentiments towards the statement. It is, however, interesting to 
note that the number of respondents in all the language groups who fall in the ‘neither 
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agree nor disagree’ category remains high, ranging from 22.7% to 46.2% and 
increased by 1.3% over the period that was surveyed. 
 
Analysis of the political party supported and the level of agreement/disagreement with 
the statement, ‘landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are fairly using 
the rights awarded them by the constitution’ showed the correlation between party 
affiliation and respondents’ views of statement S3 to also be somewhat ambiguous. 
The ANC supporters show increased levels of agreement in both ‘agree’ 4.1% and 
‘strongly agree’ 0.4% categories. ANC supporters also show a net decrease in 
cumulative categories of disagreement. In contrast, DA supporters show a net increase 
in cumulative categories of disagreement (2.7%). DA supporters show a decrease 
amongst those who ‘strongly agree’ from 28.8% to 15.3% and an increase in those 
who ‘agree’ from 39.1% to 48.1%. In 2004, the cumulative percentage in the 
agreement categories for the ANC was 51.2% and in 2007 55.7%. For the DA 
supporters, the corresponding figures are 67.9% and 63.4. Whilst the ANC supporters 
show an increase in overall levels of agreement (4.5%), DA supporters show a 
decrease (4.5%). Despite this trend, more DA supporters are in agreement than their 
ANC counterparts. The FF+ provides some interesting responses, with disagreement 
increasing substantially (39%), and cumulative agreement decreasing substantially 
(21%).  
 
When considering the effect of political party affiliation on the statement, the results 
echo those observed in the racial and language categories. Both the ANC and the DA 
supporters overwhelmingly ‘agree’ with the statement, but it is amongst ANC 
supporters that more respondents ‘agree’ in 2007 than in 2004, and fewer ‘disagree’, 
with opposite being evident amongst DA supporters. This finding therefore compels 
the correlation to also be returned in the negative, as there is no discernable pattern of 
agreement amongst political party supporters in relation to statement S3.  
 
The somewhat surprising results are reinforced when the Chi-square significance test 
and the Cramer’s V association test is preformed. The Chi-square test on all the 
independent variables confirms that a null hypothesis can be rejected. In other words, 
there is a statistically significant correlation between race, language and political party 
affiliation and agreement/disagreement with statement S3. The Chi-square tests does 
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however, not relate how strongly independent variables influence the dependent 
variables, only that a correlation exists.  
 
It is the results of the Cramer’s V strength of association tests that allows one to gauge 
whether there is a significant impact of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. For race, the Cramer’s V test returned values of .157 in 2004 and .096 in 
2007. These results show that there is no discernable or negligible relationship 
between race and statement S3. For language, the 2004 survey yielded a value of .1 in 
2004 and a value of .105 in 2007. These values also point to a relationship that is 
negligible, or can be viewed as a minimally acceptable correlation. For political party 
affiliation, the 2004 value is .101 and the 2007 value is 0.102. Both values can be 
classified as showing negligibly weak correlations. Statement S3 returned the highest 
values in the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ category, with the overall responses to this 
category at 28.3% in 2004 and 29.4% in 2007. Respondents are therefore not as sure 
about this statement as about the other statements, limiting the association between 
the dependent and independent variables. Furthermore, as was seen in Figure 5, the 
responses to this statement are those that have remained the most constant amongst all 
the statements from 2004 to 2007.  
 
The significance tests preformed therefore reinforces the rejection of demographic 
factors and party affiliation to relate with responses to the statement S3. Although it 
would appear that there is a very weak correlation between the independent variables 
employed and the responses to the statement there is no discernable pattern between 
racial and linguistic groups and political party affiliation. These results are indeed 
unexpected as for the previous two statements there was a strong correlation between 
the independent variables and level of agreement with the statements. 
 
 
5.5.1.4 Landowners who dispute land claims by going to court, are 
blocking transformation 
 
The influence of the race on the level of agreement and disagreement with the 
statement, ‘landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are blocking 
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transformation’ was analysed and showed a distinct correlation between this 
independent variable and agreement of the statement. Although Figure 7 showed that 
there was an overall increase in level of agreement to statement S4 from 2004 to 2007, 
it also highlighted the fact that responses to this statement are relatively dispersed 
amongst the response categories. The results do however have a strong racial 
dimension to them. Whites showed the highest level of disagreement at 64.4% in 
2004 and 65.4% in 2007, followed by coloureds with 39.5% in 2004 and 42.7% in 
2007 and Indians at 40.6% in 2004 and 33.9% in 2007. These are considerably higher 
levels of disagreement than in the black category that showed 21.5% in 2004 and 
21.7% in 2007. Furthermore, there is a trend amongst white respondents to shift their 
level of disagreement from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘disagree’, as was seen in responses 
to statements S1 and S2. In 2007, 19.4% of whites ‘strongly disagreed’, a decrease of 
8.6%,  while46% ‘disagreed’, an increase of 7.6%.  
 
The black and coloured sectors of the population show the highest levels of agreement 
as well as a net increase with black respondents increasing by 2.3% to 50% and 
coloureds by 3% to 26 % in 2007. The Indian and white sectors show a decrease in 
levels of agreement with figures of 20.6% (1.7%) and 8.7% (0.6%) in 2007 
respectively. Statement S4 is second only to statement S3 in the response category of 
‘neither agree nor disagree’ in all racial groups, with white and Indian respondents 
increasing with 2.2% and 10.8% to 25.4% and 45.5% in 2007, respectively. 
 
Race therefore does show a correlation to how respondents respond to statement S4, 
with whites disagreeing overwhelmingly and blacks agreeing. Coloured and Indian 
respondents are closer aligned to that of the white sector, with the coloured group 
showing levels of disagreement of 42.7% and the Indian group 33.9%. The latter two 
groups both showed lower levels of agreement than their black counterparts. There is 
a stronger level of polarisation between whites and blacks than between whites and 
the other racial groups. Whites also showed a tendency to shift disagreement from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘disagree’, a trend that was evident in responses to statements 
S1 and S2.  
 
Analyses of language spoken by respondents to determine a correlation between this 
independent variable and the level of agreement/disagreement with the statement, 
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‘landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are blocking transformation’ 
showed that responses in terms of language proved to be somewhat more ambiguous 
than that of race. The only language categories that showed a net decrease in levels of 
agreement were the Venda, Ndebele and Swazi speaking respondents. All the other 
language categories showed a net increase in level of agreement. Amongst Afrikaans 
and English speaking respondents, there is a tendency to shift level of disagreement 
with declining responses in the ‘strongly disagree’ category and increases in the 
‘disagree’ and ‘agree’ categories. This was also seen in responses to statements S1 
and S2 amongst English and Afrikaans respondents. Interestingly, there is an increase 
amongst Xhosa respondents who ‘disagree’ with the statement from 16% to 21.7%. It 
is perhaps possible that since the number of respondents in the ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ category lie between 21.1% and 37.1%, as well as showing an increase of 
17.1% in this category, has made it more difficult to establish a definite trend using 
this parameter. 
 
There is therefore no clear answer as to whether there is an identifiable trend amongst 
the language categories. There is no common trend amongst Bantu languages, nor 
among the Afrikaans and English speaking respondents in the study. One is therefore 
forced to return a negative answer to the suggestion of language having an identifiable 
correlation with responses to the statement.  
 
The influence of respondents’ affiliation to specific political parties was subsequently 
analysed in terms of correlating party affiliation to the level of 
agreement/disagreement with the statement, ‘landowners who dispute land claims by 
going to court are blocking transformation’. 
 
Amongst ANC supporters, the general tendency was to fall into a category of 
agreement with the statement. Levels amongst ANC supports in all response 
categories do not show any substantial change from 2004 to 2007. For DA supporters 
there is a decrease in the category of ‘strongly disagree’ of 7.2% and an increase in 
the category ‘disagree’ of 3.6%. For the other response categories, DA supporters 
have remained relatively consistent in their opinions towards the statement.  It would 
appear that political party to which respondents are affiliated does correlate with 
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agreement or disagreement with the statement, with ANC supporters remaining in 
agreement (48.3%) whilst the DA supports tend to be in disagreement (56.4%). 
 
A Chi-square test revealed that the null-hypothesis can be rejected with relation to all 
the independent variables. There is therefore a statistical correlation between the 
independent and dependent variables. Interesting results were obtained with the 
Cramer’s V association test. For race, the values of the Cramer’s V were .281 in 2004 
and .224 in 2007. The level of correlation can be described as a moderately strong in 
2004 and a moderate in 2007. For language, the results of the 2004 survey was .179 
and of the 2007 survey, .175. The level of association between the dependent and 
independent variable can be labelled as weak and minimally acceptable.  For political 
party affiliation, the 2004 value is .170 and the 2007 value is .156. This can also be 
described as a weak, yet minimally acceptable level of association. 
 
These results lead one to conclude that of all the independent variables, the 
relationship between a respondents’ race is the only one with significant correlation to 
responses to statement S4. A person’s race does therefore seem to correlate with the 
level of agreement to the statement, but in terms of the other independent variables, 
the results are not as clear. This compels one to reject the idea that language and 
political party affiliation has a meaningful correlation with responses to statement S4.  
 
5.5.2 Elite responses to statements 
 
Analysing elite responses to the statements S1-S4, and correlating the level of 
agreement or disagreement to social standing as well as to specific professional 
categories will allow the researcher to investigate trends within this sector of the 
public.   
 
In analysing social standing in terms of the level of agreement and disagreement with 
the statement, ‘all land whites own they stole from blacks’ it was found that the elite 
response to the statement ‘all land whites own they stole from blacks’ is significantly 
different from that of the general population, as is illustrated in Figure 2. Amongst 
elites, 25.8% ‘agreed’ with the statement, 13.2% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’ with 
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60.9% ‘disagreeing’ with the statement. Among those disagreeing, 40.5% disagreed 
strongly. The data depicted in figure 2 is different to that of the general population in 
figure 1, and shows the greatest degree of congruence with the Indian and coloured 
sectors, as disagreement is not as vehement as amongst whites, and agreement is not 
as complete as amongst blacks. Social status does therefore correlate to a respondents’ 
level of agreement/disagreement to the statement. 
 
Within the elite sector, the highest level of agreement with the statement is shown by 
the parliamentarians (39.9%) and civil servants (29.4%). The level of agreement is 
lower amongst the media (22%), church (20%) and the business sector shows the 
lowest level of agreement at 5.9%. The sector with the highest level of disagreement 
is the business sector at 86.3%, followed by the media (64%), and the church (62%). 
Parliamentarians show the lowest level of disagreement at 45% followed by civil 
servants at 60.7%. The composition of parliament36 shows that most MP’s represent 
the ANC. The high level of agreement could possible be accounted for through the 
party allegiances in these two sectors. As argued in the previous chapters, it is a goal 
of the ANC to control all organs of the state. This includes the appointment of civil 
servants and bureaucrats from amongst those who are loyal to the party. The high 
level of agreement with statement S1 amongst these sectors in the elite population is 
therefore indicative with what is seen amongst the general population amongst those 
who support the ANC.  
 
Social standing was subsequently analysed to determine if there was a correlation 
between elites and the levels of responses regarding agreement and disagreement with 
the statement, ‘landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist’. 
 
Amongst elites, 12.5% ‘agree’, 15.4% ‘neither agree nor disagree’ and 72.1% 
‘disagree’ with the statement. This value shares the greatest level of similarity with 
that of the white sector of the general population. Social standing does therefore 
correlate to agreement with statement S2, with elites tending to overwhelmingly 
‘disagree’ with the statement.  
 
                                                 
36
 Section 4.2 
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Analyses of the elite sector showed that amongst elites, parliamentarians have the 
highest level of agreement with the statement at 25.6% followed by civil servants at 
15.6%. The church, 6.1%, business, 5.9% and media, 2% show the lowest levels of 
agreement with the statement. With relation to disagreement to the statement, 
parliamentarians are the group showing the lowest response at 56.6%, followed by 
church, 75.5%, civil servants, 76.4%, the media, 80.4% and the business sector at 
84.8%. Parliamentarians therefore are the sector that shows the greatest level of 
agreement to statement S2, with civil servants closely following suit. The same can 
thus be argued as for S1 with the strong representation of the ANC in parliament 
together the party allegiances of civil servants and bureaucrats.   
 
Elite responses were next analysed to determine whether social standing correlates 
with the level of agreement/disagreement to the statement that ‘landowners who 
dispute land claims by going to court are fairly using the rights awarded to them by 
the constitution’. Amongst the elite population, 88.7% were in agreement, 6.7% 
‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, with only 4.6% disagreeing with the statement. In the 
latter category only 0.7% disagreed strongly. This is also the trend that is visible 
amongst the general population, which also shows high levels of agreement with the 
statement and low levels of disagreement, although not in such an exaggerated form 
as the elite respondents.  
 
Within the elite sector, civil servants show lowest levels of agreement with 78.4%, 
and most respondents in the category of ‘neither agree nor disagree’ at 17.6%. They 
are followed by the business sector with 86.3%, parliament, 90.8%, church, 92% and 
the media with the highest level of agreement at 94.4%. The pattern seen in the 
previous statement, where parliamentarians and civil servants tend to overwhelmingly 
support the land reform programme, is not evident in responses to statement S3. It 
would appear that most respondents amongst elites, regardless of sector, are in 
agreement with the statement. This is also a trend seen in the general population with 
regards to responses to statement S3. 
 
Finally, the correlation between social standing and the level of 
agreement/disagreement to the statement that ‘landowners who dispute land claims by 
going to court are blocking transformation’ was investigated. Amongst elites, 24.6% 
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‘agreed’, 21.1% ‘neither agreed nor disagreed’, whilst 54.2% ‘disagreed’. The elite 
sector shows the highest level of congruence with what is seen amongst coloured and 
Indian respondents. They do not agree as strongly as black respondents, nor do they 
disagree as vehemently as white respondents. Furthermore, the overall trend amongst 
elites is to disagree with the statement.  
 
In the response of the elite sector to the statement, the parliamentarians showed the 
highest level of agreement at 43.7%, followed by civil servant, 23.5%, media, 17.8%, 
church, 14% and business, 7.8%. Interestingly, half of the respondents who are in 
agreement amongst parliamentarians and civil servants agree strongly. Among the 
different sectors, parliamentarians show the lowest level of disagreement at 39.4%, 
followed by civil servants at 53%, church 54%, media 78.8% and business at 78.4%. 
It is evident that parliamentarians and civil servants are the groups that have the 
highest levels of agreement and the lowest levels of disagreement with statement S4. 
This trend shows, that they are the most likely sector in the elite population to agree 
with the governments land reform programme.  
 
5.6 Interpretation of the analysis 
 
The above analysis shows that there is indeed a correlation between the independent 
variables and the support or the rejection of the governments land reform programme. 
It was postulated that agreement with statements S2 and S4 along with disagreement 
with statement S3 identifies a respondent as supporting land reform programme of the 
government. This is because such patterns of agreement highlight that the normative 
priority of a respondent will be placed on the substantive aspect of democracy, as 
expressed through the outcomes of the land reform programme and as opposed to the 
procedural norm of the impartial functioning of the rule of law. It was also stated that 
respondents who agree with statement S1 define ownership and acquisition of land in 
terms of race and theft. 
 
It was furthermore postulated that, based on levels of agreement, one could identify 
respondents as falling either in the liberal democratic model and low-context culture 
or in the liberationist model and the high-context culture. Respondents who support 
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land reform fall in the latter category, whilst those opposed are placed in the former. It 
must be stressed that the conceptual inferences made above are not confirmed or 
disproved by the data. The data only shows what respondents think about the 
statements that were posed to them and indirectly indicates their views on land 
ownership and acquisition, the rule of law and transformation. It is their views on 
these underlying concepts of democracy that allow for the inferences above to be 
made and to have a degree of validity.  
 
When posed with the main hypothesis of the study that demographic factors (race, 
language), party affiliation and social standing correlate with respondents’ opinions 
on land reform together with their support or rejection of the government’s land 
reform policies, one is inclined to return an answer in the affirmative. Demographic 
factors, party affiliation and social status do correlate with respondents’ support or 
rejection of the government’s land reform policies. The support and rejection is 
however not as clearly visible as was hypothesised. It was postulated that those 
respondents who oppose land reform policies, would disagree with statements S1, S2 
and S4 and agree with statement S3. The inverse would hold that support for the land 
reform programme would have respondents leaning towards agreeing with statements 
S1, S2, S4 and disagreeing with statement S3.  
 
The results do however not follow these trends of agreement proposed above. The 
largest anomaly was found with respect to responses to the statement that landowners 
who dispute land claims by going to court, are fairly using the constitution (S3). 
Regardless of race, language, party affiliation or social status, there is overwhelming 
agreement with the statement. If the meaning of statement S3, as described in section 
5.3 is accepted, it would mean that most respondents attach a high value to the 
impartial and universal functioning of the law through the importance attached to the 
Constitution. In agreeing with the statement, respondents show that they place a 
priority on all being able to access courts and enjoy constitutional protection, even in 
instances when such protection could impede a specific groups’ ability to achieve 
substantive gains from land reform. Even though this result to some extent refutes the 
proposed claim by the researcher, it does not necessarily refute the claim by the 
researcher that respondents hold diverging views on normative ascriptions to 
democracy. On the contrary, it is the opinion of the researcher, that the result found in 
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responses to statement S3, reinforces the argument that different groups in South 
Africa attach different meanings to concepts crucial for the consolidation of 
democracy.   
 
The level of agreement or disagreement to the statement ‘landowners who dispute 
land claims by going to court are fairly using the rights awarded to them by the 
Constitution’, does not tell one anything about what meanings are associated with the 
Constitution. The mere fact that most respondents agree with the statement (regardless 
of race, language, party affiliation and social status), says nothing about the normative 
ascriptions assigned to the Constitution. How respondents responded to the statements 
in totality, enables one to theorise on possible meanings respondents associate with 
the Constitution. It is probable that respondents, who have diverging views on all the 
statements except statement S3, possibly do not attach the same meaning to the role or 
to the importance of the Constitution in our democracy. It is surely possible that 
respondents, who feel landowners who dispute land claims by going to court are racist 
and are blocking transformation, do not attach the same  normative meanings to the 
Constitution as do those respondents who feel that using the courts to dispute land 
claims does not label one a racist or as being apposed to transformation. 
 
This result probably serves only reinforces the hypothesis of the research project and 
that South Africans attach different values to a normative ascription of democracy. It 
is highly unlikely that black and white respondents with completely diverging 
opinions on all the statements, bar statement S3, attach the same meaning to the 
Constitution. It is the opinion of the researcher that this is evidence, albeit indirect, 
that, in our democracy, there are definite diverging and possible conflicting 
interpretations and beliefs of the role and the meaning of the Constitution. The results 
obtained display a lack of internal consistency, which reinforces such a view. 
Respondents within the same group in the population show conflicting responses with 
regards to statements relevant to the principle of the rule of law. This poses a most 
dire threat to our democratic dispensation, and the prospect of consolidating our 
democracy. For if the rule of law is seen as a cornerstone in ensuring democratic 
consolidation, then diverging opinions on the supreme document of law surely poses a 
threat to consolidating our democracy. 
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Results obtained from responses to statements S1, S2 and S4 do paint a stark picture 
of racial polarisation amongst the respondents, reinforcing the above argument. White 
and black South Africans tend to have a high degree of differences in their opinions 
with these two groups have diverging views of all the statements assessed, with blacks 
showing a predisposition to supporting the government’s land reform programme. In 
contrast, white citizens follow a pattern of disagreement to the statements that allows 
one to classify them as being opposed to the government’s land reform policies.  
 
Concurrent to the above, the elite sample of the population also shows diverging 
views on the land reform programme. The general tendency amongst elites is to 
oppose the government’s land reform programme. A sectoral analysis however, shows 
that within the elite population, parliamentarians and civil servants show the highest 
level of support for the government’s land reform programme. There exists a large 
degree of polarisation between the parliamentarians and civil servants on the one 
hand, and the media, business and church on the other. 
 
5.7 Summary 
 
From the data presented above, the following is evident:  
• There is strong racial polarisation to statements S1, S2 and S4, with blacks and 
whites showing contrasting levels of agreement with these statements  
• Within all the statements posed, there is a tendency amongst white 
respondents to move closer to that of the other racial sectors. Although the 
intensity of disagreement towards statements S1, S2 and S4 has decreased, the 
white group remains the group most opposed to these statements.  
• Most respondents agreed with statement S3, regardless of race, language, party 
affiliation or social status  
• whites tend to oppose the land reform programme, with blacks supporting the 
land reform programme. Coloured and Indian respondents fall between the 
two extremes of black and white responses 
• coloured and Indian responses to S2, S3 and S4 are more closely aligned with 
those of white respondents, with a high proportion of Indian respondents being 
noncommittal 
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• General tendency amongst elites shows disagreement with land reform 
policies 
• Amongst elites, the parliamentarians and civil servants show a greater 
inclination to agree with the land reform policies, whilst other sectors show 
overwhelming levels of disagreement 
• The greatest degree of congruence amongst the general population and elites, 
is between parliamentarians, civil servant, and black South Africans. Elite 
business, media and church responses show a greater degree of congruence 
with that of the white, coloured and Indian segments of the general population 
 
5.8 Placing public opinion on land reform within the 
democratic debate 
 
The preceding paragraphs enable one to place the public within the adopted 
theoretical framework, based on their level of agreement/disagreement towards the 
statements. The aim is to determine whether one can classify the general population as 
either subscribing to liberal democracy and low-context culture, or to liberationist 
democracy and high-context culture.  
 
In applying the theoretical framework to the survey results, the dichotomous nature of 
the theoretical framework implies that there should be a distinct grouping amongst the 
respondents. Previously in the chapter, it was proposed that agreement with 
statements S1, S2 and S4, and disagreement with statement S3, identifies respondent 
as falling in the liberationist model of democracy and the high-context cultural 
perspective. The opposite response to the statements aligns a respondent to the liberal 
model of democracy and the low-context cultural framework.  
 
The proposed results were confirmed to some extent in that the trend did emerge in 
the responses. Black respondents who overwhelmingly support the ANC and speak a 
Bantu-language, tend to agree with statements S1, S2 and S4, whilst white Afrikaans 
and English respondents who support an opposition party have opposing views. 
Coloured and Indian respondents tend to fall somewhere in between these two 
extremes.   
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The overwhelming agreement to statement S3 should not be taken as refuting or 
laying waste the idea that respondents can be placed within this theoretical 
framework. As was argued in the preceding paragraphs, if anything, it only reinforces 
the argument. Black respondents who support the ANC and speak a Bantu language 
can be classified as viewing democracy from the liberationist perspective and high-
context cultural framework. White respondents, who speak Afrikaans and English and 
support an opposition party, fall in the liberal democratic model and the low-context 
cultural framework. Coloured and Indian respondents, who overwhelmingly support 
an opposition party and speak Afrikaans and English can be seen as occupying the 
middle ground. They show a greater tendency to be aligned closer to that of the white 
segment, and would probably be defined as quasi-liberals and low-context cultural 
perspective.  
 
The overwhelming tendency amongst elites is to follow patterns of agreement that is 
seen amongst white respondents. There is however a high degree of differentiation 
amongst elites, with parliamentarians and civil servants showing different views to the 
views of other elite sectors in response to S1, S2 and S4. This could be accounted for 
by the party allegiances that could be attached to parliamentarians and civil servants. 
There is an interesting anomaly amongst the business sector in which5.9 % of the 
business sector are in agreement with S1 and S2, 5.9% are in disagreement with S3, 
and an even higher number, 7.8%, are in agreement with S4. These responses within 
the business sector tend to align with the trend seen amongst parliamentarians and 
civil servants in their response to the statements. Although it is an anomalous result 
within the business sector, it is not so within the South African context as a whole. It 
is possible that this group of business elites, which shows convergence with 
parliamentarians and civil servants, represent the emerging black business elite in 
South Africa. There is no substantial evidence for such a claim, other than the 
statistical numbers presented above representing a possible trend. It is the opinion of 
the researcher that this group could represent the opinion of those back business 
people who have benefited from policies such as black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) and Affirmative Action or who rose to the pinnacle of the business sector 
within the last 15 years.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Throughout this dissertation, the argument has been advanced that a major 
impediment to consolidating the democratic system in South Africa, centres around 
diverging interpretations of the principles that constitute our democratic order. It was 
argued in chapter three and four, that two diverging views on democracy are prevalent 
in South Africa, one the liberal model of democracy, the other the liberationist model. 
It was furthermore advocated that these paradigms to democracy can be placed within 
a larger cultural framework, strengthening the idea that those on either side of the 
debate surrounding democracy, are informed by deeper and fundamental cultural 
orientations, the high-context and low-context cultural frameworks.  
 
The argument was also advanced that the ruling ANC falls within the liberationist 
model of democracy, due to the organisation’s conception of the people, equality, the 
role of the state and the very goal of the democratic project. This claim is supported 
by the idea that democracy is geared towards serving the needs of a specific group 
and that the complete control of state apparatus is acceptable for such a pursuit, along 
with the normative priority of a specific community as opposed to all individuals 
within society.  
 
Chapter one showed that the process of land dispossession was long and protracted, 
and largely facilitated through successive legislative assaults on African land 
ownership. This long process of dispossession, created a lasting imprint on the social 
consciousness of Africans. Being classified as second class citizens and denied 
fundamental rights such as land ownership had an influence in how Africans view the 
very nature and process of democracy.  
 
It was further proposed, that during the period of South Africa’s transition and 
subsequent negotiations, negotiations were moved forward at the expense of issues 
such as what constitutes democracy and meanings associated with the Constitution — 
these fundamental differences were largely ignored (du Toit, 2003; du Toit, 2006). 
‘Social rifts’ are clearly visible in the public’s opinion of land reform (du Toit, 2004 
(b)). The result from the previous chapter show that there are indeed diverging views 
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amongst the populace, and to some extent the elites, on the governments land reform 
programme. It was shown that amongst the different racial groups, there is strong 
polarisation concerning support for the government’s land reform programme, with 
black respondents showing strong support for land reform whilst whites are opposed 
to land reform, with coloured and Indian respondents tending to take a moderate 
stance. 
 
6.1 Diverging interpretations 
 
In a country where the overwhelming majority of the population attach substantive 
and instrumental connotations to democracy (Bratton and Mattes, 2001), mobilising 
the public around issues relating to material quality of life becomes a political lever 
that can have severe ramifications on the consolidation of democracy. Bratton and 
Mattes (2001:454-459) argue that Africans in South Africa attach material 
improvements in living standard to the meaning of democracy. For many South 
Africans, democracy is viewed as a means of improving their material well-being, it is 
seen as the next cite of the liberation struggle — democracy is more about substantive 
goals than about procedural norms. The findings of this research study echo the 
findings of Bratton and Mattes (2001), with the overwhelming majority of black 
South Africans surveyed supporting the government’s land reform programme. If 
socio-economic considerations are paramount in the meaning associated with 
democracy, then these same meanings can be attached to what is hoped land reform 
will achieve. The Africans view of democracy is as much about social transformation 
as it is about political rights, a view that is echoed in the findings of this research 
study.  
 
Through the views of respondents on land reform, the researcher was able to place 
them within the theoretical debate on normative subscriptions to democracy. It was 
found that most black South Africans subscribe to the liberationist model of 
democracy. This view holds that the transformation project is geared towards serving 
the needs of the majority of black South Africans, who view democracy primarily as a 
means of improving their quality of life. The liberationists also hold specific views on 
how to achieve such transformation, and are willing to curtail individual freedoms and 
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rights in order to achieve the goals of democracy. Furthermore, the views of the black 
respondents in the general population survey find resonance in the manner in which 
the parliamentarians and civil servants view the same issues. The liberationist 
democratic project favours the advancement of substantive ends rather than the 
procedural norms which would ensure democratic survival and consolidation.  
 
6.2 Dangers posed by the liberationist project 
 
Gagiano and du Toit (1996) warn that the liberationist project runs the risk of 
degenerating into a corrupt system of government because public and parochial 
interests are not separated. Based on the data presented in this study, this is a very real 
possibility due to the congruence observed amongst black South Africans and some 
sectors in the elite population. If elites (parliamentarians and civil servants) can enact 
policies and programmes to satisfy the needs of the majority at the expense of the 
minorities and abrogate their rights, the democratic system runs the risk of becoming 
what Zakaria (1997) has labelled an illiberal democracy. For the elites 
(parliamentarians and civil servants) would be able to enact, pass and implement 
polices and programmes that discriminate against minorities and abrogate their rights 
under the guise of a democratic order.  
 
It is conceivable that land reform policies such as expropriation without fair 
compensation or deliberation could become a reality. Supported by the majority of 
black South Africans, this can have grave implications on the democratic project, as is 
illustrated by the Zimbabwean case. The erosion of minority rights would not be 
viewed as anti-democratic, as democracy is equated to improving the lives of the 
African majority. The danger is not to the continuation of democracy, but to 
constitutional liberalism which holds dear the principles of the protection of property 
rights and the rule of law (Zakaria, 1997: 25).  
 
This is a very real prospect, considering diverging views held by South Africans on an 
issue as fundamental as the meaning of our Constitution and democracy. The results 
of the survey suggest that it is highly likely that white and black South Africans do 
not attach the same meaning to democracy and to our Constitution. The results of the 
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survey compel the researcher to echo the views of du Toit (2003:113) who argues that 
“…the chasm of meaning about South Africa’s transition remains.”. It is unlikely that 
we will be able to consolidate democracy if we continue to hold diverging and 
conflicting views on concepts such as democracy and the very meaning of the 
Constitution. The ambiguities of the negotiated settlement and the meanings of the 
constitution need to be revisited, and all ambiguities spelled out in order for the 
democratic project to be successful (du Toit, 2003:114).  
 
The nature of the rule of law in South Africa, and more pertinently, the inclusion of 
justiciable socio-economic rights and the limitations of rights clause, creates a unique 
character to the normative legal framework in South Africa. The Constitution allows 
for redistributive policies and for the creation of an equal society. The vagaries 
surrounding normative meanings associated with concepts such as freedom, liberty 
and equality, can allow for the implementation of laws that abrogate the rights of the 
individual, and steer the country down a questionable path with respect to the 
consolidation of democracy. It is possible that laws can be created which disregard the 
fundamental principles of our Constitution and the democratic project. The land 
reform programme provides a good example of this. If the issue is not addressed with 
more earnest, increasingly restrictive and proscriptive laws can be created that will 
transfer ownership of land to Africans while disregarding the rights of the property 
owner, at the expense of procedural norms of democracy. Once such a process is 
initiated, it will be difficult to stop, for if minority property rights can be subjected, 
subjugating political and civil liberties of minorities within a legal framework is not 
such an unrealistic prospect.  
 
It is argued that the ruling ANC is aligned to the liberationist model of democracy, 
that in turn finds resonance in the high-context cultural framework which has further 
implications for the functioning of the ‘rule of law’. For high-context cultures, 
contracts are not fixed and do not need to remain as they were negotiated initially. It 
is a real possibility that the laws governing the protection of property rights and 
expropriation could be changed in order to accelerate land reform. These changes 
would tend to favour the community over the individual, further placing strain on 
individual property rights and the impartial functioning of the ‘rule of law’.  
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6.3 Consolidating the South African democratic project 
 
Land reform provides the government of South Africa with a golden opportunity of 
fostering democratic consolidation. It is an issue that straddles the economic, social 
and political divide, and successful land reform through legal MLAR and adherence 
to constitutional prescriptions could provide proof to the majority of South Africans 
that not only does democracy preserve the civil and political rights of all, it can offer a 
better life to those who are impoverished, landless and bereft of hope. It will, 
however, require a far greater degree of political will, administrative effectiveness and 
willingness by all parties involved to make it work. Although the results of the survey 
suggest stark polarisation of South Africans on the issue of land reform, it was seen 
amongst white respondents that opinions regarding emotive issues are not cast in 
stone and can change over time. The apparent willingness amongst whites to curtail 
their vehement opposition to land reform can be viewed as a sign of hope. For if white 
South Africans can change their views, black South Africans can do the same. It will 
be necessary however, to provide the majority of black South Africans with a belief in 
democracy, trust that it can bring them a better life, one that is less oppressed and 
wherein economic hardships are not as severely felt. That democracy can provide a 
way of life that can undo some of the injustices brought about by oppressive white 
rule and the harsh realities of the capitalist system.  
 
Although there is scant evidence of the government being able to successfully 
implement land reform amongst severe economic constrains, administrative 
deficiencies and general distrust by landowners of the land reform programme, it is by 
no means an impossibility. For, if all South Africans, irrespective of race, cultural 
orientation, social status or language, are willing to believe, not only in themselves, 
but in our country and in all that has been achieved, I have no doubt that we will 
overcome the difficulties of consolidating our democracy. It is, however, a hopeful 
assessment and the reality is that if the millions of impoverished South Africans do 
not experience tangible improvements in their lives, the democratic project runs the 
risk of falling short of a consolidated democracy. It cannot be expected of the 
impoverished masses to continue supporting a system that leaves them bereft of hope 
and promised material improvements. It is expected that the call for increased 
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interventionist strategies by the state to alleviate poverty and inequality will only 
increase, thus placing greater strain on the functioning of the rule of law and 
consequently, democratic consolidation.  
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